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Many dimensions of applied ethics appeal to consequentialist moral theories to 
evaluate the moral permissibility of an action, practice, or policy. But such an 
approach risks obscuring other, non-consequentialist concerns. In line with this 
worry, this dissertation seeks to clarify and morally examine three phenomena that 
may compound the disadvantages that members of historically and currently 
disadvantaged groups face: microaggressions, the promotion of prenatal testing for 
selective abortion, and the allocation of scarce medical resources.  
Chapter 1, “Disadvantage in Context,” describes the notion of disadvantage 
that is relevant to this dissertation and explains the relation between Chapters 2-4.  
Chapter 2, “Microaggressions: What’s the Big Deal?” argues that the standard 
view of microaggressions, which holds that microaggressions are harmful because 
they express devaluing messages about members of disadvantaged groups, is too 
underdeveloped both for identifying microaggressions and for explaining why they 
  
are morally objectionable. I then offer an improved account of microaggressions 
according to which it is the content of what is expressed that determines when 
microaggressions are morally objectionable. 
Chapter 3, “When Is the Promotion of Prenatal Testing for Selective Abortion 
Wrong?” addresses the imprecisions of the expressivist objection to prenatal testing, 
which maintains that when medical professionals promote the use of prenatal testing 
for abortion on grounds of disability, they express a harmful, devaluing message to 
and about extant disabled people. I then offer an improved formulation of this 
objection according to which the promotion of prenatal testing for selective abortion 
is sometimes wrong. 
Chapter 4, “Indirect Benefits and Double Jeopardy in the Allocation of 
Scarce, Lifesaving Resources,” examines the question of whether or not benefits to 
third parties, e.g., saving their lives or improving socioeconomic conditions, should 
count when resources are scarce and not all can be saved. By recruiting the notion of 
‘double jeopardy,’ which, as I argue, can be understood in two distinct ways, I aim to 
give a stronger foundation for the idea that counting indirect benefits such as social 
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Chapter 1: Disadvantage in Context 
 
Disadvantage, it may be argued, refers to unfavorable conditions that make attaining a 
certain end, or good, more difficult than it would be in normal conditions. For 
example, if an individual’s end is living a good life but she struggles with poverty, 
lack of proper education, poor health, or discrimination, she would be at a 
disadvantage if normal conditions for living a good life exclude such factors.  
In the contemporary U.S., the difficulty of attaining ends involving, e.g., 
education, earnings, health, among others, seems to vary depending on characteristics 
such as gender, race, ethnicity, ability, among others. For example, according to the 
U.S. Department of Labor, blacks and Hispanics fare worse than whites and Asians, 
and people with disabilities fare worse than people without disabilities, across all of 
the work force characteristics examined by the report: educational attainment, 
occupation, earnings, and employment status.1 Women are also reported to fare 
poorly in terms of earnings when compared with men: e.g., in 2014, the median 
weekly earnings of women who worked full time was 83 percent of men’s median 
weekly earnings.2 Similar disparities exist beyond the work force: e.g., in terms of life 
                                               
1 That blacks and Hispanics perform worse across these factors is a trend that has been 
recorded by the U.S. Department of Labor since at least 2007 (U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics 
2008). 
2 Although note that “[w]omen's earnings as a percentage of men's varied by occupation. 





expectancy and other key health outcomes. For example, while cardiovascular disease 
is the leading cause of death in the U.S., “[n]on-Hispanic black adults are at least 50% 
more likely to die of heart disease or stroke prematurely (i.e., before age 75 years) 
than their non-Hispanic white counterparts” (U.S. Department of Health and Human 
Services, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention 2013).3 Even infants who 
belong to certain social groups are at a disadvantage in terms of mortality rates: 
among non-Hispanic blacks, the mortality rate for infants is more than double that for 
non-Hispanic whites.  
As these data suggest, the disadvantages that members of certain social groups 
face in the contemporary U.S. are not isolated; rather, they tend to cluster.4 In other 
words, people who are at a disadvantage in terms of, e.g., socioeconomic status, are 
also at a disadvantage in terms of, e.g., educational attainment and health outcomes. 
Furthermore, these disadvantages are not ahistorical; rather, they would seem in part 
to be the product of a long history of legal (and other) mistreatment of members of 
the relevant social groups. For example, when women weren’t legally able to vote or 
                                               
were 91 percent of the earnings of their male counterparts” (U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics 
2016). 
3 Moreover, according the World Health Organization, today, lower socioeconomic status is 
linked to “poor health, more stress and lower self-confidence” (The World Health 
Organization 2017). Given these data, it would not be unreasonable to suppose that members 
of socio-economically disadvantaged groups, e.g., women, blacks, Hispanics, among others, 
may generally be at higher risk of illness than other groups. 





own property, or to accuse their husbands of rape—because rape was defined by the 
law in a way that “excluded a husband’s rape of his wife from the prohibited 
conduct”—they were clearly at a legal disadvantage (Hellman 2008, 14). When 
blacks were legally forced into chattel slavery and when they were not legally 
allowed to vote or use the same public facilities as whites, they, too, were clearly at a 
legal disadvantage. When disabled people were not able to get to work, and when 
disabled children were not able to obtain a public education because appropriate 
public accommodations were not legally required, people with disabilities were also 
clearly at a legal disadvantage. 
Talk of legal and historical disadvantage may seem overblown. In the 
contemporary U.S., segregation is illegal, women and blacks are able to vote, people 
with disabilities are legally owed accommodations, etc. In other words, the law has 
been challenged and reformed such that a wider subset of the population is now under 
its protection. This fact may lend itself to the idea that people who are at a 
disadvantage today—e.g., in terms of attaining ends involving education, earnings, or 
health—are morally responsible for the conditions that prevent them from attaining 
such ends. For instance, one might think that individuals may be responsible for not 
informing themselves about the benefits of education, or about ways to find 
employment or more affordable healthcare. But one need not discard the importance 
of individual responsibility to appreciate that the current political, economic, and 
social conditions of the U.S. do not function independently of prior states of affairs. 





disadvantage with respect to the law remain at a disadvantage today, although today it 
is with respect to a different set of factors. 
In light of these ongoing patterns of disadvantage, various policies and 
practices have been criticized for presenting further, though often subtle, problems for 
members of disadvantaged groups in their interactions with individuals as well as 
institutions. In three standalone papers, this dissertation examines three such 
practices: microaggressions, the promotion of prenatal testing by medical 
professionals, and the allocation of scarce medical resources by governmental 
institutions. 
Microaggressions are said to be brief, commonplace, and often unintentional 
slights and insults toward members of disadvantaged groups. An example might be 
saying to an academic who is black “You are so articulate” which, according to the 
standard view of microaggressions, expresses the harmful message “It is unusual for 
someone of your race to be intelligent” (Sue, et al. 2007). Similarly, according to 
supporters of the expressivist objection to prenatal testing, promoting prenatal testing 
for abortion on grounds of disability expresses a harmful message to and about extant 
disabled people: e.g., that “Disabled people’s lives are not worth living” or that 
“Disabled people’s lives are not worthy of support.” Both microaggressions and the 
promotion of prenatal testing by medical professionals, then, have been said to be 
morally objectionable not because of what they do, but because of what they express.  
But as I argue in Chapters 2 and 3, the arguments for the view that these acts 
are morally objectionable because of what they express have thus far not been 





expressive nature of these acts and others. This framework originates in the idea that 
agents often communicate much more than they explicitly state; they often 
communicate implied meanings—or, to use the technical term: implicatures. 
Implicatures are meanings that are not explicitly stated but are nonetheless 
intentionally communicated. As I argue, however, agents also often unintentionally 
communicate—through the relevant actions—information about some of the attitudes 
or value judgments that they hold: what I call hyper-implicature. In my view, it’s the 
content of an agent’s implicature and hyper-implicature that determines the moral 
relevance of her action. 
Chapter 2, “Microaggressions: What’s the Big Deal?” thus has two main aims. 
First, I offer a stronger view of what microaggressions are. I argue that a 
microaggression occurs when an agent hyper-implicates—or, unintentionally 
reveals—an attitude or value judgment about another in virtue of the other’s 
membership in some social group. Then, I examine what makes microaggressions 
wrong. In my view, the kinds of attitudes that agents hyper-implicate in a 
microaggression can be categorized into (at least) two types of attitude: those that are 
descriptive—e.g., “In the U.S., Latinos have a higher rate of unemployment than 
whites”—and those that are moral or evaluative—e.g., “Blacks are morally inferior to 
whites.” Only the latter, I argue, obviously involve a moral error on the part of the 
agent: an error that amounts to a failure to recognize the moral standing of another 






Chapter 3, “When Is the Promotion of Prenatal Testing for Selective Abortion 
Wrong?” offers an improved formulation of the expressivist objection to prenatal 
testing: what I call the expressivist objection*. In my view, when medical 
professionals engage in the action of promoting prenatal testing for selective abortion, 
they sometimes express implied messages that can be about extant disabled people. 
Moreover, sometimes expressing these messages amounts to the medical 
professional’s violating a duty to obtain informed consent from her patient to run tests 
that might present the patient with the choice of terminating the pregnancy on 
grounds of disability. If, for example, a medical professional expresses to her patient 
that “Adults with Down syndrome have no independence,” she would seem to 
express an attitude that is inaccurate or misleading, as research suggests that adults 
with Down syndrome can lead independent lives so long as they have the appropriate 
resources. Thus, insofar as this medical professional would communicate inaccurate 
or misleading information about, e.g., the reasons one might have for considering 
prenatal testing for selective abortion, to her patient, she would seem to violate a duty 
to obtain informed consent to run such tests and would thereby act wrongly.  
Chapter 4, “Indirect Benefits and Double Jeopardy in the Allocation of 
Scarce, Lifesaving Resources,” turns to the policy question of how scarce medical 
resources, such as kidneys, should be allocated. Bioethicists generally assume that it 
would be wrong for a scarce resource allocation scheme to count indirect benefits 
such as social contribution. But the arguments for this view are surprisingly weak. By 
recruiting the notion of ‘double jeopardy,’ I seek to offer a stronger foundation for the 





contribution would be morally objectionable. As I argue, ‘double jeopardy’ can be 
understood in a weak sense, according to which an allocation scheme may bring 
about injustice, and in a strong sense, according to which an allocation scheme may 
compound injustice. In the contemporary U.S., for example, a policy that counted 
indirect benefits, e.g., in terms of economic contribution, would likely put black 
Americans in strong double jeopardy. This, I argue, would seem to be worse than if 
such a policy were to put black Americans in weak double jeopardy because the 
allocating entity would seem to be the same entity that brought about the original 
injustice on which the second injustice is based. This view would seem to have 
implications for how we think of other allocation schemes, including those that make 
assumptions about the value of life with disability. 
Each of these chapters is written so that it is independent of all the others. The 












Chapter 2: Microaggressions: What’s the Big Deal? 
 
Introduction 
‘Microaggressions’ are said to involve brief and commonplace verbal, behavioral, or 
environmental indignities, whether intentional or unintentional, that communicate 
slights and insults toward members of disadvantaged groups (Sue, et al. 2007). 
Harvard psychiatrist Chester Pierce coined the term in 1970 to denote minor slights 
and insults directed at racial minorities; but today the term is used to denote slights 
and insults directed at members of various other disadvantaged groups, including 
women; individuals who are lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender or transsexual; Asian-
Americans; Hispanic-Americans; Muslim-Americans; as well as individuals who are 
obese (Lilienfeld 2017, Sue 2017). This latter use of the term originated in a 2007 
paper by psychologist Derald Wing Sue and his coauthors, who are now taken to be 
the pioneers of the concept of microaggressions. In their view microaggressions are 
harmful because they send devaluing messages to individuals who are members of 
disadvantaged groups. 
Sue et al.’s view has been widely influential yet quite controversial. 
Numerous businesses and college campuses have jumped on board what is sometimes 
called the ‘microaggression research program,’ or simply the ‘microaggression 
program’: real-world efforts aimed at counteracting microaggressions. Yet the 
program has been criticized incessantly, primarily on the basis of the negative 





unwarranted restrictions on free speech,5 worsen racial tensions,6 and help create a 
culture of victimhood7—not only in college campuses but in society at large.8  
While both the concept of microaggressions and the microaggression program 
have received quite a bit of attention from psychologists and from the media, 
philosophers have been almost entirely absent from the debate.9 Admittedly, Regina 
Rini defends the moral importance of microaggressions in a Los Angeles Times op-ed, 
arguing that we should not conceive of microaggressions as part of a new “culture of 
                                               
5 See, for example, Lukianoff and Haidt (2015). 
6 See, for example, Haidt and Jussim (2016).  
7 See, for example, Campbell and Manning (2014).  
8 Interestingly, a parallel could be drawn between the debate on microaggressions and that of 
political correctness, as understood by Dan Moller (2016). I won’t explore this point further, 
but as Moller writes, “…political correctness is distinctive, and a distinctively left 
phenomenon… Those attempting to shape discourse on the right are rarely moved by feeling 
sorry for some group and rarely make corresponding objections focused on avoiding offense” 
(2016, 92). 
9 Some psychologists have suggested that microaggressions may contribute to psychological 
disturbances such as anxiety and depression (Sue et al. 2007, 279). It’s worth noting, though, 
that there is no evidence yet that the purported negative effects on individuals’ mental states 
or mental health are actual. This lack of evidence suggests that while it may be quite intuitive 
to think that experiences of microaggressions may potentially damage a minority individual’s 
mental health, to claim that microaggressions have such causal power has yet to be explored. 





victimhood,”10 as critics suggest, but as signs of the work that needs to be done in 
order to attain a culture of solidarity: “a culture in which no one is denied full moral 
recognition” (Rini 2015).11 Moreover, Emily McTernan (2017) argues that 
microaggressions constitute “a distinctive form of injustice,” as they “form a social 
practice that contributes to structures of oppression and marginalization.” 
Nevertheless, philosophical attention has been lacking both with regard to the 
coherence of the concept of microaggressions, as well as with regard to non-
consequentialist moral concerns that microaggressions may give rise to. For example, 
as I will argue, microaggressions may reveal a moral failure in the agent who engages 
in the microaggression, independently of the consequences of his action, but the 
debate has focused only on what microaggressions mean for their victims. This paper 
is a call for political and moral philosophers to engage in the microaggressions 
debate, for, as will become clear throughout the paper, microaggressions involve a 
social practice that can be morally objectionable in a multitude of ways. 
The aim of this paper is twofold. First, I argue that insofar as Sue et al.’s 
notion of microaggressions implicitly appeals to subjective and utilitarian principles, 
it has hurt rather than helped the microaggression program. More specifically, insofar 
as it holds that microaggressions lie in the eye of the beholder and are by definition 
harmful, it offers little guidance for preventing microaggressions. If the concept of 
                                               
10 See, for example, Campbell and Manning (2014). 
11 Rini is also working on a book, The Ethics of Microaggressions, forthcoming, 2019. See 
also Tschaepe (2016), who argues that “[m]icroaggressions cause epistemic injustice and 





microaggressions is going to be useful for the microaggression program, I suggest, 
then it must distance itself from subjective and utilitarian principles and endorse, 
instead, both a more objective framework to identify when a microaggression has 
occurred, and a broader moral framework to determine when a microaggression is 
morally objectionable. 
My second aim is to offer some grounding ideas for a more useful concept of 
microaggressions. I argue that microaggressions belong to a class of actions that 
communicate more than is explicitly stated or intentionally implied; they 
communicate certain kinds of beliefs or attitudes that the agent of a microaggression 
seemingly holds.12 I refer to such beliefs or attitudes as hyper-implicatures. 
Specifically, I argue that these hyper-implicatures are about some social group to 
which the agent of a microaggression takes the interpreter of the microaggression to 
belong to. On this view, it is the content of a hyper-implicature that is subject to 
moral evaluation. In some cases, an agent who engages in a microaggression may 
hyper-implicate a descriptive attitude about another agent that is inaccurate or 
misleading: e.g., “Latin Americans like spicy food.” In other cases, an agent who 
engages in a microaggression may hyper-implicate an evaluative, or moral, attitude 
about another that is demeaning: e.g., “Blacks are morally inferior to whites.” A 
‘demeaning attitude,’ as I define it here, involves a failure on the part of the agent to 
                                               
12 I say “seemingly” to allow for cases in which an agent acts in a way that communicates a 
collective attitude without actually holding that attitude, as well as cases in which the agent 
does hold the attitude she communicates in her action. I elaborate on this distinction a bit in 





regard another appropriately.13 The idea that I defend is that while hyper-implicating 
both descriptive and demeaning attitudes can raise moral concerns (e.g., if it 
foreseeably causes indignation, irritation, offense, etc., in the interpreter of the 
action), hyper-implicating a demeaning attitude would seem to contain a moral error 
and would thereby be morally objectionable even if no one was caused any pain.  
The paper proceeds as follows. In Section 1, I explain Sue et al.’s notion of 
microaggressions in more detail. In Section 2, I elucidate two of its major 
shortcomings: it leads to counterintuitive claims because it is unnecessarily subjective 
with respect to how to identify a microaggression and unnecessarily utilitarian with 
respect to what makes microaggressions morally objectionable. In Section 3, I appeal 
to some concepts from the philosophy of language to develop a more objective 
framework for identifying when a microaggression has occurred. In Section 4, I 
develop that framework by considering the claim that it is the content of the attitudes 
that are hyper-implicated that makes a microaggression morally objectionable. 
Finally, Section 5 discusses some implications of the framework I propose, including 
the noteworthy implication that microaggressions are a kind of phenomenon whose 
target are not just members of disadvantaged groups. 
                                               
13 Indeed, as I will argue, demeaning attitudes may illustrate a failure of what Stephen 
Darwall calls recognition respect, such that if an agent hyper-implicates a demeaning 
attitude, she reveals a kind of morally objectionable error that is independent of the 





1. Sue et al.’s view of microaggressions   
In their seminal paper on microaggressions, Sue et al. are primarily concerned with 
microaggressions that occur in the context of clinical practice. Their worry is that 
white therapists may commit microaggressions against their non-white patients, 
thereby preventing successful therapeutic relationships with them.14 But the examples 
they offer involve a broader social context. For example, Sue et al. maintain that: 
                                               
14 For this reason, Sue et al. are careful to taxonomize microaggressions into three categories: 
microassaults, microinsults, and microinvalidations. I will not address these specific 
categories in this paper, but here is how Sue et al. define these terms (Sue et al. at p. 274):  
Microassault: “an explicit racial derogation characterized primarily by a verbal or 
nonverbal attack meant to hurt the intended victim through name-calling, avoidant 
behavior, or purposeful discriminatory actions. Referring to someone as ‘colored’ or 
‘Oriental,’ using racial epithets, discouraging interracial interactions, deliberately 
serving a White patron before someone of color, and displaying a swastika are 
examples. Microassaults are most similar to what has been called “old fashioned” 
racism conducted on an individual level.” 
Microinsult: “is characterized by communications that convey rudeness and 
insensitivity and demean a person’s racial heritage or identity. Microinsults represent 
subtle snubs, frequently unknown to the perpetrator, but clearly convey a hidden 
insulting message to the recipient of color.” 
Microinvalidations: “are characterized by communications that exclude, negate, or 
nullify the psychological thoughts, feelings, or experiential reality of a person of 
color. When Asian Americans (born and raised in the United States) are 





1. Asking a minority-individual “Where are you from?” “Where were you 
born?” or telling her “Your English is great” sends the message “You are 
not American” or “You are foreign.” 
2. Saying “Everyone can succeed in this society if they work hard enough” 
sends the message “People of color are lazy and/or incompetent and need 
to work harder.” 
3. Clutching on to one’s purse and crossing the street at the sight of a person 
of color approaching sends the message “You are a criminal” or “You are 
going to steal.” 
4. Mistaking a person of color for a service worker sends the message 
“People of color are servants to whites. They couldn’t possibly occupy 
high-status positions.” 
5. The overabundance of liquor stores in communities of color sends the 
message “People of color are deviant.” (Sue et al. 2007, 276-277) 
Straightaway, one may be hesitant to accept that these actions actually express 
the messages that Sue et al. claim they express, as at least some of these messages 
                                               
born, the effect is to negate their U.S. American heritage and to convey that they are 
perpetual foreigners.” 
Note that while all of these terms have some overlap, the term ‘microinsult’ seems to be 
closest to the phenomenon I am concerned with in this paper. ‘Microassaults’ seem to be 
more clearly a case of overt discrimination, and ‘microinvalidations’ may be a subset of 
microinsults that may be more adequately described as instances of what Miranda Fricker 





seem hyperbolic or groundless.15 One may also object to such a heterogeneous set of 
examples, as it may evoke a sense that too much may count as a microaggression in 
Sue et al.’s view. I will return to these concerns in Section 2. For now, let us grant 
that these examples do constitute microaggressions. In other words, let us grant that 
the actions described in each example do express the hurtful messages that Sue et al. 
claim they express. What I want to highlight is that the main characteristic of Sue et 
al.’s view is that it is entirely victim-focused—both in terms of identifying a 
microaggression and in terms of explaining why it is morally objectionable.   
Consider the following passage: 
When a White employer tells a prospective candidate of color ‘I believe the most 
qualified person should get the job, regardless of race’ or when an employee of color 
is asked ‘How did you get your job?’, the underlying message from the perspective of 
the recipient may be twofold: (a) People of color are not qualified, and (b) as a 
minority group member, you must have obtained the position through some 
affirmative action or quota program and not because of ability. (Sue et al. 2007, 274) 
In this passage, Sue et al. suggest that the messages that a microaggression 
expresses will depend, in part, on the context in which the microaggression occurs. 
The relevant contextual factors seem to include the group membership of the agent of 
the microaggression, the group membership of the ‘victim’ of the microaggression, 
and the conversational topic between them: e.g., one about race, merit, job 
                                               





appointments, etc.16 Nevertheless, the passage also suggests that despite these 
contextual factors, microaggressions ultimately “lie in the eye of the beholder”17: the 
message that the white employer’s comment expresses just is what the prospective 
employee of color takes it to be. Indeed, Sue et al. later write that “the [victim of the 
microaggression] must determine whether a microaggression has occurred” (Sue et al. 
2007, 279). In other words, microaggressions involve comments that express certain 
messages from the perspective of the microaggressee. Sue et al.’s view thus appeals 
to the subjective judgment of the victim in order to determine whether a 
microaggression has occurred. That is, Sue et al.’s view is subjective in nature. The 
question “How did you get the job?” becomes a microaggression only if the recipient 
of the question judges that such a question sends a harmful underlying message. 
Moreover, for Sue et al. microaggressions are harmful by definition: they send 
underlying harmful messages from the perspective of the microaggressee. What 
makes these messages harmful is that when communicated they cause various kinds 
of suffering in victims of microaggressions. For example, imagine that you are a 
person of color and a white person says to you something that suggests that “People 
of color are not qualified” for a certain job or that minority-individuals obtain jobs 
“through some affirmative action or quota program and not because of ability.” Such 
an action would naturally cause indignation or offense (at the very least), for it says 
                                               
16 Interestingly, these criteria have been endorsed by the University of California Santa Cruz, 
which has published a list of microaggressions that are not be permitted on campus, including 
the statement “America is the Land of Opportunity.” See Williams (2018). 





something negative about a social group to which you are perceived to belong to or to 
which you take yourself to belong to—or so Sue et al. suggest. 
But Sue et al. are concerned with more than just indignation or offense. 
Consider asking someone who ‘looks’ Asian, Hispanic, Muslim, etc., “Where are you 
from?” or “Where are you really from?” According to Sue et al., such questions, 
when directed at a member of a disadvantaged social group, communicate that he 
does not belong to some dominant social group—e.g., with regard to race, ethnicity, 
religious views, etc. In the clinical context, Sue et al. suggest, the mere highlighting 
of this fact may be enough to cause in patients a feeling of being misunderstood, 
which may result in a kind of reluctance to form a meaningful relationship with their 
therapist. In the broader social context, the highlighting of an individual’s lack of 
membership in some dominant group may cause a more general feeling of exclusion, 
perhaps even alienation from one’s society.  
Furthermore, Sue et al. indicate, microaggressions may put microaggressees in 
something of an internal double-bind. For example, if a microaggressee points out a 
microaggression, she risks being perceived as overly sensitive or paranoid, but if she 
does not point out the microaggression, she risks tacitly endorsing the continuance of 
such a microaggression. Such a predicament can, in turn, cause feelings of paranoia 
(“What if I’m exaggerating?”) or of being gaslighted (“She can’t possibly be serious; 
she must be messing with me”).18   
                                               
18 For example, a member of a minority group who is given the intended compliment “You 
are so articulate” may wonder whether this is a microaggression: did the complimenter say 





The takeaway here is that on Sue et al.’s view microaggressions are morally 
objectionable because, by expressing harmful messages, they cause various kinds of 
negative mental states in microaggressees, including indignation, offense, alienation, 
paranoia, anxiety, among others. We can thus think of Sue et al.’s view as sharing a 
feature with utilitarianism, as it locates the harm of microaggressions in the negative 
mental states that victims of microaggressions experience as a result of the messages 
that microaggressions send.  
In short, because on Sue et al.’s view a microaggression occurs if the ‘victim’ 
of some action has been caused a negative mental state by the messages he takes the 
action to express, their view is entirely victim-focused—both in terms of how to 
determine when a microaggression has occurred (it is up to the victim of the 
microaggression), and in terms of what makes a microaggression morally problematic 
(it causes negative mental states in the victim of the microaggression). 
2. Some shortcomings of Sue et al.’s view 
As I mentioned earlier, Sue et al.’s view has served as the foundation for the 
‘microaggression program’: efforts adopted by businesses and college campuses 
                                               
minority individual? As Lilienfeld reports, a shortcoming of the concept of microaggressions 
is that they “are often or usually extremely ambiguous in nature, rendering it difficult or even 
impossible to ascertain whether they have actually occurred” (Lilienfeld 2017). Nevertheless, 
supporters of Sue et al.’s view, and McTernan, see this as one of the defining characteristics 
of microaggressions. In my view, however, this is not a defining feature of microaggressions, 





aimed at counteracting microaggressions. In the business world, companies such as 
Airbnb, Coca-Cola, Facebook, and, most recently, Starbucks have provided training 
aimed at preventing implicitly prejudicial or otherwise offensive comments and 
actions in the workplace (Fisher 2015, Scheiber and Abrams 2018). In the academic 
world, colleges and universities have distributed lists of microaggressions19 and 
sponsored round table discussions20 presumably to inform potential microaggressors 
about what kind of language is offensive to individuals who belong to historically or 
currently disadvantaged groups (hereafter: disadvantaged groups). Moreover, colleges 
and universities have also attempted to show support to “victims” of 
microaggressions by encouraging them to share their experiences on “Walls of 
                                               
19 For example, the University of California, Berkeley has distributed lists of 
microaggressions to encourage faculty and students not to engage in behaviors that may be 
offensive to minorities (Lilienfeld 2017, 139). See also footnote 16 above.  
20 For example, the University of Maryland, College Park has sponsored “round table 
discussions led by trained facilitators about the impact of microaggressions on the everyday 






Expression” distributed across campus,21 or by using certain ‘hashtags’ on social 
media.22 
 The microaggression program thus rests on Sue et al.’s idea that 
microaggressions psychologically harm minority individuals on a regular basis and in 
covert ways—e.g., by being ambiguous or by putting minority individuals in an 
internal double bind—and that these are harms that must be prevented. This is 
certainly a noble cause; but, as I argue in this section, Sue et al.’s notion of 
microaggression is currently too underdeveloped for that cause. In particular, because 
Sue et al.’s view is entirely victim-focused, it has had the effect of hurting rather than 
helping the microaggression program, as it offers little guidance both for preventing 
microaggressions and for explaining when they are morally objectionable.23 
                                               
21 The University of South Florida has tried to combat microaggressions via cross-campus 
“Walls of Expression,” on which students could write “any word that struck them as 
offensive,” no matter “if the word had been used to describe the student, if the student used it 
before or if the person simply viewed it as commonly out-of-context”: 
http://news.usf.edu/article/templates/?z=38&a=5326. Presumably, words said commonly out-
of-context involved words that were insulting and irrelevant to a particular conversation. 
22 For example, the University of Maryland has encouraged students to bring attention to the 
microaggressions they experience by using the hashtag “#ITooAmMaryland”: 
https://dsa.umd.edu/events/itooammaryland-responses-to-racial-microaggressions. 






As I mentioned in Section 1, on Sue et al.’s view, microaggressions express 
harmful messages from the perspective of minority individuals. One central objection 
to this claim is that Sue et al. offer no support for the idea that microaggressions 
actually express such harmful messages (Lilienfeld 2017). This objection has two 
interpretations. One is that there is no empirical evidence that microaggressions 
actually cause the negative mental states that Sue et al. claim they cause. As Scott O. 
Lilienfeld (2017) argues, it may be that the negative mental states that victims of 
microaggressions report are the result of certain personality traits that make some 
individuals hypersensitive, paranoid, or neurotic. Specifically, as Lilienfeld 
highlights, some individuals may have what is known as the personality trait of 
‘negative emotionality’: “a propensity toward depression and anxiety, and a tendency 
to react to stressful situations with unpleasant emotions.”24 Thus, Lilienfeld argues, it 
may be that some people are so sensitive that they may interpret interactions that need 
not be negative negatively. Without empirical data for the claim that 
microaggressions actually cause the harmed mental states that Sue et al. claim they 
cause, we can’t be sure that the messages expressed by microaggressions are actually 
harmful—or so Lilienfeld suggests.  
Sue has responded to this point that in applying the principle of skepticism to 
the study of microaggressions Lilienfeld negates the lived experiences of individuals 
who anecdotally report suffering as a result of microaggressions (Sue 2017, 171). I 
agree with Sue that there is plenty of anecdotal evidence of what he calls 






“microaggressive suffering” so I will set this worry aside.25 But, I want to restate, 
even if there is anecdotal evidence of such suffering, Sue et al.’s view currently offers 
little guidance for deciphering the content of the messages that microaggressions 
purportedly express. Specifically, they offer no support for claiming, for example, 
that mistaking a person of color for a service worker actually sends the message 
“People of color are servants to whites. They couldn’t possibly occupy high-status 
positions.” As Lilienfeld puts it, “there is no research evidence that the 
microaggressions identified by Sue et al. are linked, either probabilistically or 
inexorably, to these negative messages, as there are no data on what proportions of 
minority individuals interpret each microaggression in accord with the purported 
message” (Lilienfeld 2017, 146). In Section 3 I will offer a way to avoid this lack-of-
support objection. For now, let me elucidate the scope of this objection.  
The objection involves two worries. The first is empirical: there is no 
evidence that minority individuals actually interpret microaggressions to express the 
specific messages that Sue et al. claim they express. Now, this worry again fails to 
account for the vast testimonial evidence of experiences of microaggressions, so I 
will set it aside. The second worry, however, is theoretical: even if it turns out that 
minority individuals do interpret microaggressions to express the messages that Sue 
et al. claim they express, Sue et al. offer no theoretical background for justifying such 
                                               
25 A simple YouTube search for ‘things that white people say to <insert some minority-
group>’ reveals that the term has proved useful for many individuals who belong to 
disadvantaged groups to pick out all-too-familiar slights and insults that occur in their 





interpretations. That is so say, minority individuals may just be wrong in their 
interpretations of purported microaggressions.  
But herein lies the strongest case against Sue et al.’s notion of 
microaggressions: it is too underdeveloped. Consider again the case of mistaking a 
person of color for a service worker. The objection is that Sue et al. offer no 
theoretical foundation for favoring the interpretation that this action expresses 
“People of color are servants to whites. They couldn’t possibly occupy high-status 
positions” over, e.g., “The color of your shirt, not the color of your skin, suggested to 
me that you were a service worker.” Or, consider the case of asking a minority-
individual “Where were you born?” or telling her “Your English is great.” According 
to Sue et al., this kind of action sends the (offensive) message “You are not 
American” or “You are foreign”; but they offer no support for that interpretation over 
an interpretation such as “Where in the U.S. were you born?” 
The point here is this. An individual who chooses the interpretation that 
involves a message of disvalue over an alternative, more charitable interpretation 
could just be wrong, and Sue et al. offer no theoretical support for deeming the victim 
of the microaggression justified in interpreting an action as expressing a message of 
disvalue. Without a successful reply to this worry, one may be tempted to agree with 
Lilienfeld’s call to abandon the microaggression program. After all, if there is no 
theoretical support in favor of microaggressees’ interpretations of the messages that 
microaggressions purportedly express, it is unclear what the microaggression program 
is engaged in except for the prevention of free speech just in case someone, 





Sue et al. may respond in one of two ways. They may appeal to the idea that 
whites and nonwhites perceive racial relations in very different ways and claim that 
for this reason there is no fact of the matter regarding what microaggressions actually 
express. As Sue et al. put it,  
White Americans tend to believe that minorities are doing better in life, that 
discrimination is on the decline, that racism is no longer a significant factor in the 
lives of people of color, and that equality has been achieved. More important, the 
majority of Whites do not view themselves as racist or capable of racist behavior. 
(Sue et al. 2007, 277) 
Sue et al.’s suggestion is that an individual’s conception of race can radically affect 
the way she perceives the world, such that while an action may seem morally neutral 
to a white person who does not experience racism or discrimination on a regular 
basis, that same action may be perceived as an obvious instance of racism or 
discrimination to a person of color. But while this may be true, what Sue et al. seem 
to be suggesting is that there is no fact of the matter as to what is or is not racist—a 
point that does not seem viable. In other words, it seems wrong to say that there is no 
fact of the matter of whether or not an action is an instance of racism or 
discrimination, and to suggest that there is no fact of the matter of what an action 
such microaggression expresses. Surely there is some set of criteria that one might 
appeal to in order to determine whether an action is an instance of racism or 
discrimination. Similarly for what it is that a microaggression might express—a point 





Alternatively, Sue et al. may reply that microaggressions express the messages 
that Sue et al. claim they express only in certain contexts—contexts involving, e.g., a 
certain conversational topic and certain group memberships among the participants of 
the action. Specifically, they may suggest that some of the necessary conditions for a 
microaggression to occur may be that the microaggressor be a member of some 
dominant group and that the microaggressee be a member of some minority-group. 
But even if they did say this, such a set of criteria would seem to be much too vague 
for choosing one interpretation of a microaggression over another. Nevertheless, both 
of these responses that Sue et al. may offer may be supported by an appeal to the idea 
that microaggressions ultimately lie in the eye of the beholder: that it will ultimately 
be up to the victim of the microaggression to determine whether or not a 
microaggression occurred.  
But I believe that this response to the criticism that Sue et al. offer little 
theoretical support in favor of choosing one interpretation of what a microaggression 
expresses over another highlights one of the central shortcomings of Sue et al.’s view. 
In claiming that microaggressions lie in the eye of the beholder, Sue et al. focus on 
the point of view of the victim of a microaggression to a fault. Neither the intention of 
the agent nor any objective criteria for an action’s counting as a microaggression 
plays a role. The problem with this entirely subjective notion of microaggression is 
that it over- and under-extends—that is, too little and too much turns out to be a 
microaggression on Sue et al.’s view.26  
                                               





Suppose a black student constantly raises her hand in response to her teacher’s 
questions, but her teacher constantly calls on a white student first, partly because the 
teacher believes, explicitly or implicitly, that the black student, because she is black 
and likely less competent, will derail the class discussion. Now, while the teacher’s 
action may express a message of disvalue, if the black student does not experience the 
action as a slight or insult, then the action is not a microaggression—or so Sue et al. 
would seem to suggest. But this conclusion seems counterintuitive. Many of us would 
agree that even though the student does not register the teacher’s action as a 
microaggression, there is a sense in which something microaggression-like did occur. 
In a world in which for one reason or another no one realizes that such slights are 
occurring, microaggressions wouldn’t exist on Sue et al.’s view. Their view thus 
captures too little as a microaggression. 
Now, imagine that a socially conscientious teacher develops the following 
policy to avoid being a microaggressor: she will be careful not to automatically call 
on her white students first when she poses a question to her class. Suppose, further, 
that today she calls on a white student first because she does not see a nonwhite 
student raise his hand before the white student. On Sue et al.’s view, if the nonwhite 
student experiences the teacher’s action as expressing a slight or insult, the action 
would indeed be a microaggression—despite the teacher’s explicit intention not to 
engage in microaggressions. But, many of us would agree, that would be unfair to the 
teacher; agents don’t need to be infallible in terms of foreseeing others’ 
interpretations of what their actions express. Thus, the conclusion that the teacher’s 





as a microaggression.27 Because Sue et al.’s view is strictly subjective, then, in 
addition to capturing too little, it captures too much as a microaggression. 
Now, since the microaggression program appeals to Sue et al.’s notion of 
microaggressions, and since one of the main aims of the microaggression program is 
to prevent the occurrence of microaggressions, Sue et al.’s entirely subjective notion 
of microaggressions is unhelpful to that end, as it offers little guidance with regard to 
preventing microaggressions. Admittedly, Sue et al.’s notion of microaggressions 
does suggest that one should avoid actions that might be interpreted to express 
offensive messages to individuals who belong to disadvantaged groups; but it leaves 
the interpretation of the action entirely up to the victim of the purported 
                                               
27 Lilienfeld tries to illustrate this worry by citing an example that “both (a) ignoring and (b) 
attending to minority students in classrooms have been deemed to be microaggressions by 
some authors”: some see ignoring an Asian-American student who raises her hand as a 
microaggression, whereas others see complimenting a minority student as a microaggression. 
Lilienfeld worries that such variance in opinion leaves potential microaggressors—in this 
case, teachers—in a sort of double bind: “If they ignore minority students’ raised hands, they 
risk being accused of implicit prejudice; conversely, if they call on students and compliment 
them, they risk the same accusation” (Lilienfeld 2017, 150). Note, though, that it’s a mistake 
to think that these are the only two options for teachers. Teachers could try to avoid both 
ignoring and complimenting their minority students. Moreover, a teacher determined to avoid 
microaggressions could aim to compliment a student not because he is or isn’t a minority-





microaggression. This means that whether or not an agent engages in a 
microaggression may in many cases be out of her hands. 
Now, recall that according to Sue et al. microaggressions are harmful by 
definition: they express messages that cause negative mental states in individuals who 
belong to disadvantaged groups. Thus, in addition to appealing to subjective 
principles, Sue et al.’s view also shares an important feature with utilitarianism: it 
suggests that because the messages expressed by microaggressions (tend to) cause 
suffering rather than happiness, they make the world a worse place.28  
But this point suggests another shortcoming of Sue et al.’s view, for such a 
basis for the harm in microaggressions invites at least two serious worries. Suppose 
an individual who is tired of feeling hurt—e.g., slighted, offended, displaced, 
alienated, gaslighted, etc.—by the microaggressions he encounters left and right 
decides to adopt a stoic attitude towards such actions. Sue et al.’s view entails that if 
this individual does not feel hurt by the action, then the action isn’t harmful (and, 
moreover, that it isn’t a microaggression). But that again seems wrong. Many of us 
would agree that it would be much more appropriate to say that a morally problematic 
microaggression did occur, even though it did not harm the stoic individual.  
Now, insofar as Sue et al.’s view attributes the harm in microaggressions 
entirely to the negative mental states that microaggressions, in virtue of expressing 
                                               
28 As Mill put it, “Utility, or the Greatest Happiness Principle, holds that actions are right in 
proportion as they tend to promote happiness, wrong as they tend to produce the reverse of 
happiness. By happiness is intended pleasure, and the absence of pain; by unhappiness, pain, 





harmful messages, cause, it invites a popular objection to the microaggression 
program: that instead of encouraging individuals who belong to disadvantaged groups 
to look for microaggressions left and right, the microaggression program should train 
such individuals to be more resilient to these supposed slights and insults.29 I believe 
that this objection is misguided, but, as will become clear in the next section, it is 
avoidable if Sue et al. (a) move away from the idea that microaggressions are harmful 
by definition, and (b) broaden their understanding of what makes microaggressions 
morally objectionable. In short, the utilitarian feature of Sue et al.’s view captures 
only some of what may be objectionable about microaggressions, and thereby makes 
the microaggression program seem wrongheaded.   
To sum up this section: insofar as Sue et al.’s view is implicitly subjective, it 
captures too little and too much as a microaggression. Moreover, insofar as it is 
utilitarian in nature, it fails to account for intuitive cases of morally objectionable 
microaggressions and invites an undesirable yet avoidable objection: that the 
microaggression program should train minority individuals to be less sensitive. For 
these reasons, Sue et al.’s entirely victim-focused notion of microaggressions offers 
little guidance for avoiding microaggressions, and thus fails to provide the support 
that the microaggression program needs in order to be successful. 
If the concept of microaggressions is going to be taken seriously and if the 
microaggression program is going to have a defensible foundation, then we need to 
                                               
29 See, for example, Campbell and Manning (2014), Lukianoff and Haidt (2015), Haidt 





refine Sue et al.’s conception of microaggressions so that it is neither entirely 
subjective nor strictly utilitarian. In the rest of the paper, I offer some grounding ideas 
for such a project. Before doing so, however, let me stress that in highlighting that the 
concept of microaggressions must not be entirely subjective I do not intend to 
downplay the opinions or feelings of microaggressees. A more objective framework 
for identifying microaggressions is not committed to dismissing people’s wounded 
feelings. Indeed, that many people agree that some microaggressions are hurtful is 
one central reason why the phenomenon is in need of further scrutiny. Rather, in 
offering a more objective framework for identifying microaggressions, I want to 
highlight that microaggressions are a distinct kind of phenomenon and that there is 
more to what makes them morally objectionable than has been entertained in the 
debate on microaggressions thus far. 
3. Refining the concept of microaggressions: How to identify a microaggression  
I mentioned in Section 2 that Sue et al. offer no theoretical support for their 
interpretations of the messages that they claim microaggressions express. In this 
section, I argue that there are concepts in the philosophy of language that we can use 
to try to decipher what it is that microaggressions might express. Typically, when 
philosophers of language talk about meaning, they talk about two kinds of meaning: 
literal meaning and implied meaning. What I want to suggest is that given the 
vagueness of Sue et al.’s view, it’s easy to equate the ‘messages’ that they claim 
microaggressions express with the implied meanings that a speaker communicates in 
an utterance. But, as I will argue, this is a mistake, for microaggressions are a kind of 





meanings: it reveals some of the attitudes or value judgments that the agent of the 
microaggression seemingly holds.  
On Grice’s theory of implicature, our utterances communicate both literal 
meanings and implied meanings, or implicatures (Grice 1957). By the term 
‘implicature,’ Grice refers to the act of communicating something by saying 
something else. In other words, an implicature is what a speaker communicates by an 
utterance without saying it.30 For Grice, an implicature occurs if certain conditions are 
met, but for the purposes of this paper we don’t need to go into detail about what 
those conditions require; it will suffice to note that for Grice both the speaker’s 
intention and the hearer’s understanding play a central role in what the speaker 
implicates.31 Consider the following example. 
                                               
30 For Grice, implicatures can be conventional, or semantic, or conversational. I here focus 
only on the latter. See Grice (1989). 
31 Grice writes, 
A man who, by (in, when) saying (or making as if to say) that p has implicated that q, 
may be said to have conversationally implicated that q provided that (i) he is to be 
presumed to be observing the conversational maxims […]; (ii) the supposition that he 
is aware that, or thinks that, q is required in order to make his saying or making as if 
to say p (or doing so in those terms) consistent with this presumption; and (iii) the 
speaker thinks (and would expect the hearer to think that the speaker thinks) that it is 
within the competence of the hearer to work out, or grasp intuitively, that the 





Suppose that as you are leaving the office with a couple of friends, you 
suddenly remember that you forgot to turn off the light in your office, so you say to 
your friends, “I’ll be right back—I forgot to turn off the light!” Suppose, further, that 
one of your friends replies “Oh, but we don’t pay for electricity!” intentionally and 
successfully communicating that it’s fine for you to leave without going back to turn 
off the light. In this example, your friend conveys both a literal meaning and an 
implied meaning, or implicature. His literal meaning is the content of what he 
explicitly states: namely, that you do not pay for electricity; and his implied meaning, 
or implicature, is that it is fine for you to leave without going back to turn off the 
light.  
But notice that this is not all that your friend communicates. He also 
communicates—albeit unintentionally—additional information about his own set of 
beliefs or value judgments. This additional information is not equivalent to the 
meanings he communicates, but it can be inferred from them. For instance, your 
friend seems to also communicate that he holds a set of attitudes or value judgments 
that includes something along the lines of “It’s okay to unnecessarily waste 
resources,” “It’s okay to waste resources we don’t pay for,” “It’s not problematic to 
unnecessarily waste these resources,” etc.  
Now, determining exactly how to calculate the precise content of the attitudes 
that an agent communicates through an action is a project that is beyond the scope of 
this paper. What I want to do instead is suggest that we might conceive of this 
additional, unintentionally communicated information as part of the agent’s 





communicates through her utterance. Accordingly, if your friend did not hold an 
attitude such as “It’s okay to unnecessarily waste resources” or “It’s okay to waste 
resources we don’t pay for,” it would be difficult to explain, in this scenario, why he 
would remind you that you do not pay for those resources in order to communicate 
that it’s okay to leave without turning off the light.  
Note that the literal and implied meanings that your friend communicates also 
allow us to infer certain attitudes or value judgments that he must not hold. For 
example, we can infer that he seemingly does not hold an attitude such as “It is 
morally problematic to waste resources unnecessarily.” If he did hold such an 
attitude, it would be unclear why he would say what he said to imply what he 
implied.32 Nevertheless, regardless of whether the additional, unintentionally 
communicated information involves attitudes that your friend holds or attitudes he 
does not hold, what’s important for our purposes is that these attitudes are not part of 
the literal or implied meanings of the action—at least not in the sense I’ve described 
these meanings here. In other words, even though those attitudes or value judgments 
can arguably be inferred from your friend’s literal and implied meanings, they are not 
equivalent to those meanings.  
                                               
32 It’s worth noting that the set of beliefs we arrive at as an explanation for the literal and 
implied meanings of an action may be disputed by the agent. This need not mean that the set 
of belief we arrive at is wrong; agents do not have transparent introspective access to their 
own attitudes (See Carruthers 2011). But it does suggest that there may be cases in which an 
agent only seemingly holds the set of beliefs that we infer from the meanings she 





The point here is this: it would be a mistake to say that this additional, 
unintentionally communicated information is part of the meanings that an agent 
communicates. In other words, while we can claim that your friend communicates a 
literal meaning (“But we don’t pay for electricity”) and an implied meaning (“It is 
okay for you to leave without turning off the lights”) it would be a stretch to say that 
he also communicates the meaning that “It’s okay to waste resources we don’t pay 
for.” Rather, in addition to the literal and implied meanings that your friend 
communicates, he also reveals, or makes manifest, an attitude or value judgment that 
he seemingly thinks it is okay to waste resources we don’t pay for.33 That attitude is 
equivalent neither to his literal meaning nor to his implied meaning but can be 
inferred from those meanings as part of the best explanation for the pair of meanings 
that he communicates. In what follows, I will refer to this kind of information as 
hyper-implicature—‘hyper-’ because although it resembles an implicature in that it is 
not explicitly stated, it is beyond just implicature because it is inferred in part from 
the speaker’s implicature.  
What does this discussion about meaning and hyper-implicature have to do 
with microaggressions? I believe that microaggressions are the kind of action through 
which an agent hyper-implicates certain kinds of beliefs or attitudes that she 
                                               
33 I submit that microaggressions involve unintentionally revealed attitudes—a point that I 
discuss in more detail in Section 5. Moreover, note that some authors have referred to this 
kind of additional information as unintentional implicature. This is not an uncontroversial 
view, as most philosophers of language tend to agree that Gricean implicature requires the 





seemingly holds. In other words, microaggressions may be a kind of action through 
which, like your friend in the example above, an agent reveals, or makes manifest, 
attitudes or value judgments that are separate from the literal meaning and the implied 
meaning that she intends to communicate. These hyper-implicated attitudes or value 
judgments are not explicitly stated or intentionally implied, but can nonetheless be 
inferred from the agent’s literal and implied meanings as part of the best explanation 
for such meanings. Now, the kinds of attitudes or value judgments that an agent 
hyper-implicates in a microaggression are not about just anything; rather, they are 
about the interpreter of the agent’s action, are based on some (social) group to which 
she belongs, and may (often for that reason) be offensive to her.  
Consider the paradigm microaggression of asking a minority individual 
“Where are you from?” Now, suppose that the question is asked by a white American 
to an Asian-American and that, given the context of their interaction, the white 
American intentionally implies “What part of Asia are you from?” In other words, the 
white American’s literal meaning is what he explicitly states—namely, “Where are 
you from?”—and his implicature is what he intentionally implies—namely, “What 
part of Asia are you from?” If the preceding is on the right track, then we can infer 
from these meanings a hyper-implicature—that is, information involving the set of 
attitudes or value judgments that the white American holds (or does not hold). 
Suppose, then, that given the context of the action, we can infer that the content of her 
hyper-implicature approximates “This person must not be American; people who look 
Asian are not American” or “This person must not be American; people who look 





from,” the white American not only communicates a literal and an implied meaning, 
but also reveals, or makes manifest, a hyper-implicature: a set of false beliefs that he 
seemingly holds, including, in this scenario, that people who ‘look’ Asian are not 
American or that they must have been born outside of the U.S. Absent some 
alternative, better explanation, her question “Where are you from?” accompanied by 
her implicature “What part of Asia are you from?” would not seem to make sense.  
Note that the hyper-implicature in this example—namely, that “This person 
must not be American; people who look Asian are not American”—is based on the 
interpreter of the action’s membership in the (social) group ‘Asian-American’ (or: 
‘looks Asian-American’). Specifically, the white American’s hyper-implicature is an 
inference about the interpreter of the action from his membership in that (social) 
group. Note, also, that it would not seem unreasonable to think that such a hyper-
implicature might be offensive to the interpreter of this action from the point of view 
of the agent of the microaggression. In other words, it would not be unreasonable to 
think that the content of such a hyper-implicature might, e.g., undermine the 
interpreter’s sense of belonging or make her feel abnormal. Now, I do not mean to 
suggest that the agent of the microaggression must actually foresee that such a hyper-
implicature may be offensive to the interpreter; rather, I think that given, e.g., the 
agent’s socio-historical situation, we can say that she could, practically speaking, 
foresee that the interpreter of her action might be caused pain or offense by her hyper-
implicature. Furthermore, I do not mean to suggest that the interpreter of the action 





given the context in which the action occurs (e.g., a certain sociohistorical context), it 
would not be unreasonable for the interpreter of the action to take offense. 
We can sum up my proposal for how to identify a microaggression as follows. 
A microaggression takes place if, and only if, the following three conditions are met: 
1. An agent hyper-implicates to another an attitude or value judgment about 
the other,  
2. The attitude or value judgment that the agent hyper-implicates is based on 
the other’s membership in some (social) group, and  
3. The agent can—although she need not actually—foresee that such an 
attitude or value judgment may be insulting to the agent about whom it is.  
Note, that although these are necessary and jointly sufficient conditions for a 
microaggression to take place, they are not jointly sufficient for a morally 
objectionable microaggression to take place. I will discuss the necessary and 
sufficient conditions for a morally objectionable microaggression to take place in the 
next section.  
The framework I’m proposing for identifying when a microaggression takes 
place is more objective than Sue et al.’s current framework. By appealing to the 
concepts of literal meaning, implicature, and hyper-implicature, it takes into account 
not just the understanding of the interpreter of the action (i.e., the “victim” of the 
microaggression), but also the intention of the speaker, as well as the context in which 
the action occurs, in order to determine what the agent of a microaggression reveals 
or makes manifest about himself by engaging in the microaggression. Consequently, 





accounting for some intuitive cases of microaggressions. Admittedly, a more 
sophisticated account for calculating the exact content of a hyper-implicature will be 
needed, but it’s worth noting that if such an account is developed and adopted, we 
will be in a good position to avoid two counterintuitive entailments of Sue et al.’s 
view.  
The first involves the case, from Section 2, of the white teacher who 
constantly calls on his white students first because he believes that calling on his 
black student, because she is black and likely less competent, will derail the class 
discussion. On Sue et al.’s current view, if the student does not deem the teacher’s 
action a microaggression, no microaggression has occurred. But according to my 
proposal, if the teacher communicates certain literal and implied meanings and 
thereby hyper-implicates a certain kind of attitude—e.g., that “A black student is less 
competent because she is black and blacks are less competent than whites”—then her 
action is a microaggression, for it reveals a certain kind of potentially offensive belief 
that the teacher holds, even if the student does not register it. This is because in this 
example the teacher’s hyper-implicature involves a value judgment about his student 
in virtue of the student’s membership in some social group—a value judgment that 
the teacher could, it would be reasonable to believe, foresee causing the student pain 
or suffering.  
The second counterintuitive entailment of Sue et al.’s view that we can avoid 
by adopting the framework I am proposing involves the teacher, also from Section 2, 
who has consciously decided that she will not be a microaggressor. In that case, after 





student and the nonwhite student deems the action a microaggression. On Sue et al.’s 
current view, the teacher’s action is a microaggression because, insofar as 
microaggressions lie in the eye of the beholder, the teacher’s intentions do not play a 
role. But according to my proposal, it’s not straightaway clear that the teacher’s 
action is a microaggression. Again, more needs to be said with regard to how to 
calculate the content of the set of attitudes that the teacher hyper-implicates in such a 
scenario; but her intention will play a role at the very least indirectly: e.g., in terms of 
the meanings she intentionally communicates, whether explicitly or implicitly. This 
means that my framework offers more guidance for preventing microaggressions than 
Sue et al.’s framework, for the agent’s intention will play at least an indirect role in 
what she reveals through a microaggression. 
4. Refining the concept of microaggressions: When microaggressions are morally 
objectionable  
With this more objective framework for identifying microaggressions in hand, we can 
now ask: When are microaggressions morally objectionable? In what follows, I argue 
that the answer to this question lies in the kind of attitude that an agent hyper-
implicates in a microaggression. In some cases, the attitude will be a descriptive 
attitude that, when hyper-implicated, may bring about consequences that may be 
morally problematic: e.g., foreseeably causing pain or suffering in another. In other 
cases, the attitude will be an evaluative or moral attitude that may be morally 
objectionable despite the consequences of hyper-implicating it. Microaggressions of 
this latter kind, I will suggest, may involve a failure of what Stephen Darwall calls 





Imagine A and B, both American citizens, having a conversation about certain 
kinds of food. A is of Chilean descent and B is of European descent, and each knows 
about the other’s descent and citizenship status. Imagine, further, that A tells B about 
her love for a certain spicy Korean dish and that B responds—in a manner that makes 
it obvious that she is not joking—“Oh, right, you guys like spicy.”34 Suppose B is 
intentionally implying something along the lines of “You, Latin Americans, like spicy 
food.”35 Given B’s implicature and literal meaning, it would be reasonable to infer, 
she hyper-implicates not only that she believes something along the lines of, “Of 
course A likes spicy; Latin Americans like spicy,” but also that she does not believe 
something along the lines of, “Chili powder is used in Mexican cuisine, but that does 
not mean that chili powder is also used in the cuisine of every other Latin American 
country.” If she did believe this, it would be unclear why she would say “Oh, right, 
you guys like spicy” and implicate “You Latin Americans like spicy food.” Notice 
that the attitude that B hyper-implicates is about A’s membership in a certain (social) 
group (i.e., ‘Latin American’), and that it would not seem unreasonable to think that, 
given B’s socio-historical situation, she could foresee that a hyper-implicature such as 
                                               
34 It’s important to note that while B is not joking when she says this, humor can raise 
complications by altering the implied meanings and thereby the attitudes or value judgments 
that we can infer from those meanings. 
35 I don’t take this to be controversial, especially given the background against which this 
kind of comment occurs, at least in the U.S.: namely, one that involves many people’s belief 






“Of course A likes spicy; Latin Americans like spicy” may be hurtful or offensive to 
A—after all, in the contemporary U.S., there is a tendency of making generalizations 
about Latin Americans as if Latin American was a homogenous region of the world.  
The idea that I wish to defend with this example is that B hyper-implicates a 
misleading descriptive attitude that need not, in virtue of being hyper-implicated, 
make her action morally objectionable. For example, in some cases, it would not be 
unreasonable to expect A to be unfazed by what B’s comment communicates, or to 
investigate whether B does in fact believe what she hyper-implicates and correct her 
if she does. In other words, there may be cases in which a microaggression’s 
interpreter may unreasonably experience pain or suffering: e.g., if the hyper-
implicature is not one that the interpreter of the action experiences on a regular basis. 
But it would be a different story if A regularly undergoes hyper-implicatures 
involving inferences about her in virtue of inaccurate or misleading stereotypes about 
a group to which she is taken to belong. In that case it would be understandable if A 
experienced negative mental states as a result of such hyper-implicatures: negative 
mental states such as annoyance, indignation, or offense. And it would then seem 
unreasonable to expect A to be unfazed by such experiences. Of course, one could 
argue that if A had such experiences on a regular basis, then it would be in her best 
interest to grow thicker skin. But without getting too far from the point, let me note 
that there’s reason to think that this is an unviable option. Imagine regularly 
undergoing hyper-implicatures that suggest that others regard you not as an 
individual, but as a member of some group about which some (often negative) 





treatment may come at the risk of consequences that may be worse than irritation: 
e.g., becoming detached from or resentful towards one’s community or society. 
Nevertheless, regardless of whether or not detachment from or resentment towards 
one’s community or society is in fact worse than plain irritation, the point here is just 
that some microaggressions may occur often enough that each additional 
microaggression may understandably become harmful even if a single such 
experience should cause no harm. Kelly Burns puts this point nicely when she writes, 
“While one paper cut is not a big deal, if you are continually being cut in the same 
place, it can become quite painful” (Burns 2014, 140).  
To put the point differently, we might say that if an agent engages in a 
microaggression against another agent and thereby foreseeably causes pain or 
suffering in the other agent, then her action amounts to a morally problematic 
microaggression. Importantly, as above, by ‘foreseeably’ I do not mean that the agent 
must actually foresee that the content of her hyper-implicature will cause pain in the 
interpreter of her action, but rather that, given, e.g., her socio-historical situation and 
cognitive abilities, the agent could, practically speaking, foresee that the interpreter 
would be caused pain. 
Note that this point that microaggressions may or may not cause harmful 
mental states is not one that Sue et al.’s current view seems able to account for. In 
their view, microaggressions are harmful by definition: they are harmful because the 
messages they express cause pain or suffering. On the framework I’m proposing, 
however, a microaggression can occur without being morally objectionable. This is 





the case of the stoic individual who is unfazed by a microaggression, a 
microaggression still occurs; it just does not cause the stoic individual pain—
something Sue et al. do not seem in a good position to claim.  
Nevertheless, against the framework I am proposing, an opponent may 
highlight that in cases such as the stoic’s, in which the microaggression does not 
cause any pain or suffering, my framework leads to the conclusion that the 
microaggression isn’t morally objectionable. In other words, if no one is irritated, 
offended, etc., what’s the problem? The opponent may then conclude that my 
framework, just like Sue et al.’s, fails to justify the microaggression program, as we 
could instead train potential victims to be like the stoic and refrain from reacting 
negatively to microaggressions. But I think that this objection relies on a very narrow 
understanding of what makes an action morally objectionable: that an action is 
morally objectionable only if it causes negative mental states—or perhaps more 
charitably: only if it leads to bad consequences. Indeed, that seems to be Sue et al.’s 
own take of what makes microaggressions morally objectionable. But as I have been 
arguing, that approach is misguided, for it excludes other types of wrongs. What I 
want to suggest is that wrongs come in various forms, only some of which involve 
consequences. As I will now argue, agents who engage in microaggressions 
sometimes hyper-implicate attitudes that are morally questionable independently of 
whether or not anyone is caused any pain or suffering.  
Imagine an agent who hyper-implicates an attitude the content of which is 
something along the lines of “Blacks are inferior to whites.” Note that there is a 





as the one hyper-implicated in the example above: namely, “Latin Americans like 
spicy.” Whereas attitudes such as “Latin Americans like spicy” are arguably 
descriptive, attitudes such as “Blacks are inferior to whites” are evaluative or moral; 
they involve a value judgment: in this case, one about the moral standing of another 
agent (or group of agents). What I want to suggest is that an agent who holds an 
erroneous descriptive attitude such as “Latin Americans like spicy” makes a factual 
error about Latin Americans as a group, but that an agent who holds an attitude such 
as “Blacks are inferior to whites” makes a moral error about blacks as a group: one 
that involves holding an attitude that is demeaning. 
Examining the precise nature of a demeaning attitude is beyond the scope of 
this paper, but Stephen Darwall’s (1977) notion of recognition respect is useful to 
that end. As I understand Darwall, recognition respect involves “a disposition to 
weigh appropriately some feature or fact in one’s deliberations,” such that that feature 
or fact limits our conduct (Darwall 1977). With this notion of recognition respect in 
hand, we might contend that recognition respect for another person might also 
involve a disposition to weigh in one’s moral deliberations the fact that the other is a 
person, such that the other’s status restricts not just an agent’s conduct toward 
another, but also the set of attitudes that it is permissible for him to hold about 
another agent. We might then hold that a set of permissible attitudes toward another 
agent would seem to exclude attitudes that fail to recognize the status of another agent 
as a person. A demeaning attitude might then be understood as an attitude that 





an attitude would seem to be an attitude that gets the moral standing of another agent 
wrong, such as “Blacks are morally inferior to whites.” 
The idea, then, is that some moral or evaluative attitudes may be demeaning: 
they may involve an error about the moral standing of another agent. In the context of 
microaggressions, we might contend that when an agent engages in a microaggression 
that involves an attitude that is demeaning—e.g., “Blacks are inferior to whites”—he 
reveals, through the microaggression, a failure of recognition respect for the other 
agent. In other words, he reveals that he does not give appropriate weight to the fact 
that the other agent is a person. To be precise, the agent of the microaggression would 
seem to have made an error, in his moral deliberations, regarding the set of attitudes 
that it is permissible for him to hold about another agent.36 
Now, in line with the sufficient condition for a morally problematic 
microaggression to take place examined above, this kind of microaggression would 
seem to clearly be morally problematic if the agent foreseeably causes pain or 
suffering in the interpreter of her action as a result of engaging in the 
microaggression. But the suggestion I am after is that an agent who engages in a 
microaggression that involves a demeaning attitude about another would, through 
such microaggression, seem to reveal something morally objectionable regardless of 
whether or not she foreseeably causes pain or suffering in the interpreter of her 
                                               
36 Now, one might think that just because an agent has a certain belief about another does not 
mean that the belief enters into the agent’s deliberation regarding what to do or of how to 
regard another. But it’s worth noting that such a belief may nonetheless enter into the agent’s 





action. This is because in holding such an attitude the agent of the microaggression 
would be making an error about the moral status of the other agent. More specifically, 
an agent who engages in a microaggression that involves a demeaning attitude would 
seem to have made an error, in his moral deliberations, regarding the set of attitudes 
that it is permissible for him to hold about another agent.  
Put differently, the idea is that a morally problematic microaggression takes 
place in at least two ways: if, in virtue of a microaggression, an agent foreseeably 
causes pain or suffering in another, and if the attitude that she hyper-implicates is 
demeaning. And this latter instance of a microaggression would seem to be morally 
objectionable regardless of whether or not the other is foreseeably caused any pain.37  
                                               
37 Earlier I mentioned that there may be cases in which an agent only seemingly holds the 
attitudes or value judgments that she hyper-implicates, such that some microaggressions may 
involve an agent’s revealing that she holds a certain group-based attitude, while others may 
involve an agent’s seemingly revealing that she holds a certain group-based attitude when she 
does not in fact hold it. In my view, a microaggression would take place so long as the hyper-
implicature obtains—that is, independently of whether or not the agent holds the attitude that 
she hyper-implicates. This suggests that, in my view, an agent can hyper-implicate a certain 
kind of attitude or value judgment without actually holding the attitude that she hyper-
implicates. Imagine an agent who hyper-implicates the attitude “Blacks are morally inferior 
to whites” to another agent who is black, but that the agent who hyper-implicates this attitude 
does not actually hold this attitude. The question is: assuming this is a microaggression, is it a 
morally objectionable one? I take it that although the attitude that this agent hyper-implicates 





An interesting question arises here: Does a microaggressor who hyper-
implicates a demeaning attitude, thereby revealing a moral error but without harming 
anyone, act wrongly? I cannot begin to answer this question here, but let me note that 
how we answer this question might turn on whether or not we think that there is such 
a thing as doxastic wronging. Doxastic wrongs are said to be wrongs that occur in 
virtue of what an agent believes about another agent—not in virtue of how an agent 
acts towards another. The idea is that an agent can wrong another by believing, e.g., 
that she can treat him as a mere means, even if she never so treats him.38 In the 
context of microaggressions, it seems plausible that even if we agree that an agent 
who hyper-implicates a demeaning attitude but does not harm anyone does not act 
wrongly, there may still be reason to think that something morally objectionable takes 
                                               
not be morally objectionable. Moreover, if the agent does foreseeably cause pain or suffering 
in another, his action would be morally problematic regardless of whether or not he actually 
held the attitude he hyper-implicated. In other words, in this latter case, the agent’s action 
would meet one of the sufficient conditions for a morally problematic microaggression to 
take place. Interestingly, though, insofar as the agent does not actually believe that “Blacks 
are morally inferior to whites,” there is a question of whether or not he can be held 
responsible or blameworthy for hyper-implicating such an attitude. Although an appropriate 
answer to this question is not a project I can tackle here, I take it that a relevant consideration 
in answering this question will be whether or not the agent could have foreseen that his action 
would hyper-implicate the relevant attitude or that hyper-implicating such an attitude would 
cause pain or suffering in another. 





place, insofar as the agent would seem to engage in a moral error with respect to the 
status of another agent. 
To sum up the framework I gave been proposing: A microaggression takes 
place if, and only if, an agent hyper-implicates to another an attitude or value 
judgment that is based on the other’s membership in some social group, and she 
can—although she need not actually—foresee that such an attitude or value judgment 
may—although it need not actually—be insulting to the agent about whom it is. But 
these necessary and jointly sufficient conditions for a microaggression to take place 
are not jointly sufficient for a morally objectionable microaggression to take place. 
Rather, a morally objectionable microaggression takes place if an agent who engages 
in a microaggression foreseeably causes pain or suffering in the victim of the 
microaggression. But a morally objectionable microaggression can take place even if 
the agent does not foreseeably cause anyone any pain or suffering: for example, a 
morally objectionable microaggression may occur if an agent of a microaggression 
hyper-implicates a demeaning attitude, such as “Blacks are morally inferior to 
whites.” In such cases, the agent reveals that he has made a moral error about the 
moral standing of another agent.  
In a nutshell, there are at least two sufficient conditions for a morally 
objectionable microaggression to take place: 
1. If an agent foreseeably causes pain or suffering in another as a result of a 
microaggression, and  






Notice that whereas Sue et al.’s view currently appeals strictly to the pain or 
suffering that microaggressions may cause in their victims to explain why 
microaggressions may be morally objectionable, my proposal highlights both that not 
all microaggressions are morally objectionable and that microaggressions may be 
morally objectionable for reasons other than the harm they may cause in their victims. 
Moreover, recall that Sue et al.’s view, insofar as it is entirely victim-focused, invites 
the objection that instead of encouraging minority-individuals to look for 
microaggressions left and right, the microaggression program should train such 
individuals to be more resilient to microaggressions. My proposal need not deny that 
there is virtue in resilience, but, in holding that some microaggressions may involve 
moral errors on the part of their agents, it sheds light on a different aspect of when 
microaggressions are morally objectionable. My proposal for amending Sue et al.’s 
view of microaggressions is thus more action-guiding than Sue et al.’s current view, 
as it makes avoiding some microaggressions a matter that is strictly up to the 
microaggressor. 
5. Some lingering questions 
A few questions may have lingered in the background of this discussion. Let me start 
by restating that on the framework I am proposing, committing a microaggression is 
not always wrong. Some microaggressions may neither have bad consequences nor 
hyper-implicate demeaning attitudes, but they still are microaggressions if the agent 
of the microaggression hyper-implicates a certain kind of group-related attitude that 





Now, I mentioned earlier that on Sue et al.’s current view microaggressions 
are slights directed at members of disadvantaged groups. Does an action that 
communicates an attitude about an individual in virtue of his membership in some 
non-disadvantaged group count as a microaggression, in my view? Imagine C, a 
white waitress who regularly experiences covert slights from her coworkers—slights 
having to do with their perception of her as a “Becky” (a term sometimes used to 
refer to blonde women who are said to have predictable preferences and to lack 
common sense). I think that such slights would indeed count as microaggressions if 
they communicated certain (negative or misleading) attitudes about C in virtue of her 
being a “Becky.” What’s central to microaggressions is not that the group about 
which the hyper-implicated judgment is made be a disadvantaged group, but that the 
judgment strips the individual of her individuality by judging her in virtue of a 
(misinformed or erroneous) belief about a group to which she is taken to belong. This 
means that microaggressions are a kind of phenomenon that occurs not only to 
members of disadvantaged groups, but to anyone. Nevertheless, this point that 
microaggressions need not involve judgments about disadvantaged groups should be 
taken with care for two reasons. First, microaggressions that don’t involve 
disadvantaged groups may be less pervasive than those that do; after all, 
microaggressions involving disadvantaged groups may show up not just in one’s 
workplace, for instance, but also in other spheres of life, including, for example, 
education, healthcare, customer service, etc. And second, microaggressions that don’t 





accompanied by a history of arguably unjust treatment of the members of those 
groups.  
Another worry that may have arisen throughout the paper may be that since I 
have argued that a microaggression is the kind of action that unintentionally reveals 
information about the belief set of the agent of the microaggression, it follows that 
actions that intentionally reveal information about the belief set of the agent of the 
microaggression may not count as microaggressions on my proposal. It seems to 
follow, then, that when Roseanne Barr, a public figure who is white, compared 
Valerie Jarrett, a former government official who is African-American, to an ape, she 
did not engage in a microaggression.39 And, when Donald Trump compares illegal 
immigrants to “animals,” or when he refers to sanctuary cities as places where 
immigrants “breed,” he also does not engage in microaggressions.40 I welcome these 
conclusions because even if such actions have some of the same negative effects of 
microaggressions (e.g., cause negative mental states), and even if they evince the 
same kind of moral failure in the agent that a microaggression that reveals a 
demeaning attitude evinces (e.g., a failure to regard another appropriately), they seem 
to be actions of a different kind: they seem to involve intentionally implied racist and 
dehumanizing meanings, or, to use the technical term, implicatures—and not attitudes 
that can only be inferred from those meanings. Moreover, they seem to amount to 
                                               
39 See Heil (2018). 
40 See Wolf (2018). For more on Trump’s overtly racist actions, including the comments 
“Black guys counting my money! I hate it. … I think that the guy is lazy. And it’s probably 





overtly aggressive and hostile behavior toward members of certain social groups, not 
covert, inferable attitudes. Such actions may instead amount to behavior that is 
primarily morally objectionable because it is intended to harm. 
Finally, if microaggressions are unintentional, potentially offensive ways to 
communicate certain kinds of attitudes, and not overtly aggressive behavior, one may 
worry that the term ‘microaggression’ is a misnomer. After all, the word aggression 
seems to fundamentally mischaracterize the phenomenon as a violent action. A better 
term, one might suggest, would be micro-insult or covert-insult. This is a question 
worthy of a much deeper analysis than I can offer here. But it’s worth noting in favor 
of this worry that insofar as the phenomenon under investigation here is 
unintentional, it seems counterintuitive to refer to it as an “unintentional 
aggression.”41 Yet it’s also worth noting that regular experiences of expressions of 
otherwise covert demeaning attitudes, in particular, may have a feel of hostile attacks, 
or aggressions, to a person’s dignity or moral standing.  
6. Concluding remarks  
I have argued that Sue et al.’s notion of microaggression, insofar as it has subjective 
and utilitarian features, offers little guidance for identifying and preventing 
microaggressions, and explains only some of the ways in which microaggressions 
may be morally objectionable. I have also offered a way to improve Sue et al.’s 
                                               
41 Although it’s worth noting that people do sometimes unintentionally and without any self-
awareness act aggressively: e.g., if they are having a bad day and, unintentionally and without 





notion of microaggressions: by adopting a framework that appeals to concepts from 
the philosophy of language in order to identify microaggressions. On this framework, 
we can morally evaluate the content of the attitudes that an agent hyper-implicates in 
a microaggression in order to determine when a microaggression is morally 
objectionable. This proposal generates a notion of microaggressions that is neither 
subjective nor strictly utilitarian and thus does a better job than Sue et al.’s current 
view in terms of how to identify microaggressions, and in terms of how to explain 
when they are morally objectionable. Yet, if this proposal is going to be successful, a 
more detailed account of how to calculate the content of the attitudes that are hyper-
implicated in a microaggression, as well as of how to determine the precise nature of 
a demeaning attitude will have to be developed. 
One final point. I mentioned earlier that critics of the microaggression 
program generally argue that supporting the microaggression program is a bad idea 
because it may have negative consequences not only for college campuses but for 
society at large. They argue, for instance, that it may lead to unwarranted restrictions 
on free speech, worsen racial tensions, and help create a culture of victimhood. While 
these consequentialist worries face problems of their own,42 if my proposal is on the 
                                               
42 For instance, Nathan J. Robinson writes that “Haidt has devoted himself to trying to 
understand the psychological roots of political ideology, and yet he doesn’t seem interested in 
listening to the perspectives of the people whose motivations he wants to diagnose” 
(Robinson 2018). There are grounds for this response to Haidt, for he mistakenly claims that 
the microaggression program trains “diverse students, who arrive from all over the world 





right track, these critics will be advised to reconsider their arguments at least with 
respect to microaggressions that may contain demeaning attitudes, as those 
microaggressions may turn out to constitute a particularly morally objectionable 
social practice for which the victims of microaggressions are not to blame.   
                                               






Chapter 3: When Is the Promotion of Prenatal Testing for 
Selective Abortion Wrong? 
 
Introduction 
Medical professionals routinely offer prenatal genetic testing services to their 
expecting patients. In theory, this testing helps prospective parents better prepare for 
the birth of their child, e.g., if the child will have a disability. In practice, however, 
such testing often leads to the termination of pregnancies that would produce a child 
who has a disability. In light of our society’s history of poor treatment of people who 
have disabilities, some bioethicists believe that when medical professionals promote 
the use of this testing for abortion on grounds of disability, they express a devaluing 
message to and about extant disabled people: that their lives are not worth living or 
that their lives are not worthy of support (Parens and Asch 2000).43 Supporters of this 
expressivist objection further maintain that in expressing such a message, medical 
professionals not only cause wounded feelings in extant people who are disabled; 
they also reinforce negative, misinformed attitudes about them and thereby further 
stigmatize them. While the expressivist objection has received quite a bit of support 
from disability rights theorists—in part because of its intuitive appeal—its current 
                                               
43 The expressivist objection has been raised both against parents who use prenatal testing for 
selective abortion and against medical professionals who promote or routinize such testing. 
While this paper focuses only on medical professionals’ promotion of such testing, it has 
implications for how we think about prospective parents’ use of such testing, as well as 





formulation suffers, I believe, from a lack of precision that renders it implausible. A 
careful examination of this imprecision, along with an appeal to some tools from the 
philosophy of language, might reveal a more adequate formulation of the objection 
that preserves its core insight. 
The paper develops as follows. Section 1 examines in more detail the 
expressivist objection’s current formulation along with some of its shortcomings. 
Section 2 recruits two concepts from the philosophy of language—illocutionary acts 
and implicatures—in order to offer an improved formulation of the expressivist 
objection. According to this expressivist objection*, the promotion of prenatal testing 
for selective abortion is a kind of illocutionary act that expresses precise information. 
With this formulation in hand, Section 3 examines when this illocutionary act is 
morally objectionable. Finally, Section 4 considers the possibility that sometimes the 
promotion of prenatal testing for selective abortion involves a morally objectionable 
belief. I conclude that the promotion of prenatal testing for selective abortion is at 
least sometimes wrong. 
1. The expressivist objection’s current formulation 
According to the broadest formulation of the expressivist objection, the promotion of 
prenatal testing for selective abortion expresses the message that the lives of disabled 
people are less worth living than the lives of nondisabled people (Asch 2000, Asch 
and Wasserman 2015, DeGrazia 2012).44 The idea is that “[i]f we abort a fetus on the 
                                               
44 Now, the objection can be raised at the mere promotion of prenatal testing—that is, even if 





basis of a single trait, this symbolically suggests that not only this fetus's life but the 
life of anyone who has this trait is not worth living or preserving” (Kukla and Wayne 
2018). In this section, I argue that when formulated in more detail the expressivist 
objection is imprecise, both with respect to the content of the messages that are 
purportedly expressed by the promotion of prenatal testing for selective abortion, and 
with respect to how such an action brings about harms for extant disabled people. 
Moreover, I argue that this imprecision renders implausible the expressivist 
objection’s claim that the promotion of prenatal testing for selective abortion 
expresses devaluing messages, and that it obscures non-consequentialist wrongs that 
this action may contain.  
Supporters of the expressivist objection have described the messages 
purportedly expressed by the promotion of prenatal testing for selective abortion as 
“disparaging,” “disrespectful” (Nelson 1998), “hurtful” (Parens and Asch 2000), 
“demeaning” (Saxton 1997), “discriminatory” (Asch 2003), or just “negative” (Holm 
2008). Moreover, some have claimed that the content of such messages is that 
“disabled people’s lives are not worth living” or that disabled people’s lives are not 
“worthy of support” (Parens and Asch 2000, 8), while others have claimed that it is 
that disabled people are morally inferior to nondisabled people, or that disabled 
people should not be—or should not have been—born (Scott 2005). But the 
heterogeneity of these claims raises concerns. To clarify, the claim that the messages 
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expressed by prenatal testing are “hurtful” or “demeaning” suggests that the moral 
concern with such messages is that they harm extant disabled people psychologically: 
e.g., that they attack disabled people’s sense of self-worth or cause them offense. But 
the claim that the messages are “discriminatory” suggests that the moral concern with 
the expression of such messages lies in the kind of treatment that extant disabled 
people may encounter in our society. This latter concern is about wrongful 
discrimination and can be independent of the psychological states of extant disabled 
people.45 Nevertheless, all of these concerns are unified by the idea that it is the 
consequences of an action that determine its moral permissibility. After all, 
supporters of the expressivist objection are concerned with the expressive power of 
the promotion of prenatal testing for selective abortion: i.e., what expressing negative 
or devaluing attitudes may cause for disabled people—including, e.g., psychological 
harms such as attacking their sense of self-worth, civic harms such as further 
stigmatizing them (e.g., by promoting or reinforcing false or denigrating attitudes 
about them), and material harms such as reducing the amount of resources that 
disability communities receive. 
However, as critics highlight, supporters of the expressivist objection offer no 
account for how to determine the kind and content of the messages or meanings that 
the objection claims the promotion of prenatal testing expresses. Admittedly, 
supporters of the expressivist objection have suggested that what our actions express 
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argues that these are various elements of the expressivist objection. I find that interpretation 





is necessarily connected with our society’s history—a history that includes various 
forms of unjust treatment toward people who have disabilities. But the way in which 
such a history determines the meanings or messages that an action such as promoting 
prenatal testing for selective abortion expresses has not been addressed.46  
David DeGrazia (2012) develops this kind of objection in some detail. While 
he focuses explicitly on the use of prenatal testing for selective abortion by expecting 
parents, his argument is also applicable to the promotion of prenatal testing for 
selective abortion by medical professionals. According to DeGrazia, while nonverbal 
actions that belong to agreed-upon systems of signs express precise meanings or 
messages, nonverbal actions that do not belong to agreed-upon systems of signs do 
not express precise meanings or messages. For example, if a driver gives another the 
middle finger after the other cuts him off on the highway, DeGrazia maintains, the 
driver couldn’t then claim that he used this sign to mean “Top of the morning!” to the 
other driver. Giving someone the finger in the context of someone cutting you off is 
part of an agreed-upon system of signs and carries a specific meaning (“F-you”). 
Using prenatal testing for selective abortion, by contrast, is not part of an agreed-upon 
system of signs, and so does not express a specific, agreed-upon meaning. Thus, the 
nature and content of the message it expresses is underdetermined. A message that 
“disabled people’s lives are not worth living” is no more likely than a message such 
as “It is acceptable to prefer not to have a child with a particular substantial disability 
and to make reproductive decisions accordingly” (DeGrazia 2012, 105). In the latter 
                                               





case, no negative message about extant disabled people, e.g., that they have lower 
moral status, is expressed. The expressivist objection against the use of prenatal 
testing fails, DeGrazia concludes, because the use of prenatal testing for selective 
abortion cannot express messages or meanings that are precise enough for the claims 
of the expressivist objection.47 In other words, using prenatal testing for selective 
abortion, unlike giving someone the finger, does not necessarily express a message of 
disvalue. 
Now, in the case of the promotion of prenatal testing for selective abortion 
DeGrazia’s objection would be that promoting prenatal testing for selective abortion 
is a nonverbal action that, unlike giving someone the finger, does not have agreed-
upon meanings or messages.48 Thus, it cannot express messages or meanings that are 
precise enough for the claims of the expressivist objection.   
Mary Ann Baily (2000) also argues that it’s not clear why we should accept 
the interpretation that using prenatal testing necessarily or even generally expresses 
the devaluing meanings or messages that supporters of the expressivist objection 
claim it expresses. As she writes, “Acceptance of prenatal diagnosis and abortion 
certainly can express rejection of people with disabilities. But must it? Or can one 
                                               
47 See also McMahan (2005). 
48 DeGrazia suggests this when he writes that “If use or institutional promotion of PGD 
[prenatal genetic diagnosis] communicates anything, it does so nonverbally. Verbal 
communication, by contrast, involves a public language: a highly complex, rule-governed 
system of signs whose conventions of meaning are broadly accepted by the linguistic 





look at it another way?” Baily’s point is that an agent’s reasons for acting surely play 
a role in what his action expresses. For instance, a prospective mother may choose to 
have prenatal testing for selective abortion for various reasons, including, for 
example, a preference not to have a child who, in having a disability, would make her 
life more difficult than she would want. Thus, Baily writes, if using prenatal testing 
for selective abortion expresses anything: 
It does not express my opinion on whether people with disabilities can have 
worthwhile, fulfilling lives (they can), whether parenting a child with a disability can 
be rewarding (it can), whether other people should be pressured into aborting fetuses 
with disabilities (they shouldn't), or whether societal resources should be devoted to 
improving the lives of people with disabilities (they should). 
It also does not express my belief that I'm ‘entitled to a perfect child.’ […] 
It expresses only the fact that given a choice, I would rather my child did not have a 
disability. That's all. (Baily 2000) 
In terms of the promotion of prenatal testing for selective abortion, Bailey’s 
objection might be that medical professionals who promote prenatal testing for 
selective abortion may do so for many reasons, including, e.g., informing their 
expecting patients’ of their choices and thereby respecting their patients’ ability to 
make their own informed decisions. In other words, they need not express disvalue 
for the lives of extant disabled people. According to this objection, then, it’s not clear 
why we should accept the interpretation that promoting prenatal testing necessarily or 
even generally expresses the devaluing message or meaning that supporters of the 





DeGrazia’s and Baily’s objections appeal to the lack of necessity of an act’s 
expressing a certain specific meaning. In light of these objections, supporters of the 
expressivist objection respond that regardless of whether or not using or promoting 
prenatal testing for selective abortion necessarily expresses a devaluing message to 
and about extant disabled people, and regardless of whether or not the agent in either 
action intends to express a devaluing message, many extant disabled individuals 
nonetheless receive that message (Hofmann 2017, Edwards 2004).49 But note that this 
response suggests a sufficient condition for what using or promoting prenatal testing 
expresses which renders the expressivist objection implausible—or so I think many of 
us would agree. In other words, the idea seems to be that that disabled individuals 
receive such a message is sufficient for the action of using or promoting prenatal 
testing for selective abortion to have sent that message. Consider the following case.  
A, B, and C. A promotes prenatal testing to her patient, B, because B is a 
carrier of Tay-Sachs disease (TSD).50 A does this because he would like for B 
to know that she can use prenatal testing to learn whether or not her future 
child will have TSD and, if so, terminate the pregnancy in order to prevent her 
future child’s suffering—as well as her own. A does not believe that disabled 
people are not worth saving, or that children with TSD are morally inferior to 
children without TSD. All he wants is for B to be informed about her options. 
Now, C, a disabled person, learns about A’s action and interprets it as sending 
                                               
49 See also Parens and Asch (2000).  
50 TSD involves the loss of a child’s ability to see, hear, and move, along with intense pain 





a devaluing message such as “Disabled people should not be born,” or, 
equivalently in C’s opinion, “All disabled people should be killed.”  
If all that’s required for us to say that prenatal testing expresses a general or 
specific devaluing message is the judgment of extant disabled people, then we would 
have to say that A’s action expresses that “All disabled people should be killed.” But 
that seems wrong. There must be more to what an action expresses than the 
interpreter’s judgment of what it expresses—or so many of us would agree.  
Put differently, the point is that if all that’s required for an action to express a 
message of disvalue to and about a certain group of people is the judgment of 
members of the relevant group, then any action could in theory meet this criterion. A 
person born with spina bifida could interpret the promotion of taking folic acid to 
prevent spina bifida as expressing a devaluing message about extant people with 
spina bifida. Or, a person with osteoporosis could interpret the action of taking 
calcium supplements to avoid developing severe osteoporosis as expressing a 
message of disvalue about extant people with osteoporosis. But to claim that now the 
promotion of taking folic acid is morally objectionable because it expresses a 
devaluing message to and about extant people with spina bifida, or that the promotion 
of taking calcium supplements is now morally objectionable because it expresses a 
devaluing message to and about extant people with osteoporosis, seems extreme.51 
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writes, “Offence is different from harm, and persons with disabilities, like all others, must 
accept offences” (at p. 510). Furthermore, he writes, “offence has to be balanced against other 





Again: there must be more to what an action expresses than what its interpreter takes 
it to express. The current formulation of the expressivist objection thus suggests an 
implausible condition for how to determine the kind of message that is expressed by 
an action. 
I don’t mean to claim that we now have reason to ignore that some or many 
disabled people do receive devaluing messages from the use or promotion of prenatal 
testing for selective abortion. My point is just that if prenatal testing does express a 
devaluing message about extant disabled people, this claim has not been adequately 
defended on a theoretical level. Now, I believe that the expressivist objection’s core 
insight—that there are expressive grounds for objecting to the promotion of prenatal 
testing for selective abortion—can be preserved by recruiting some tools from the 
philosophy of language and devising a stricter set of criteria for what our actions 
express, and I embark on that project in the next section. But before turning to that 
project, let me highlight another shortcoming of the current formulation of the 
expressivist objection.  
Recall that supporters of the expressivist objection agree that prenatal testing 
for selective abortion is morally objectionable only because of what it brings about 
for extant disabled people—e.g., it may further stigmatize them, reduce the amount of 
resources allocated to disability communities, etc. In response to this claim, 
opponents of the expressivist objection highlight that there is no evidence that the 
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promotion of prenatal testing for selective abortion actually expresses the attitudes 
that its supporters claim it expresses, so there is no evidence that the promotion of 
prenatal testing for selective abortion actually brings about the consequences that 
supporters of the expressivist objection claim it brings about. Moreover, critics 
suggest, even if the promotion of prenatal testing for selective abortion did express a 
negative attitude about the quality of life of disabled people, it does not follow that it 
also expresses an attitude about how disabled people should be treated. Attitudes 
about the quality of life of disabled people are conceptually distinct from attitudes 
about how such individuals should be treated (Shakespeare 2006, Glover 2008, 
Buchanan 1996, McMahan 2005).52 Therefore, even if the promotion of prenatal 
testing for selective abortion did express an attitude such as “Life with disability is 
not worth living,” it does not follow that it also expresses an attitude such as “People 
who have disabilities should be treated poorly.” And if this latter attitude is not 
expressed, then it is doubtful that the promotion of prenatal testing for selective 
abortion would promote the poor treatment of extant disabled people—or so 
opponents of the expressivist objection maintain. 
Supporters of the expressivist objection respond that even if there is no 
evidence that prenatal testing for selective abortion has negative consequences for 
extant disabled people, this does not amount to evidence that prenatal testing for 
selective abortion does not have such bad consequences. But, while true, this point 
offers no further support for the claim that promoting prenatal testing for selective 
                                               





abortion, in virtue of expressing devaluing messages, brings about the negative 
consequences that supporters of the expressivist objection claim it does.  
This highlights what I take to be another shortcoming of the current 
formulation of the expressivist objection. Suppose, for the sake of argument, that 
supporters of the expressivist objection are wrong that the promotion of prenatal 
testing for selective abortion further stigmatizes extant disabled people or diminishes 
the resources that disability communities receive. Would the promotion of prenatal 
testing for selective abortion, absent such bad consequences, cease to be morally 
objectionable? I don’t believe so. Imagine the following case: 
D. D is a medical professional who firmly believes that people who are born 
with any kind of disability are morally inferior to people who are not born 
with a disability. For example, she believes that the value of the life of people 
who are born with a disability is lower than the value of the life of people who 
are not born with a disability, and that the interests of people who are born 
with a disability are owed less consideration than the interests of people who 
are not born with a disability. For this reason, she makes sure that all of her 
patients understand that they should use prenatal testing and terminate their 
pregnancy if their future child will be disabled. Suppose that D’s action 
expresses an attitude such as “Disabled people have lower moral worth and 
should not be born,” and that in expressing this attitude, her action has no 
negative consequences for extant disabled people. That is, it does not cause 
any psychological harms (e.g., no disabled person learns about it), civic harms 





harms (e.g., it has no effect on the number of social resources that extant 
disabled people receive).  
Now, insofar as supporters of the expressivist objection maintain that what’s morally 
objectionable about prenatal testing for selective abortion amounts solely to its 
negative consequences for extant disabled people, they would have to maintain that 
D’s action is not morally objectionable. After all, it causes no psychological, civic, or 
material harms to such individuals. But many of us would still find D’s promotion of 
prenatal testing morally problematic; it’s just that what makes it morally problematic 
may not lie in the consequences of her action. I will return to this point in Section 3; 
for now, all I want to suggest is that even if the promotion of prenatal testing for 
selective abortion does not have any negative consequences for disabled people, it 
does not follow that it is not morally objectionable. But the current formulation of the 
expressivist objection, because it focuses solely on the consequences of this action, 
obscures the idea that actions can be morally objectionable on non-consequentialist 
grounds, too.   
To sum up, the current formulation of the expressivist objection is imprecise, 
both with respect to what the promotion of prenatal testing for selective abortion 
purportedly expresses, and with respect to the reasons why promoting prenatal testing 
for selective abortion is morally objectionable. Moreover, as a result of this 
imprecision, the current formulation of the expressivist objection adopts an 
implausible sufficient condition for what an action such as the promotion of prenatal 
testing for selective abortion expresses, and obscures other, non-consequentialist 





A more sophisticated formulation of the expressivist objection will offer a 
stricter set of criteria for what an action such as promoting prenatal testing for 
selective abortion might express. It will also have a wider scope regarding what’s 
relevant for morally evaluating such an action. The rest of the paper will lay out the 
basics for such an improved formulation of the expressivist objection. Before 
proceeding, however, let me clarify that in engaging in such a project, I do not intend 
to imply that disabled people’s judgments about what the promotion (or use) of 
prenatal testing for selective abortion expresses are insignificant. Nor do I intend to 
imply that the potential consequences of expressing such a message are not serious. 
Rather, my goal is to offer an improved formulation of the expressivist objection that 
both better explains what an action such as promoting prenatal testing for selective 
abortion expresses, and better captures when such an action is morally objectionable.  
2. What our actions express 
I believe that we can begin to offer a more adequate defense of what an action such as 
promoting prenatal testing for selective abortion expresses by appealing to two 
concepts from the philosophy of language: illocutionary acts and implicatures. In 
what follows, I argue that the promotion of prenatal testing for selective abortion can 
be conceived of as an illocutionary act that can occur over the course of a clinical 
interaction. Moreover, I argue that when a medical professional engages in such an 
act, she sometimes expresses precise meanings (or messages) about extant people 
who are disabled. This improved formulation of the expressivist objection—which I 





discussed in Section 1 and lays the groundwork for morally evaluating the promotion 
of prenatal testing for selective abortion more thoroughly. 
Illocutionary acts, or illocutions, are verbal or written utterances which 
themselves constitute some intended action (Bach 1998, Austin 1962, Searle 1969).53 
For example, if I utter “I promise I won’t eat the rest of the marionberry pie,” I 
engage in the act of promising. My utterance itself constitutes my intended action. 
Similarly, if a priest says, “I now pronounce you husband and wife,” his action itself 
constitutes the act of marrying.  
Now, an utterance need not be explicit in order to count as an illocution. If I 
utter “Yes” when my daughter asks me “Do you promise you’ll take me to Lizzy’s 
once I finish my homework?” my utterance counts as an act of promising even if I 
don’t state “I promise I will take you to Lizzy’s once you finish your homework” 
explicitly. Furthermore, the authority of the speaker makes a difference in whether or 
not an action counts as an illocutionary act; we would not say of someone who utters 
“I hereby pronounce you husband and wife,” but does not have the authority to marry 
two individuals, that she has married them.  
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utters—an action that does not require an effect on the interpreter. For example, stating, 
asserting, or suggesting are all illocutionary acts. These acts are, for Austin, distinct from 
perlocutionary acts. Perlocutionary acts refer to what an agent does by uttering what he 
utters—e.g., persuading, convincing, and scaring are all examples of perlocutionary acts. 





Suppose, then, that a nurse practitioner utters the words “I hereby promote the 
use of prenatal testing for selective abortion.” I take it that this utterance would, quite 
straightforwardly, constitute his intended action of promoting the use of prenatal 
testing for selective abortion. But notice that the nurse does not have to utter these 
words explicitly in order for his utterance to count as an illocutionary act of 
promoting prenatal testing for selective abortion. Similarly for the following case. 
E and F. During her first prenatal visit, E’s doctor, F, says something along 
the lines of: 
Thanks to various recent technological advances, at this point in the 
pregnancy you have the option of doing some tests to learn more about the 
fetus. This testing is not high-risk at all, and the benefits of doing it 
outweigh the drawbacks, particularly because it gives you the option of 
using the test results to make a decision about whether or not to continue 
the pregnancy—say, if the fetus has some kind of chromosomal 
abnormality, such as Down syndrome, and you don’t want to have a child 
who won’t even be able to go to the bathroom on his own. 
Here, F does not utter the words “I hereby promote prenatal testing for 
selective abortion,” yet his action arguably does have the illocutionary force of 
promoting the use of prenatal testing for selective abortion.54 My goal here is not to 
                                               
54 Note that whether or not I’m right will depend in part on what kind of action promoting is. 
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offer a set of necessary and sufficient conditions for why F’s action amounts to the 
illocutionary act of promoting prenatal testing for selective abortion, although it’s 
worth noting two promising points of departure to that end: that F has medical 
authority in this context (i.e., he is a prenatal medical professional), and that he 
presents prenatal testing for selective abortion in a positive light: e.g., “thanks to 
recent technological advances,” “the benefits of prenatal testing outweigh its 
drawbacks,” etc. Rather, my point is that we can conceive of the act of promoting 
prenatal testing for selective abortion as an illocutionary act—one that can occur 
during a clinical interaction between a medical professional and a prospective parent. 
What I want to highlight next is that in addition to presenting the option of 
using prenatal testing in a positive light, F communicates other kinds of information, 
                                               
One might then say that in uttering what he utters, N states (illocutionary act) that there are 
some tests O can opt for, and that such tests are not dangerous. Moreover, one might say that 
by uttering what he utters (perlocutionary act), N devalues or, e.g., expresses disvalue, for 
extant disabled people. I’m not sure about the virtues of this route, but it seems to me that the 
act of promoting something is not one that requires an effect in the interpreter. That is, I think 
that promoting something is an illocutionary act—an action that resembles more the act of 
stating rather than the act of, say, persuading. Nevertheless, what seems at least a little bit 
plausible is that by uttering what she utters, N devalues extant disabled people. But here the 
question becomes a question of what kind of act devaluing is. And crucial in answering that 
question is whether or not someone can devalue another without having an effect on him. I 
think so, but if I’m wrong, then the act of devaluing another might best be described as a 





too. For example, he communicates that E “has the option of doing some tests to learn 
more about the fetus,” that “this testing is not high risk at all,” and that “the benefits 
of doing [this testing] outweigh the drawbacks.” Importantly, however, he also 
communicates implied meanings or messages—that is, information that he does not 
state explicitly but that he nonetheless communicates. Philosophers of language call 
this kind of information implicature. On a Gricean picture of meaning, speakers 
convey two kinds of meaning in their utterances: a literal meaning and an implied 
meaning, or implicature (Grice 1957). Whereas a speaker’s literal meaning amounts 
to what he explicitly states, ‘implicature’ refers to what he communicates without 
explicitly stating it (Grice 1989).55 How, then, are implicatures deciphered? 
According to Grice, implicatures are calculated from the intention of the speaker, the 
understanding of the interpreter, and the context in which the utterance occurs.56 The 
following example will prove clarificatory:  
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only on the latter.  
56 This is an uncontroversial understanding of Grice. Grice himself writes of conversational 
implicature that: 
A man who, by (in, when) saying (or making as if to say) that p has implicated that q, 
may be said to have conversationally implicated that q provided that (i) he is to be 
presumed to be observing the conversational maxims […]; (ii) the supposition that he 
is aware that, or thinks that, q is required in order to make his saying or making as if 
to say p (or doing so in those terms) consistent with this presumption; and (iii) the 





G and H. Carrying with him an empty plastic water bottle, G arrives at H’s 
home and asks her “Where do you keep your recycling?”; H replies “Ugh, I’m 
too lazy for that! The trash is under the sink.”  
In this example, each agent communicates a literal meaning and an implied 
meaning, or implicature. The literal meaning that G communicates is the content of 
the question “Where do you keep your recycling?” Moreover, in part because he is 
holding a plastic bottle, the implicature he communicates is something along the lines 
of, “I wish to dispose of this plastic bottle.” H also communicates a literal meaning: 
namely that she is too lazy for a recycling bin and that the trash is under the sink; and, 
in part because she understands that G is trying to dispose of something, she also 
communicates an implicature: something along the lines of “I don’t recycle; just use 
the trash bin.” 
What is the relevance of this discussion for the promotion of prenatal testing 
for selective abortion? Let us return to the case of E and F and reexamine the second 
half of what F says. Here it is reproduced: 
[Running these prenatal tests] gives you the option of using the test results to make a 
decision about whether or not to continue the pregnancy—say, if the fetus has some 
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supposition mentioned in (ii) is required. (Grice 1989, 30) 
For a more controversial understanding of Grice, according to which implicature can be 





kind of chromosomal abnormality, such as Down syndrome, and you don’t want to 
have a child who won’t be able to even go to the bathroom on his own. 
Note that F arguably implies—or, to use the technical term, implicates—
something along the lines of “People with Down syndrome have no independence.” 
Now, I don’t intend to offer a set of necessary and sufficient conditions for how to 
determine exactly what F implicates here. But it’s worth noting that what F 
communicates by implicature will depend at least in part on the context surrounding 
this interaction—namely, a clinical interaction about prenatal testing. The point just is 
that clinical interaction—like many other verbal interactions—can involve 
communicating both explicit and implicit meanings. In the E and F example, F 
engages in the action of promoting prenatal testing for selective abortion and thereby 
communicates both a literal meaning and an implied meaning or message. Moreover, 
at least some of the implied meanings or messages that he communicates are about 
extant disabled people—namely, something along the lines of “People with Down 
syndrome have no independence.” 
We can now begin to reformulate the expressivist objection—at least with 
respect to what the action of promoting prenatal testing for selective abortion might 
express: 
The expressivist objection*: The promotion of prenatal testing for selective 
abortion is an illocutionary act that can occur over the course of clinical 





express implied messages or meanings that can be about extant disabled 
people.  
If this is right, then the expressivist objection* sidesteps the DeGrazia-Baily 
objection discussed in Section 1. According to the DeGrazia-Baily objection, you’ll 
recall, promoting prenatal testing for selective abortion is a nonverbal action that does 
not have any agreed-upon meanings. It thus need not express the messages the 
expressivist objection claims it expresses. But according to the expressivist 
objection*, the promotion of prenatal testing for selective abortion is a verbal action 
and does express precise messages or meanings. It thus can—at least sometimes—
express precise enough messages or meanings about extant disabled people. 
With this framework in hand, we can now ask: Do medical professionals who 
promote prenatal testing for selective abortion act wrongly? This is the question I 
now turn to.  
3. When our actions express vague or misleading attitudes 
You’ll recall from Section 1 that supporters of the expressivist objection differ with 
respect to the exact content of the messages that promoting prenatal testing for 
selective abortion purportedly expresses. Some claim it is roughly that “Disabled 
people’s lives are not worthy of support”; others claim it is that disabled people 
should not be, or should not have been, born. Now, given the framework developed in 
Section 2, I think it’s plausible to suppose that medical professionals may sometimes 
express a meaning or message such as “Disabled people’s lives are not worthy or 





for selective abortion—especially when they recommend testing for various 
disabilities with the aim of selective abortion—so I will assume this in what follows. 
What I want to examine is whether and when the promotion of prenatal testing for 
selective abortion is wrong in virtue of expressing these attitudes and others. As I will 
argue, promoting prenatal testing for selective abortion is wrong when it involves 
violating a duty to obtain informed consent. It thus can be wrong even if it does not 
bring about any negative consequences for extant disabled people. 
Bioethicists tend to agree that medical professionals have a duty to obtain 
informed consent from their patients before running certain tests on them. One of the 
main goals of obtaining informed consent is to ensure that the patient makes a 
voluntary and informed decision regarding her medical treatment, with a reasonable 
understanding of the consequences of her options. In prenatal care settings involving 
the promotion of prenatal testing for selective abortion, obtaining informed consent 
would thus seem to involve ensuring that the expecting parents understand that if they 
opt for this testing and their future child receives a positive diagnosis for some 
disability, they might face the tough moral choice of whether or not to continue the 
pregnancy.57 Thus, it is important that the information that the medical professional 
communicates while promoting prenatal testing for selective abortion is not false or 
misleading, e.g., by conveying unreflective stereotypes. If such information is false or 
misleading, then the expecting parents would not be able to make an informed 
decision about whether or not to use prenatal testing and the medical professional 
                                               





would not be acting in accordance with a duty to obtain informed consent. For 
example, imagine that a medical professional says to her patient, “You can’t legally 
opt out of this testing.” In this case, we would agree that this medical professional 
would not be acting in accordance with a duty to obtain informed consent from her 
patient to run prenatal tests that might present her with a choice of whether or not to 
terminate the pregnancy; she would be coercing her patient by appealing to the 
authority of the law.  
Now, I think that many of us would also agree that the medical professional 
would not act in accordance with a duty to obtain informed consent if the information 
she communicates by implicature is false or misleading. For example, suppose that a 
medical professional promotes prenatal testing for selective abortion and thereby 
expresses, or communicates by implicature, the meaning or message “You can’t 
legally opt out of this testing.” Although this medical professional does not state this 
information explicitly, she still communicates it—albeit by implicature. Moreover, 
insofar as this information is false and misleading, this medical professional violates a 
duty to obtain informed consent from her patient. And she does this because even if 
she only expresses this information, she nonetheless communicates it—or so I think 
most of us would agree.  
What I’m suggesting, then, is the uncontroversial idea that medical 
professionals can violate a duty to obtain informed consent not only by explicitly 
stating false or misleading information, but also by implicating it. For the purposes of 
the expressivist objection*, however, it’s what the medical professional expresses—





his action. Thus, we can determine whether or not a medical professional acts 
wrongly by looking at whether or not what he expresses, or implicates, while 
promoting prenatal testing for selective abortion is inaccurate or misleading. If it is, 
then in expressing such information, he violates a duty to obtain informed consent 
from his patient.  
Let us reexamine the case of E and F from Section 2. In that example, F 
expresses or implicates the meaning or message that “People who have DS have no 
independence.” Thus the question is: Does F violate a duty to obtain informed 
consent and thereby act wrongly when he promotes prenatal testing for selective 
abortion to E? Now, qualitative data on the daily lives of adults who have DS are 
scarce, but a recent study surveyed family and caregivers of adults with DS, most of 
whom lived in the Midwest, in order to gather such data (Matthews, et al. 2018). 
According to this study, over eighty percent of adults with DS had “no difficulty”—
that is, needed no assistance—when engaging in everyday tasks such as moving 
around in or out of the house, eating meals independently, and dressing and 
undressing themselves. Additionally, the majority of these adults were reported to 
have “no difficulty” using the toilet independently, grooming themselves, and 
washing themselves, and around sixty-percent were reported to have “no difficulty” 
carrying out domestic activities, such as making their beds and light housecleaning, or 
being left home alone for a period greater than two hours.  
I cite this study not to suggest that the message “People who have DS have no 
independence” is obviously false, or that in general people with DS are independent. 





reported to live with family, and only nine percent were reported to live in an 
independent home. Furthermore, over half of these adults were reported to have “a lot 
of difficulty” going out alone, and over seventy-three percent had “a lot of difficulty” 
managing daily finances.58 Rather, I cite this study to suggest that a message such as 
“People who have DS have no independence” is vague or misleading at least in part 
because what counts as independent behavior is not clear.59  
Returning to the example of E and F, though, the idea is that if a meaning or 
message such as “People who have DS have no independence” is inaccurate or 
misleading, in expressing it, F violates a duty to obtain informed consent from E, 
insofar as E would be making a decision to opt for or against prenatal testing based, 
in part, on the idea that a lack of independence might constitute a reason for 
terminating her pregnancy. In other words, F prevents E from making an informed 
decision about whether or not to opt for prenatal testing.  
If I’m right, we can summarize this section by offering a more complete 
formulation of the expressivist objection*—one that, on the one hand, addresses what 
the promotion of prenatal testing for selective abortion might express, and, on the 
                                               
58 “A lot of difficulty” means that they were unable to.  
59 There is also evidence that two main factors associated with greater employment access 
and higher self-sufficiency rates among people who have DS are familial and social support. 
In particular, studies suggest that one reason we don’t see more people who have DS having 
full-time jobs may be more due to their lack of social support than to their cognitive ability. 





other, explains why such an action can, in virtue of what it expresses, be morally 
objectionable:  
The expressivist objection*: The promotion of prenatal testing for selective 
abortion is an illocutionary act that can occur over the course of clinical 
interaction. When medical professionals engage in this action, they sometimes 
express implied messages or meanings that can be about extant disabled 
people. When these expressed messages or meanings are inaccurate or 
misleading, medical professionals act wrongly, as they violate a duty to obtain 
informed consent to do prenatal, disability-related testing on their expecting 
patients.  
Note another important advantage of the expressivist objection* over the 
original expressivist objection. Whereas the original expressivist objection maintains 
that the promotion of prenatal testing for selective abortion is morally objectionable 
because, in expressing a devaluing message, it brings about harmful consequences for 
extant disabled people, the expressivist objection* maintains that the wrong lies in the 
speech act that the medical professional engages in. In other words, according to the 
expressivist objection*, the promotion of prenatal testing for selective abortion can be 
wrong in virtue of what it expresses even if no bad consequences obtain for extant 
disabled people. This does not mean that on the expressivist objection* the 
consequences that the promotion of prenatal testing for selective abortion, in virtue of 
what it expresses, brings about are irrelevant to whether or not this action is morally 
objectionable. The expressivist objection* can grant that bringing about harmful 





expressivist objection* does not need to appeal to those consequences of promoting 
prenatal testing for selective abortion in order to account for the moral wrongness of 
this action. All it needs to appeal to is a duty-based, agent-centered consideration that 
remains even if no bad consequences obtain for extant disabled people.60 
                                               
60 Interestingly, expressing a generic attitude such as “People who have DS have no 
independence” may be morally objectionable independently of whether or not it’s false or 
misleading. For example, the generic “Tigers are striped” often communicates the essentialist 
idea that members of the kind ‘tiger’ share a ‘distinctive, non-obvious and persistent property 
or underlying nature that causally grounds’ their stripedness. Recent findings also suggest 
that while generics are a significant mechanism by which we transmit social information, 
they may be insidious in more ways than one might think: for example, they may be 
implicated in the foundations of social prejudice involving, for example, race, gender or 
sexuality, or a combination of such categories (Leslie 2014, 209). And this may seem 
especially alarming given experimental evidence which suggests that there may be a causal 
link between essentialized beliefs and prejudice (Keller 2005). I don’t mean to suggest that 
this research gives us reason to claim that medical professionals who communicate, by 
implicature, generics about people with DS or about people with disabilities more generally, 
contribute to social prejudice against people with DS or against people with disabilities more 
generally. After all, this research is about explicit generic statements, not about implicit 
generic attitudes or messages. But I do want to suggest that it is at least plausible to think that 
a message such as “People who have DS have no independence” might suggest the 
essentialist generic: namely, that people who have DS, in virtue of having DS—and not, for 






4. Implicature and hyper-implicature 
Thus far, this paper has examined and rejected the original formulation of the 
expressivist objection—a view that locates the wrong of promoting prenatal testing 
for selective abortion strictly in the victim of the action. In its place, I offered the 
expressivist objection*—a view that locates the wrong of promoting prenatal testing 
for selective abortion in the speech act that medical professionals who promote 
prenatal testing for selective abortion engage in. An interesting puzzle arises when we 
consider the possibility that the wrong lies neither in the victims of the action nor in 
the speech act that medical professionals engage in, but, rather, in the agents 
themselves: specifically, in their belief sets. In this section, I examine what I call 
hyper-implicature—that is, information that agents unintentionally communicate via 
their utterances—in order to argue that medical professionals who promote prenatal 
testing for selective abortion may sometimes unintentionally reveal information about 
their own disability-related beliefs. As I will argue, such cases suggest that medical 
professionals may sometimes engage in a moral wrong even if they don’t, in virtue of 
what they reveal, bring about bad consequences or violate a duty to obtain informed 
consent.   
Recall from Section 2 the case of G and H, the aim of which was to highlight 
that on a Gricean picture of meaning, agents communicate at least two kinds of 





G and H. Carrying with him an empty plastic water bottle, G arrives at H’s 
home and asks her “Where do you keep your recycling?”; H replies “Ugh, I’m 
too lazy for that! The trash is under the sink.”  
The idea was that G communicates the literal meaning “Where do you keep 
your recycling?” and implicates, roughly, that he wishes to dispose of the plastic 
bottle; and that H communicates the literal meaning that she is too lazy for a 
recycling bin, that the trash is under the sink, and implicates, roughly, that she does 
not recycle and that G should just use the trash bin. Notice, though, that this is not all 
that G and H communicate in this interaction. Given the literal and implied meanings 
that they communicate, we can infer some additional information about each agent’s 
belief set—or so I believe.  
For instance, given the literal and implied meanings that G communicates, we 
can infer that he probably believes that having recycling bins is the norm, or that he 
thinks of H as someone who recycles. If this were not the case, it would not be clear 
why he would ask “Where do you keep your recycling?” to communicate that he 
wishes to dispose of the plastic bottle—instead of, say, something like “Do you have 
a recycling bin?” or “Do you recycle?” Moreover, in the case of H, we can infer that 
recycling is not something that she is concerned with—or, at the very least, that 
recycling is not a priority for her. If recycling did concern her, or if it was a priority 
for her, it would be odd for her to communicate to G that he should just use the trash 
bin because she is too lazy to recycle. In short, the idea is that sometimes we can infer 
information about an agent’s set of beliefs or value judgments from the meanings she 





recycling bin, and that H does not care much about recycling. In what follows I will 
refer to this revealable kind of information as hyper-implicature—‘hyper-’ because 
although it is implicature-like, it is beyond just implicature in that it can be inferred, 
in part, from what is implicated.61  
Note that what an agent communicates by hyper-implicature is distinct from 
the meanings that she communicates—at least according to the Gricean picture of 
meaning I’ve been considering. Philosophers of language tend to agree that, on a 
Gricean picture of meaning, the intention of the speaker is an important factor in the 
meanings that he communicates. It would thus be a mistake to say that G expresses 
the meaning or message “Recycling is the norm” or “H recycles,” or that H expresses 
the meaning or message “Recycling is not something that concerns me.” A more 
appropriate way to describe what is communicated, I submit, is that each agent 
reveals (although not intentionally) a belief or value judgment that he or she holds. 
Thus, G reveals (although not intentionally) that he believes that H recycles, and H 
reveals (although not intentionally) that she does not value recycling all that much.  
If this is right, it’s conceivable that, in the same way that G and H reveal 
information about their own set of beliefs or value judgments, medical professionals 
also sometimes reveal information about their own set of beliefs or value judgments. 
It also seems plausible that, in contexts involving prenatal testing and selective 
                                               
61 Note that although philosophers of language tend to agree that implicatures are intentional, 






abortion, these hyper-implicatures can be about extant disabled people or about life 
with disability more generally.  
Now, one might highlight that if these hyper-implicatures are inaccurate or 
misleading, a medical professional who reveals them while promoting prenatal testing 
for selective abortion may violate a duty to obtain informed consent from his patient 
in the same way that he would violate a duty to obtain informed consent from his 
patient if he expressed—or, to use the term I’m proposing: hyper-implicated—
inaccurate or misleading information. For example, one might worry that a medical 
professional who, in promoting prenatal testing for selective abortion, hyper-
implicates “People who have DS have no independence” would violate a duty to 
obtain informed consent from his patient to run a prenatal test. I think this possibility 
is worth exploring—especially if we consider that patients tend to think that medical 
professionals’ training and qualifications render their beliefs (and recommendations) 
authoritative. But I will not argue for this here. What I want to examine instead is that 
even if medical professionals who promote prenatal testing for selective abortion and 
thereby hyper-implicate inaccurate or misleading beliefs or value judgments about 
extant disabled people do not, in virtue of revealing such information, violate a duty 
to obtain informed consent from their patients, and even if they do not, in virtue of 
what they reveal, cause any harms to extant disabled people, such cases may still 
contain a moral wrong.  





J and K. J is a medical professional who works at a reproductive clinic where 
prenatal testing for selective abortion is often promoted. In part as a result of 
working at this reproductive clinic, J has come to believe that “People who 
have disabilities, in virtue of having disabilities, have less moral standing than 
individuals who lack disabilities.”62 For example, J has come to believe that 
the interests of people who have disabilities are owed less consideration than 
the interests of people who lack disabilities. Today, J is promoting prenatal 
testing for selective abortion to his patient, K, who is disabled. In so doing, he 
unintentionally reveals that he believes, or hyper-implicates, that “People who 
have disabilities, in virtue of having disabilities, have less moral standing than 
individuals who lack disabilities.” No harmful consequences for extant 
disabled people obtain. 
In this example, while J does not intend to reveal that he believes that “People 
who have disabilities, in virtue of their disabilities, have less moral standing than 
people who lack disabilities,” he nonetheless reveals that he believes this (given what 
he intentionally communicates). Nevertheless, J does not, in virtue of what he reveals, 
bring about any harmful consequences for extant disabled people. Now, remember 
that we are setting aside the possibility that J violates a duty to obtain informed 
consent in virtue of what he reveals. Does a wrong occur even though no harms 
occur, and even though no duty to obtain informed consent is violated? I believe that 
if it does, then at least part of the explanation lies in that J and K contains a doxastic 
                                               





wronging: a kind of wrong that occurs in virtue of what one agent believes about 
another. 
Philosophers tend to agree that it is actions—not beliefs—that wrong. If I treat 
another person merely as a means, I wrong her, but if I merely believe that I can treat 
her merely as a means, without ever so treating her, I do not wrong her. Contrary to 
this idea, however, Rima Basu and Mark Schroeder (2019) have recently offered a 
prima facie case for the existence of doxastic wrongs.63 As Basu and Schroeder put it, 
a doxastic wronging occurs “if one person wrongs another in virtue of what she 
believes about him.” Consider their own example: 
[S]uppose that you have struggled with an alcohol problem for many years, but have 
been sober for eight months. Tonight you attend a departmental reception for a 
visiting colloquium speaker, and are proud of withstanding the temptation to have a 
drink. But when you get home, your spouse smells the wine that the colloquium 
speaker spilled on your sleeve while gesticulating to make a point, and you can see 
from her eyes that that she thinks you have fallen off of the wagon. If you are like us, 
then you will be prone to feel wounded by this. Yes, you have a long history of 
falling off of the wagon, and yes, there is some evidence that this time is another. 
You can see how it could be reasonable for someone to draw this conclusion. But it 
                                               
63 Basu and Schroeder’s aim, though, is to defend the existence of doxastic wrongs from 
some likely objections, and argue that if they are right, then the existence of doxastic wrongs 





still hurts – not least because in your eyes, tonight was an achievement to stay on the 
wagon despite adverse circumstances. (Basu and Schroeder 2019)64 
Basu and Schroeder extract three characteristics of doxastic wrongs from this 
example. First, they indicate, that you feel wounded by your spouse’s having the 
belief that you have fallen off the wagon suggests that your spouse isn’t just wrong in 
believing this, but that she has wronged you.65 Second, the wrong that occurs is not a 
matter of what led your spouse to have the belief that you fell off the wagon—i.e., 
that you have this history and that tonight you came home smelling like wine. Nor is 
it a matter of what actions follow from her belief—e.g., if she were to falsely accuse 
you. Rather, it is a matter of her having the belief.66 Finally, the wronging occurs in 
                                               
64 In support for the existence of doxastic wrongs, Basu and Schroeder also cite the Book of 
Common Prayer’s Rite II version of the Eucharist, in which the congregation confesses that 
“we have sinned against you in thought, word, and deed.” 
65 Note that this point is not convincing. Although people may feel wounded when they are 
wronged, that one might feel wounded when one is wronged need not entail that one has been 
wronged. In other words, feeling wounded need not track wrongings. Nevertheless, one need 
not agree with this point of Basu and Schroeder’s analysis to consider the possibility that 
doxastic wrongs exist.  
66 As Basu and Schroeder put it, “For example, it would feel insincere and unsatisfying if 
[your spouse] apologized for the upstream act of not investigating more carefully before 
forming this belief, but continued to believe it anyway, or if she apologized for the 






virtue of what your spouse believes: she believes something false about you. In short, 
Basu and Schroeder believe that doxastic wrongs are directed, that they occur in 
virtue of holding a certain belief, and that they are wrongs in virtue of what is 
believed (something false). 
Notice that J and K seems to fit these criteria. In believing that “People who 
have disabilities, in virtue of their disabilities, have less moral standing than people 
who lack disabilities,” J seems to wrong K (and people like K). Moreover, what 
seems morally objectionable about this case is not what leads J to have this belief—
e.g., his work environment. Nor is it what follows from his belief, since no bad 
consequences obtain in virtue of his having or revealing this belief. Rather, it is that J 
believes that “People who have disabilities, in virtue of their disabilities, have less 
moral standing than people who lack disabilities” that seems morally objectionable. 
Finally, the wrong that occurs is a wrong in virtue of what is believed: that K (and 
people like K), in virtue of their disabilities, have less moral standing than people who 
lack disabilities.  
What I’m proposing, then, is that if we find the case of J and K morally 
disconcerting, it might be because J believes that “People who have disabilities, in 
virtue of their disabilities, have less moral standing than people who lack 
disabilities”—and not because J brings about negative consequences for extant 
disabled people in virtue of what he reveals (he doesn’t), nor because he violates a 
duty to obtain informed consent in virtue of what he reveals (since we are setting this 





Basu and Schroeder would suggest that part of the wrong lies in that J’s belief 
is false.67 But I want to consider a different possibility that I find plausible: that J 
wrongs K because his belief involves a moral error. Others have considered the idea 
that the moral error involved in a doxastic wrong lies in the process by which a 
morally questionable belief is formed. For example, Basu (2019) argues that beliefs 
wrong when they violate an obligation of “what we epistemically owe to each 
other.”68 What we epistemically owe to each other, she maintains, is to treat each 
other, in thought, not as things that can be studied and predicted but as persons. When 
we fail at this, we make a moral error.  
                                               
67 In line with this point, one might think that J’s belief involves an epistemic error. See 
(Schroeder 2018). To clarify, the idea is that if doxastic wrongs exist, then there may be 
beliefs that are morally wrong, and this would seem to impact what we take to be 
epistemically justified. Schroeder appeals to stakes-related reasons in order to argue that 
beliefs wrong only when they falsely diminish and that they falsely diminish when there are 
moral reasons that make it harder to justify a belief. Such moral reasons lie in the risks of 
having a belief that’s false, such that “believing it can be unacceptably risky, even in cases in 
which it happens to be true.” Examining Schroeder’s account appropriately is well beyond 
the scope of this paper, but it’s worth noting that it would seem to suggest that the wrong in J 
and K stems from the unacceptable risk of J’s believing that “People who have disabilities, in 
virtue of their disabilities, have less moral standing than people who lack disabilities,” such 
that if J is wrong, his belief would “guarantee an epistemic fault.” 
68 Basu invokes Sherlock Holmes as an example: Holmes “observes everyone as objects to be 






What I want to examine, though, is that the moral error in a doxastic wrong 
lies not (or not only) in an obligation that is violated in the process in which the belief 
is formed, but (also) in the kind of belief that is held. Consider the following case: 
L and M. While promoting prenatal testing for selective abortion, L reveals to 
his patient M, who has DS, that he believes that “People who have DS can’t 
live alone.” No harmful consequences occur as a result of L’s revealing that he 
holds this belief, and L does not violate a duty to obtain informed consent 
from M.  
To clarify, L does not explicitly say that “People who have DS can’t live 
alone,” nor does he implicate it. Rather, he communicates it by hyper-implicature. 
Nevertheless, I think that many of us would agree that unlike J in the example 
above—who seems to wrong K in virtue of revealing that he believes that “People 
who have disabilities, in virtue of their disabilities, have less moral standing than 
people who lack disabilities”—L does not seem to wrong M in virtue revealing that he 
believes that “People who have DS can’t live alone”—even if this belief is false.69 
                                               
69 It’s worth noting that one might worry that given his profession, L has an obligation to 
learn basic pertinent facts about people who have DS, such that in believing that “People who 
have DS can’t live alone,” L might fail to fulfill this duty and might thereby fall short of 
giving sufficient concern to his patients. But I will set this worry aside in part because 
according to the study from above, the majority of adults with DS (seventy-eight percent) 






This difference in judgment, I believe, stems from a familiar distinction between 
evaluative judgments and descriptive judgments.70 To clarify, J’s belief is quite 
straightforwardly an evaluative judgment: it is a moral judgment about the moral 
standing of another person or group of people in virtue of their having a disability. 
But L’s belief is not (or not clearly) an evaluative judgment. L’s belief seems better 
described as a descriptive judgment about what life with DS involves. My point is not 
that there is a clear-cut distinction between an evaluative judgment such as J’s and a 
descriptive judgment such as L’s. After all, one might think that an attitude such as 
“People with DS can’t live alone” at the very least suggests a judgment about the 
value of living alone. My point is simply that if this distinction holds up, one might 
think that the reason J wrongs K, and L does not wrong M, is that J makes a moral 
error—not just a descriptive or epistemic error such as L’s.  
An adequate defense of this position is beyond the scope of this paper, but let 
me note one plausible way we might proceed. We might claim that J’s belief, but not 
L’s belief, involves a kind of category mistake about what we are morally permitted 
or not permitted to believe about other agents. Stephen Darwall’s (1977) notion of 
                                               
70 Hare (1952) makes this kind of distinction, but he is concerned with the relationship 
between descriptive and evaluative judgments. As he argues, descriptive remarks are often 
given as a reason for making an evaluative remark: for example, “This strawberry is sweet” 
(a descriptive judgment) is often given as a reason for “This is a good strawberry” (at p. 111). 
For the purposes of this paper, however, this relationship is not relevant; all I want to 






recognition respect offers some guidance here. As I read Darwall, recognition respect 
involves a disposition to weigh appropriately in one’s deliberations the fact that 
another agent is a person, such that that person’s status restricts the set of actions that 
are permissible to an agent. Invoking this notion, we might contend that recognition 
respect might also involve a disposition to weigh appropriately in one’s moral 
deliberations the fact that another agent is a person, such that that person’s status 
restricts the set of attitudes or judgments that are permissible to hold about another 
person. Doxastic wrongs, then, could be understood as involving a failure of 
recognition respect. In other words, they could be understood as involving a 
disposition to give inappropriate weight to some irrelevant fact about another agent in 
one’s moral deliberations. On this proposal, J might wrong K insofar as in believing 
that K has lower moral standing in virtue of her disability, he gives inappropriate 
weight to some irrelevant fact about K (i.e., her disability), thereby failing to respect 
her in the ‘recognition respect’ sense of the term. And in so failing, he makes a moral 
error. By contrast, in the example of L and M, it’s not straightaway clear that L fails 
to ‘recognition respect’ M by believing that people like M, in virtue of having DS, 
can’t live alone. This belief may be somewhat inaccurate or misguided, but it need 
not involve giving inappropriate weight to the fact that M is a person. In other words, 
it need not amount to wronging her. 
If I’m right, we can summarize this section by offering a final formulation of 
the expressivist objection* that leaves room for the existence of doxastic wrongs: 
The expressivist objection*: The promotion of prenatal testing for selective 





interaction. When medical professionals engage in this action, they sometimes 
express implied messages or meanings that can be about extant disabled 
people. When these expressed messages or meanings are inaccurate or 
misleading, medical professionals act wrongly, as they violate a duty to obtain 
informed consent to do prenatal, disability-related testing on their expecting 
patients. But medical professionals may also hyper-implicate morally 
erroneous attitudes about extant disabled people. In such cases, medical 
professionals might wrong extant disabled people even if they don’t, in virtue 
of what they reveal, violate a duty to obtain informed consent from their 
patients.  
Now, an opponent might ask: given the training that medical professionals in 
general and genetic counselors in particular receive, how likely is it that they will 
promote prenatal testing for selective abortion in the morally objectionable ways that 
I have described? If not at all likely, then how is the position I’ve presented 
interesting? I don’t know how likely it is that medical professionals will express or 
reveal the morally problematic attitudes I have offered as examples throughout this 
paper. What I do know is that there is reason to be hesitant to accept the idea that 
because medical professionals are trained professionals, they are immune to moral 





medical research, consider that there is reason to worry that race71 and gender72 may 
play a role in the treatment that patients receive in healthcare settings, and that some 
medical professionals have reportedly refused to treat LGBT patients.73 More relevant 
to the topic at hand, however, consider that some disabled people report questionable 
interactions with medical professionals, and that research suggests that older people 
who have a disability are more likely than those who don’t have a disability to 
experience discrimination in healthcare settings.74 While these data do not directly 
suggest that medical professionals who promote prenatal testing for selective abortion 
do so in the morally objectionable ways I have described, they do give us a reason not 
to assume that they don’t.  
In this section, my goal was to establish the possibility that medical 
professionals may engage in something that’s morally wrong not only if they engage 
in the speech act of promoting prenatal testing for selective abortion when so doing 
violates a duty to obtain informed consent, but also if they ‘merely’ hold a certain 
kind of belief about people who have disabilities. On this view, the promotion of 
prenatal testing for selective abortion is sometimes a manifestation of a doxastic 
                                               
71 See, for example, Tello (2017). 
72 For instance, women may have a hard time finding a doctor who takes them seriously in 
their request for tubal ligation. See Mattoni (2017). 
73 See, for example, Green (2016).  
74 According to Rogers et al. (2015), “[o]ne out of five adults over the age of 50 years 
experiences discrimination in healthcare settings. One in 17 experience frequent healthcare 





wrong. In other words, the promotion of prenatal testing for selective abortion is not, 
on this view, wrong in itself. Rather, it contains a moral wrong when it reveals that 
the agent holds a morally erroneous belief about another agent. Importantly, though, 
it’s not the revealing of such a belief that’s morally objectionable (although one 
might think that revealing such beliefs betrays basic decency); rather, it’s the holding 
of such a belief that’s morally objectionable. In other words, a medical professional 
may be engaged in something that’s morally objectionable even if she never reveals 
that she holds a morally erroneous belief about another agent.  
If I’m right, then it seems to follow that medical professionals in general—
that is, not just medical professionals who promote prenatal testing for selective 
abortion—may wrong some of their patients merely by holding morally objectionable 
beliefs about them. While I will not argue for this here, I welcome this consequence 
of my view and hope that I have said enough to motivate an interesting line of 
thought that may help us better understand why a case like J and K, but not a case 
like L and M, seems to be morally objectionable.  
5. Concluding Remarks  
In this paper, I first argued that the current understanding of the expressivist objection 
faces various problems. Specifically, it is imprecise, both with respect to what the 
promotion of prenatal testing for selective abortion purportedly expresses and with 
regard to why promoting prenatal testing for selective abortion is morally 
objectionable. Moreover, as a result of this imprecision, the current formulation of the 





such as the promotion of prenatal testing for selective abortion expresses, and 
obscures other, non-consequentialist wrongs that such an action may involve. I then 
offered an improved formulation of the expressivist objection: the expressivist 
objection*. This improved formulation conceives of the act of promoting prenatal 
testing for abortion on grounds of disability as an illocutionary act that involves both 
literal meanings and implied meanings, or implicatures. According to this expressivist 
objection*, when medical professionals express implied meanings that are inaccurate 
or misleading, they violate a duty to obtain informed consent from their patients and 
thereby act wrongly. Nevertheless, sometimes medical professionals hyper-implicate, 
or reveal (although not intentionally), that they hold inaccurate or misleading attitudes 
about people who have disabilities. Such cases seem to manifest a different kind of 
wrong: a doxastic wrong that is independent both of any consequences the medical 
professional may bring about in virtue of revealing a morally erroneous attitude, and 
of any violations of a duty to obtain informed consent that may occur as a result of 
what the medical professional reveals. In short, according to the expressivist 
objection*, medical professionals may engage in a moral wrong not only when they 
express inaccurate or misleading attitudes while promoting prenatal testing for 
selective abortion, thereby violating a duty to obtain informed consent from their 
patients, but also when they hold a morally erroneous belief about other agents, 
including their patients who have disabilities.  
Thus, the expressivist objection* does not entail that the promotion of prenatal 
testing for selective abortion is always wrong. But it also does not entail that the 





entails is that the promotion of prenatal testing for selective abortion can be wrong. 
It’s thus worth remembering that not all cases of promoting prenatal testing involve 
the aim of terminating a pregnancy on grounds of disability; medical professionals 
may also promote prenatal testing with the end of learning more about the fetus, just 
in case the child will have a disability, so that expecting parents can be better 
prepared to welcome their child Medical professionals who wish to avoid the risk of 
engaging in a moral wrong may thus choose to promote the use of prenatal testing for 
the sake of learning more about the fetus or for the sake of respecting parental 
autonomy, rather than for the sake of terminating the pregnancy if there is a positive 
result for a disability. The promotion of prenatal testing for the sake of learning more 
about the fetus seems, at least prima facie, less likely to involve the expression or 
hyper-implicature of an erroneous or misleading attitude. Alternatively, medical 
professionals may choose to avoid making recommendations about prenatal testing 
altogether and just offer this service in a neutral way. But then it’s important to note 
that the act of offering prenatal testing is a different kind of action and may require an 






Chapter 4: Indirect Benefits and Double Jeopardy in the 
Allocation of Scarce, Lifesaving Resources 
 
Introduction 
The outcomes of allocating scarce, lifesaving resources, such as organs for 
transplantation, often involve varying kinds of benefits, including direct and indirect 
benefits.75 In this paper, I will understand direct benefits to be those that benefit the 
recipient of a resource, e.g., by extending her life or improving her quality of life; and 
indirect benefits as those that, as a result of being allocated to a direct beneficiary, 
benefit third parties, e.g., by saving their lives or by improving socioeconomic 
conditions.76 For example, imagine we had one dose left of a life-saving vaccine and 
we had to choose between saving A or B, both of whom, if saved, would live another 
forty years. A is a thirty-year-old analyst who, if saved, would continue to lead a life 
of minimal social contribution, and B is a fifty-year-old diplomat who, if saved, 
would be able to attend a meeting at which he would prevent World War III, thereby 
saving millions of lives.77 In this case, saving A would generate a direct benefit to A: 
                                               
75 Benefits can also be distinguished as health-related or non-health-related, but, for the sake 
of simplicity, I will not discuss that distinction here. For a discussion of that distinction, see 
Brock (2003) and Bognar (2008). 
76 Cf. Brock (2003) and Kamm (1993). For a discussion of different conceptions of 
direct/indirect benefits, see Du Toit and Millum (2016), who argue that there is no morally 
relevant distinction between direct and indirect benefits.  





i.e., forty years of life; but saving B would generate not only a direct benefit to B: i.e., 
forty years of life, but also an indirect benefit to society or third parties: i.e., the 
prevention of WWIII, thereby saving millions of lives. As this example suggests, 
counting indirect benefits may at least sometimes be permissible: saving B would lead 
to much better consequences than not doing so, since it would prevent WWIII and 
thereby spare millions of lives. 
Bioethicists tend to assume that it would be wrong to decide between 
candidates for a scarce, lifesaving resource on the basis of the indirect benefits that he 
or she may generate: e.g., on the basis of her social contribution. One kind of worry is 
practical: it’s not clear which factors indicative of social contribution would 
constitute suitable allocation criteria. Another kind of worry is that such an allocation 
scheme would disregard the value of the life of the direct beneficiary by giving undue 
preference to the desires and interests of third parties. However, as I argue in this 
paper, neither of these kinds of worries is compelling enough against the idea that 
indirect benefits such as social contribution should count when resources are scarce 
and not all can be saved. But there is another objection to the view that indirect 
benefits such as social contribution should count in scarce resource allocation: the 
double jeopardy objection.78 Imagine that we had one dose left of a life-saving 
                                               
78 The ‘double jeopardy objection’ was first offered by Harris (1987) against the use of the 
Quality-Adjusted Life-Year (QALY) measure for priority setting in health care, which I 
discuss in Section 2. For other fairness-based objections, see Du Toit and Millum (2016), 





vaccine, but we had to choose between saving C or saving D, both of whom, if saved, 
would live another twenty years. Imagine, further, that C is employed and D is 
unemployed, and that, if saved, C would immediately be able to go back to work and 
thereby contribute to economic productivity, whereas D, if saved, would not (or not 
immediately) be able to do so. A policy that counted indirect benefits in this case 
would have a reason to choose C over D: choosing C would, it would be reasonable 
to believe, lead to better consequences, e.g., in terms of economic productivity. But, 
the double jeopardy objection would go, choosing C would put D in a kind of double 
jeopardy: not only is she already worse off than C: i.e., she is unemployed, but now 
because she is unemployed and thereby worse off, this allocation scheme would give 
her lower consideration for a lifesaving drug.79 The idea, then, is that an allocation 
scheme that counted indirect benefits such as social contribution would, in this case, 
put an individual who is already at a disadvantage into a further disadvantage on the 
basis of her prior disadvantage. 
In this paper, I argue that a careful examination of this double jeopardy 
objection might reveal a stronger foundation for the view that, when resources are 
                                               
79 It’s worth noting that one might here appeal to a prioritarian ideal according to which 
priority should be given to those who are worse off. For example, according to Parfit, the 
moral significance of a benefit depends not only on “how great this benefit would be,” but 
also on “how well off the person is to whom this benefit comes” (1997, 213). In other words, 





scarce and not all can be saved, counting indirect benefits such as social contribution, 
at least in certain social conditions, would be wrong.  
The paper develops as follows. Section 1 begins by surveying some of the 
arguments for and against counting indirect benefits such as social contribution in 
scarce resource allocation. Section 2 then introduces the double jeopardy objection to 
counting such benefits, arguing that this objection can be understood in a weak sense, 
according to which a certain rationing scheme might result in injustice, and in a 
strong sense, according to which a rationing scheme might compound injustice. The 
strong sense of double jeopardy, I argue, seems worse than the weak sense of double 
jeopardy when the agent that compounds injustice is the same agent that brings about 
the original injustice. Next, in Section 3, I recruit data from the U.S. Bureau of Labor 
to argue, first, that counting indirect benefits such as social contribution would, in the 
contemporary U.S., be likely to put certain social groups, e.g., in terms of race, in 
strong double jeopardy. I then argue that, in the contemporary U.S., such a policy 
would be worse than one that put such social groups in double jeopardy in the weak 
sense because of who the agent who compounds injustice is. Section 4 addresses 
some objections, and Section 5 considers the implications of my view for allocation 
schemes that make assumptions about the value of life with disability. 
1. Why and why not count indirect benefits in scarce resource allocation  
The case in which we must save either the diplomat who would prevent World War 
III and thereby spare millions of lives, or some other person who would not 





social contribution when resources are scarce and not all can be saved.80 The strength 
of this case is undeniable; it works even if the diplomat’s expected direct benefit from 
the resource is lower than the other person’s. For example, even if the life of the 
diplomat were expected to be extended by only two years, whereas the life of the 
other person were expected to be extended by twenty, many of us would still find it 
permissible to save the diplomat. Some might even say that, given the type of indirect 
benefit that he would bring about, the diplomat is of “greater value” (Basson 1979). 
This section begins by discussing the main argument for counting indirect benefits 
such as social contribution when resources are scarce and not all can be saved. I then 
examine two types of objection to this argument, arguing that neither is compelling 
enough to support the idea that counting indirect benefits such as social contribution 
would be morally objectionable.  
                                               
80 It’s worth noting right away, though, that there is also a prima facie case against counting 
indirect benefits such as social contribution or, e.g., social worth. Suppose we had to choose 
between two individuals who are equal in all respects except that one has slightly greater 
social worth. Suppose, further, that this slightly greater social worth came from her slightly 
better manners. In such a case, counting indirect benefits in terms of social worth, i.e., 
slightly better manners, is clearly not a morally legitimate consideration for favoring one 
person over another when they are competing for a scarce, lifesaving resource. Kamm (1993) 
makes this point. While I will not discuss this further, note that one might respond, in favor of 
counting such indirect benefits, that we are dealing with something very different when the 





The main argument in favor of counting indirect benefits such as social 
contribution is consequentialist in nature.81 The idea is that when resources are scarce 
and not all can be saved, counting indirect benefits, e.g., in terms of social 
contribution, would produce better consequences than not counting them.82 
Importantly, according to this argument, when resources are scarce and not all can be 
saved, there is no principled reason for only counting indirect benefits that are 
lifesaving: e.g., the indirect benefits of saving the diplomat—that is, sparing millions 
of lives (Basson 1979). In other words, the idea is that if we find it permissible to 
count the indirect benefits of an allocation scheme when doing so would spare 
millions of lives (i.e., bring about better consequences than not counting such 
benefits), it seems like we should, on the same grounds, find it permissible to count 
the indirect benefits of an allocation scheme when doing so would bring about other 
kinds of benefits (i.e., better consequences than not counting such benefits). Such 
indirect benefits may take various forms: for example, they may manifest in terms of 
economic growth or societal wellbeing. But the point is that not counting them would 
amount to a kind of waste of resources—or so many would seem to agree. 
                                               
81 Note that one might also appeal to a kind of fairness consideration in defense of counting 
indirect benefits: that the possibility of receiving resources has been made possible through 
social investment, and so society’s interests, or the interests of third-parties, should play a 
role in how these resources are allocated or used. For this view, see Shatin (1966) and 
Rescher (1969). 
82 Lippert-Rasmussen and Lauridsen (2010) refer to this kind of view as health non-





Nevertheless, this consequentialist argument for counting indirect benefits in 
scarce resource allocation raises several worries. One of them is practical: it is unclear 
which factors indicative of indirect societal benefit would constitute suitable 
allocation criteria. For example, would number of dependents or ability to contribute 
to the economy be relevant factors? One response to this worry is that deciphering 
suitable allocation criteria is at least prima facie not an impossible task, as we might 
form committees of laypeople in order to come up with allocation criteria that are in 
accordance with societal values (Basson 1979, Rescher 1969, Shatin 1966). Of 
course, the worry then is that such committees might generate criteria that are biased 
or unreflective, such as assuming that societal benefit is just a matter of wealth or 
power.83 Nevertheless, while it may be difficult or impossible to eliminate such biases 
altogether, it does not seem unreasonable to think that efforts could be undertaken to 
reduce such biases.84 For example, as I argue in Section 3, while it may seem 
reasonable to think that economic contribution would be an acceptable way to gauge 
indirect benefit to society, a careful analysis of what this would bring about in the 
                                               
83 See, for example, Alexander (1977) for a discussion of many questionable factors that may 
have played a role in the allocation of dialysis machines in an Oregon hospital in the 1960s, 
including ability to pay and moral character.  
84 Suggestions to this end include conducting opinion surveys (Shatin 1966) and forming 
committees of experts (Basson 1979). But note that there is reason to think that conducting 
opinion surveys alone would not circumvent the worry that forming committees of laypeople 
could lead to criteria that are immoral. A committee of laypeople formed in Nazi Germany 





contemporary U.S., for instance, might reveal some important moral concerns. I will 
thus set aside this practical worry with counting indirect benefits such as social 
contribution. 
Another kind of objection to the consequentialist argument for counting 
indirect benefits such as social contribution involves a set of worries regarding the 
idea that social contribution might be assessed by counting number of dependents 
(Harris 1985). Imagine we had to choose between giving a lifesaving drug to Jane, 
who has five children who are dependent on her, or to some other person who has no 
dependents. A policy that counted indirect benefits such as social contribution in 
terms of number of dependents would seem to generate a reason to save Jane: saving 
Jane, unlike saving the other person, would bring about indirect benefits to her five 
children.85 Nevertheless, as Harris (1985) writes, 
If the fact that Jane has children who want her to live, and are dependent on her, is a 
good reason for saving her rather than me, why shouldn’t the fact that she has 
children who want her dead be a good reason for saving me rather than her?  
Harris’ point is that if we do not find it appropriate to count the desires and interests 
of third parties as justifications against someone (i.e., choosing not to save her), then 
                                               
85 Harris uses the term ‘social usefulness’ instead of ‘social contribution,’ but I take these to 





we also should not find it appropriate to count the desires and interests of third parties 
in favor of someone (i.e., choosing to save her over someone else).86  
But Harris’ worry is misguided. While it does seem inappropriate to count 
Jane’s children’s wants as justifications against her, the point seems less strong when 
it comes to counting her children’s interests against her—that is, their dependence on 
her. To clarify, suppose Jane abuses her children. In this case, regardless of whether 
or not the children want Jane dead, many of us might find it appropriate to discount 
her claim on the drug on grounds that saving her would not be in the interest of her 
children.87 In other words, even if Harris is right that counting the desires of third 
                                               
86 Consider another example, adapted from Lippert-Rasmussen and Lauridsen (2010). 
Imagine a former popstar who is in need of a scarce, lifesaving resource and who, if saved, 
would go on to make a new album. Now, suppose that one of the things we know about this 
former popstar is that last month a representative poll revealed that many people in our 
society have a strong preference against her making a new album, and that very few people 
have a slight preference for her making a new album. Should the fact that many people have a 
strong preference against the former popstar making a new album be counted against her? 
Harris’ point is that if we do not find it appropriate to count the interests and desires of third 
parties (i.e., people in our society) as justifications against someone (i.e., choosing not to 
save the popstar), then we should not find it appropriate to count other indirect benefits in 
favor of someone (i.e., choosing to save him over someone else). 
87 In the case of the popstar, the idea would be that the reason we find it inappropriate to 





parties against someone would be inappropriate, there may be good reasons for 
counting their interests. Harris’ third-party desires and interests objection to counting 
number of dependents is thus not conclusive against the consequentialist argument for 
counting indirect benefits, either. 
But Harris thinks that there is an additional problem with counting indirect 
benefits such as number of dependents when resources are scarce and not all can be 
saved. He thinks that doing so might, at the policy level, amount to a “systematic 
family preference.” This idea takes two forms. First, Harris thinks that counting 
number of dependents would lead to two kinds of citizens: those with families and 
those without, where those without families would carry the burden of never being 
chosen when competing for resources against those with families. Note that to agree 
with Harris one must assume that this would happen if all other relevant factors—e.g., 
prognosis—were equal; otherwise, it’s not clear how this family preference would 
arise.88 In any case, Harris’ point is that while it is true that dependents would be 
caused great misery and loss if their loved one is not saved, this does not entail that 
these dependents have a right to, or ought to, be “protected against such misery and 
                                               
new album, but rather that it would not be really bad for society, i.e., in terms of dependence, 
if the popstar were saved and went on to make a new album. 
88 It’s generally agreed upon that prognosis is a relevant factor when allocating a lifesaving 
drug. For instance, if we had to save X or Y, both of whom are 20 years old, but X had a 
prognosis of 2 years if saved, while Y had a prognosis of 40 years if saved, many people 





loss, at the expense of the lives of others who also would be miserable and suffer a 
great loss if they were to die prematurely” (Harris 1985). 
Note, though, that this point depends on the kind of misery and loss in 
question. One might think that some kinds of misery and loss may be acceptable 
considerations for choosing to save one person over another: e.g., if such misery and 
loss included life-threatening conditions for the family members or other third parties. 
Thus, even if Harris were right that counting number of dependents would lead to 
individuals without families carrying the burden of never being chosen for a 
lifesaving treatment, such a preference may, at least in some cases, be justified.  
Harris’ second formulation of the worry that counting number of dependents 
would lead to a systematic family preference is that counting number of dependents 
might serve as a reason for people to see the acquisition of dependents as a kind of 
insurance for a higher priority rating. Harris’ worry is that although this may lead to 
positive consequences—e.g., more durable marriages, more intense custody battles, 
or higher rates of adoption—these consequences are unlikely to be preferable, 
morally, to giving individuals lower priority based on a low number of dependents.  
But this point seems unwarranted, too. Accumulating a steady number of 
dependents would quickly become a quite expensive burden, thereby disqualifying 
this as an option for many people. Moreover, it seems unlikely that individuals would 
consider seriously such expensive, long-term commitments just in case they happen 
to need some scarce lifesaving resource in the future. Harris’ worry that counting 
number of dependents may lead people to see the acquisition of dependents as a kind 





To sum up: the underlying argument for counting indirect benefits when 
resources are scarce and not all can be saved is consequentialist in nature: the claim is 
that counting indirect benefits such as social contribution would bring about better 
consequences than not counting them. Two types of objections have been raised 
against this argument: a practical one about how to gauge indirect benefits, and one 
about counting social contribution in the form of number of dependents; but neither is 
conclusive against the claim that indirect benefits such as social contribution should 
count. Might counting indirect benefits such as social contribution be morally 
objectionable for other reasons? In the next section, I recruit Harris’ (1987) double 
jeopardy objection to the use of the Quality-Adjusted Life-Year measure for priority 
setting in health care in order to offer a stronger case for the idea that it would be 
wrong for a scarce resource allocation scheme to count indirect benefits such as social 
contribution. 
2. Two concepts of ‘double jeopardy’ 
My goal in this section is to lay the groundwork for the idea that certain kinds of 
allocation schemes, e.g., those that count indirect benefits such as social contribution, 
are morally objectionable because they risk putting certain people in double jeopardy. 
To this end, I make a distinction between a ‘weak’ sense of double jeopardy, 
according to which an allocation scheme brings about injustice, and a ‘strong’ sense 
of double jeopardy, according to which an allocation scheme brings about additional 
injustice—or, equally, compounds injustice. As I argue, strong double jeopardy seems 
worse if the allocating agent or entity is the same agent or entity that brought about an 





The double jeopardy objection originates in a paper by Harris (1987) against 
the use of the Quality-Adjusted Life-Year (QALY) measure for priority setting in 
healthcare. The QALY measure seeks to offer allocation recommendations that are 
based on the number of ‘QALYs’ that a certain allocation scheme would generate. 
QALYs are calculated by taking into account the life expectancy as well as the 
expected quality of life of an individual or group of individuals who would benefit 
from a health treatment.89 On this system, a high priority healthcare activity is one 
that generates a low cost per QALY; a low priority healthcare activity is one that 
generates a high cost per QALY. Harris’ worry is that because the QALY system 
measures expected quality of life, and because people who have disabilities are more 
likely to have a lower expected quality of life than people who lack disabilities, using 
                                               
89 Harris (1987) quotes Alan Williams, “the architect of QALYs”: 
The essence of a QALY is that it takes a year of healthy life expectancy to be worth 
one, but regards a year of unhealthy life expectancy as worth less than 1. Its precise 
value is lower the worse the quality of life of the unhealthy person (which is what the 
"quality adjusted" bit is all about). If being dead is worth zero, it is, in principle, 
possible for a QALY to be negative, i.e., for the quality of someone's life to be 
judged worse than being dead. 
The general idea is that a beneficial health care activity is one that generates a 
positive amount of QALYs, and that an efficient health care activity is one where the 
cost per QALY is as low as it can be. A high priority health care activity is one where 






the QALY system would effectively lead to a systematic preference against people 
who have disabilities—both in terms of making allocation decisions between 
candidates, and in terms of making decisions about which treatments to fund. For 
example, imagine we had to save either a person who just suffered an accident and 
who, if saved, would live with paraplegia, or some other person who, if saved, would 
make a perfect recovery. Furthermore, imagine that each candidate would live 
another twenty years if saved. As Harris puts it, 
QALYs dictate that because an individual is unfortunate, because she has once 
become a victim of disaster, we are required to visit upon her a second and perhaps 
graver misfortune. The first disaster leaves her with a poor quality of life and QALYs 
then require that in virtue of this she be ruled out as a candidate for lifesaving 
treatment, or at best, that she be given little or no chance of benefiting from what 
little amelioration her condition admits of. Her first disaster leaves her with a poor 
quality of life and when she presents herself for help, along come QALYs and finish 
her off! (Harris 1987, 120) 
Harris’ point is that the QALY measure puts the candidate who became 
paraplegic as a result of misfortune in double jeopardy. Not only does she suffer a 
misfortune: i.e., is left paraplegic and thereby with a lower expected quality of life, 
but because of this misfortune, the QALY measure presents her with an injustice: it 
gives her unfair or unjust lower consideration for a scarce lifesaving treatment.90 Put 
                                               
90 Harris (1995) offers two arguments for thinking that the QALY system is unjust. One is 
based on his idea that the value of the life of one person (who wants to go on living) is equal 





differently, not only is the patient who was a victim of an accident already worse off 
than the patient who would make a full recovery, but because she is worse off, the 
QALY measure makes her even worse off: she now gets a lower priority score for a 
lifesaving treatment. In still other words, the QALY measure puts the person who is 
already at a disadvantage into a further disadvantage on the basis of her prior 
disadvantage (Singer, et al. 1995). 
Consider the double jeopardy objection against an allocation scheme that 
counted indirect benefits such as social contribution. Recall the case of C or D from 
above. C is employed, D is unemployed, and, if saved, each would live an additional 
twenty years. A rationing scheme that counted indirect benefits, e.g., in terms of 
economic productivity, would in the case of C or D generate a reason for saving C: it 
would be reasonable to believe that saving C, because he is employed, would bring 
about better consequences for society, i.e., in terms of economic contribution, than 
saving D. However, the double jeopardy objection would go, saving C on these 
grounds would amount to putting D in a kind of double jeopardy: not only would D 
                                               
value does not vary depending on, e.g., how many more years an individual will live or what 
her expected quality of life will be. He thus seems to think that a system (or any system) that 
gives higher priority to one individual over another is unjust, for it gives inappropriate weight 
to the life of one person over the life of another. The other argument that Harris offers for 
thinking that the QALY system is unjust is that if a community “values individuals 
differentially according to the success of their lives and its quality and predicted length of un-
elapsed time, this is highly likely to have a disastrous effect on [those individuals’] sense of 





be already worse off than C, i.e., she is unemployed; but because she worse off, she 
would now receive a lower priority score for a lifesaving treatment. In other words, 
choosing C on grounds of the indirect benefits that saving her would generate would 
put D, who is already at a disadvantage, into a further disadvantage on the basis of her 
prior disadvantage.  
A supporter of counting indirect benefits such as social contribution might 
respond that in order for this double jeopardy objection to work, we would need a 
reason to think that D’s being unemployed actually makes her already worse off than 
C (Du Toit and Millum 2016, Singer, et al. 1995). If D is poor and unemployed, for 
instance, then giving higher priority to C may well make D even worse off. But 
suppose D happened to be the recipient of a very large inheritance. In this case, even 
though D is unemployed, she is not already worse off than C. Giving higher priority 
to C would thus not make D even worse off—in other words, it would not put D in 
double jeopardy. Thus, this reply to the double jeopardy objection would go, the 
double jeopardy objection is unsuccessful because it does not always work; counting 
indirect benefits such as economic contribution may or may not further disadvantage 
an individual who is already at a disadvantage. In what follows, I will refer to this 
reply to the double jeopardy kind of objection as the does-not-always-apply reply.  
I do not think that we should accept the does-not-always-apply reply for two 
reasons. First, the relationship between counting indirect benefits and making 
someone worse off than she already is, on the basis that she is already worse off, does 
not have to be necessary to be worth examining. But, second, and more importantly, I 





jeopardy. Understanding each of these concepts might highlight that some cases of 
double jeopardy may be worse than others.  
Let’s  begin by noting that Harris’ notion of double jeopardy involves a 
combination of factors that results in an injustice.91 On the one hand, there is the 
misfortune that the candidate for the scarce lifesaving treatment suffers: she is in an 
accident that leaves her paraplegic and thereby with a lower expected quality of life. 
On the other hand, there is the kind of allocation scheme in place: in this case, the 
QALY measure, which generates an allocation recommendation on the basis of the 
candidate’s expected quality of life. When combined, these factors result in an 
injustice: the candidate who is paraplegic is now denied equal consideration for a 
lifesaving treatment on the basis of her expected quality of life—an expected quality 
of life that was the result of misfortune. In other words, not only is this candidate in 
an accident that leaves her with a lower expected quality of life, but now because she 
is in an accident that leaves her with a lower expected quality of life, she receives 
lower consideration for the scarce lifesaving treatment. According to this 
understanding of double jeopardy, then, one injustice occurs: the accident victim is 
denied equal consideration for a lifesaving treatment. 
                                               
91 It’s worth keeping in mind that Harris thinks that such a policy would be unjust because it 
would fail to give equal weight to the interests if each person, failing to account for “the root 
of democratic theory and of most conceptions of justice: that each person is as morally 






But there is a second, stronger sense of double jeopardy—or so I believe. 
Suppose we had to save either a person whose back was broken by an attacker and 
who, if saved, would live with paraplegia, or some other person who, if saved, would 
make a perfect recovery. Suppose, further, that each candidate would live another 
forty years if saved. In this case, the QALY system would seem to generate a reason 
for giving the attack victim lower priority, as she would generate fewer QALYs 
(since she would live the same number of years as the other candidate, but with a 
lower quality of life). This case, like the accident case above, also involves a 
combination of factors that results in an injustice. One factor is that as a result of 
being attacked, this candidate is left with paraplegia and thereby with a lower 
expected quality of life. The other factor is that there is a certain kind of allocation 
scheme in place: the QALY measure, which generates an allocation recommendation 
on the basis of the candidate’s lower expected quality of life. When combined, these 
factors result in an injustice just like in the case above: the attack victim is denied 
equal consideration for a lifesaving treatment on the grounds that she was attacked 
and left with a lower expected quality of life. 
But note that while the attack case and the accident case are similar in that 
both bring about an injustice (i.e., both candidates are denied equal consideration for 
a lifesaving drug), there is an important difference between these candidates: whereas 
it is unfortunate that the accident victim is left paraplegic and thereby with a lower 
expected quality of life, it is not merely unfortunate that the attack victim is left 
paraplegic and thereby with a lower expected quality of life. Accidents are 





accident victim receives lower consideration for the lifesaving drug as a result of a 
prior misfortune, the attack victim receives lower consideration for the lifesaving 
drug as a result of a prior injustice. Thus, insofar as the QALY system makes priority 
recommendations based on an individual’s expected quality of life, it puts the 
accident victim in double jeopardy in a weak sense, and it puts the attack victim in 
double jeopardy in a strong sense. In other words, the QALY system brings about an 
injustice for the accident victim but brings about additional injustice—or, equally, 
compounds injustice—for the attack victim.  
Now, does this mean that disfavoring the attack victim (i.e., putting her in 
strong double jeopardy) is worse than disfavoring the accident victim (i.e., putting her 
in weak double jeopardy) if resources are scarce and not all can be saved? One might 
not think so. After all, in these examples the allocating agent or entity does not seem 
to have anything to do with the misfortune that the accident victim previously 
suffered or with the injustice that the attack victim previously suffered. In fact, it is 
precisely because no wronging occurs in the accident case that that is a case of weak 
double jeopardy. Thus, one might think that even if one grants that the QALY system 
brings about an injustice for both the accident victim and the attack victim (insofar as 
both get a lower priority score based on their expected quality of life), one can still 
hold that it is not the place of an allocating entity to try to remedy past misfortune or 
injustice—especially if the allocating entity is not the same entity that brought about 
such misfortune or injustice.  
So far so good. But imagine a case in which the allocating entity is the same 





based. To be more precise, imagine, for example, that in the case of the attack victim, 
the entity that makes an allocation decision based on the attack victim’s expected 
quality of life is the same entity that attacked the victim in the first place. In other 
words, in the case we are imagining now, the allocating entity makes an allocation 
decision based on the attack victim’s expected quality of life, but it is the allocating 
entity itself that brought about the attack victim’s lower expected quality of life (i.e., 
by attacking the victim).  
Now, would it be worse for the allocating entity to disfavor the attack victim 
in this scenario than it would be for it to disfavor the accident victim, whose lower 
expected quality of life was the result of mere misfortune? I believe so. While the 
accident victim is wronged once by the allocating entity—insofar as she does not 
receive equal consideration for the lifesaving drug—the attack victim is wronged 
twice by the allocating entity: first, she is attacked by this entity and left with 
paraplegia and thereby with a poor expected quality of life, and then because of this 
attack, she does not receive equal consideration for the lifesaving drug. Put 
differently, the accident victim is put in weak double jeopardy: she suffers an 
injustice based on a prior misfortune; but the attack victim is put in strong double 
jeopardy: she suffers an injustice on the basis of a prior injustice. In other words, the 
allocating entity brings about an injustice for the accident victim, but it compounds 
the injustices that the attack victim suffers; it wrongs the attack victim a second time 
on the basis of having already wronged her. Consequently, strong double jeopardy 





What does this suggest for the topic of this paper—namely, the idea that 
indirect benefits such as social contribution should count in scarce resource 
allocation? I believe that it suggests that an allocation scheme that counted indirect 
benefits such as economic contribution and thereby put certain individuals in double 
jeopardy in the weak sense would be morally objectionable, but that it would be 
worse if such a policy put certain individuals in double jeopardy in the strong sense 
when the agent who brings about the second injustice is the same agent that brought 
about the first injustice, which is the basis for the second injustice. In the next section, 
I offer a concrete, real-world case in support of this claim.  
To sum up this section, then, one way in which one might object to the 
consequentialist argument that indirect benefits such as social contribution should 
count when allocating scarce, lifesaving resources is by appealing to Harris’ double 
jeopardy objection to the use of the QALY measure. But there are two concepts of 
‘double jeopardy’ that are relevant when determining how bad a certain allocation 
scheme would be. There is a weak sense of double jeopardy, according to which an 
allocation policy may bring about injustice, and a strong sense of double jeopardy, 
according to which an allocation policy may compound injustice. The latter would 
seem to be worse if the entity that brings about the second injustice is the same entity 
that brings about the first injustice. 
3. The contemporary U.S.: When counting indirect benefits compounds injustice 
There are various ways in which indirect benefits such as social contribution might 
figure in an allocation scheme: they may be taken as the sole factor, as one of several 





section is threefold. First, I offer a concrete case in support of the idea that an 
allocation scheme that counted indirect benefits such as social contribution—whether 
as the sole factor, as one of several factors, or as a kind of tiebreaker—would, in the 
contemporary U.S., be morally objectionable because it would put certain social 
groups, e.g., in terms of race, in weak double jeopardy.92 Next, I argue that there is 
reason to believe that such an allocation scheme would, in the contemporary U.S., put 
blacks in strong double jeopardy. Ultimately, the claim I seek to defend is that, in the 
contemporary U.S., an allocation scheme that put black Americans in strong double 
jeopardy would be worse than one that put them in weak double jeopardy because the 
allocating entity would seem to be the same entity that brought about an original 
injustice on which it bases its allocation decision.  
To these ends, I will assume that whether we are concerned with societal 
wellbeing or with economic growth, social contribution can be gauged in terms of 
                                               
92 Notice that there is a question of whether or not compounding injustice might be justified if 
overall health benefit is maximized. For instance, one might think that compounding injustice 
would be justified if the overall health benefit in terms of number of lives saved increases. 
Properly addressing this suggestion is a project for another time, but for a discussion of this 
idea with regard to the use of kidney vouchers, see Kerstein (2017). Note, though, that while 
Kerstein considers the permissibility of potentially exacerbating inequalities by using kidney 
vouchers, the relevant point for this paper is whether a policy that counted indirect benefits 





economic contribution.93 This assumption is not uncontroversial; it circumvents the 
difficult question of what constitutes an appropriate measure of a society’s 
wellbeing.94 Nevertheless, I think it is at least plausible that a society’s wellbeing 
goes hand in hand with its higher standard of living, and that a higher standard of 
living goes hand in hand with economic growth, such that counting economic 
contribution—whether in terms of past contribution, future contribution, or both—
would be a plausible way to gauge social contribution, or indirect societal benefit.95 
                                               
93 For one proposal in which social usefulness might make a difference, see Persad, 
Wertheimer and Emanuel (2009). 
94 For instance, is an appropriate measure of a society’s wellbeing its economic power? The 
Human Development Index? The Quality of Life Index? Moreover, it is not at all obvious 
that the higher a person’s salary or purchasing power, the more socially useful she is. One 
might think, for instance, that someone who is more likely to increase her society’s wellbeing 
is more socially useful. For example, a preschool teacher might have a lot more social worth 
than an investment banker; but if all we consider in order to determine social usefulness are 
economic factors, we might deem the banker to be more socially useful than the teacher. 
95 Further evidence of how counting economic benefit might make a difference in the real 
world, see Du Toit and Millum (2016), who write: “For example, in a joint news release from 
the World Health Organization (WHO), ‘Stop TB Partnership, and the World Bank,’ Dr. 
Margaret Chan, Director-General of the WHO, is quoted saying: ‘[t]here were already 
compelling reasons to fight TB, which causes massive human suffering. Now, as a further 
incentive, there are strong indications that investment in meeting the Millennium 





Several factors may be indicative of economic contribution. The U.S. Bureau 
of Labor’s report on the characteristics of the labor force offers some relevant 
information with respect to such factors (U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics 2017). For 
example, according to the 2016 report, over 90 percent of whites, blacks, and Asians 
age 25 and older who were part of the labor force were reported to have at least a high 
school diploma, compared to only 72 percent of Hispanics.96 These statistics are 
useful for our purposes because, according to the same report, individuals who have 
higher levels of education are generally more likely to be employed in higher-paying 
jobs than are individuals who have lower levels of education.97 Moreover, level of 
education for all of these groups is also directly related to employability, such that the 
higher the level of education, the greater the likelihood of employment and the lower 
the likelihood of unemployment.98 The report thus offers enough information for at 
least four possible ways of measuring economic contribution: (1) educational 
attainment (insofar as it correlates with higher salaries), (2) occupation (insofar as the 
report sorts occupations into higher- and lower-paying categories), (3) wages (as 
indicative of purchasing power), and (4) employment status (also as indicative of 
                                               
96 Moreover, 60 percent of Asians but only 38 percent of whites, 27 percent of blacks, and 19 
percent of Hispanics in the labor force had a bachelor’s degree or higher. 
97 Even so, blacks and Hispanics generally had lower earning when compared with whites 
and Asians at nearly all educational levels. 
98 Although according to this report the relation between employability and level of education 
was true of every group, blacks and Hispanics were still more likely to be unemployed than 





purchasing power). As we will soon see, however, whites and Asians fare better 
across all of these characteristics than blacks and Hispanics. This suggests that a 
scarce, lifesaving resource allocation scheme that counted economic contribution and 
took these factors as indicative of it would likely have the effect of giving higher 
priority to whites and Asians than to blacks and Hispanics. Moreover, note that these 
characteristics, insofar as they represent patterns across educational attainment, 
occupation, wage, and employment status, could be taken to be indicative of both past 
and future or expected economic contribution. 
Consider educational attainment first. Because Hispanics are less likely than 
whites, blacks, and Asians to have a high school diploma, an allocation scheme that 
measured (past or future) economic contribution in terms of, e.g., ‘educational 
attainment above a high school diploma,’ would give lower priority to Hispanics.  
Consider ‘occupation’ next. According to the report, the majority of Asians 
were employed in the highest paying category, and only one-third of blacks and one-
fifth of Hispanics were employed in the same category.99 Moreover, 2 out of 5 blacks 
and Hispanics were employed in the lowest-paying category, but only, approximately, 
                                               
99 To be more precise, while 51 percent of Asians were employed in the highest-paying major 
occupational category, ‘management, professional, and related occupations,’ 39 percent of 
whites, 30 percent of blacks, and only 21 percent of Hispanics were employed in the same 






1 out of 4 whites and Asians were employed in the same category.100 Thus, if we were 
to allocate scarce, lifesaving resources by measuring economic contribution in terms 
of ‘occupation,’ giving priority to the highest-paying category, the report suggests, we 
would likely give lower priority to blacks and Hispanics, and higher priority to whites 
and Asians.  
A similar trend follows if we take ‘wages’ as indicative of economic 
contribution. The same report indicates that blacks and Hispanics generally had lower 
earnings when compared with whites and Asians at nearly all education levels, and at 
nearly all the different occupation categories. Only three—of twenty-two—
occupations listed blacks or Hispanics as having higher wages than either whites or 
Asians.101 This suggests that on an allocation scheme that took ‘wages’ as an 
                                               
100 To be more precise, 41 percent of blacks and 42 percent of Hispanics were employed in 
the categories of ‘service’ or ‘production, transportation, and material moving’—the two 
categories reported to have the lowest weekly earnings of full-time wages and salaries—
compared to 27 percent of whites and 27 percent of Asians. Service occupations had the 
lowest weekly earnings of full-time wages and salaries (total median of $505, although lower 
for blacks and Hispanics, at $483 and $454 respectively); and ‘production, transportation, and 
material-moving’ occupations had the second-lowest weekly earnings of full-time wages and 
salaries (total median of $642, although lower for blacks and Hispanics, at $597 and $540 
respectively). 
101 In ‘protective service occupations,’ average wages for Hispanics were higher than they 
were for Asians, but lower than they were for whites; in ‘farming, fishing, and forestry 





indicator of economic contribution, blacks and Hispanics would again be likely to 
receive lower priority than whites and Asians. 
Finally, consider ‘employment status.’ Although, according to the same 
report, the total unemployment rate was 6.2, the unemployment rates for whites and 
Asians were lower than this average (5.3 and 5.0, respectively), but higher for blacks 
(11.3—that is, almost twice the total!) and Hispanics (7.4). In fact, the unemployment 
rate for whites has been lower than that of Hispanics, which has been lower than that 
of blacks, since 1973. In short, according to the report, blacks and Hispanics were 
more likely to be unemployed than were whites and Asians. This suggests that an 
allocation scheme that measured economic contribution in terms of ‘employment 
status’ would again be likely to give lower priority to blacks and Hispanics than to 
whites and Asians. 
In short, any one of these ways of measuring economic contribution—that is, 
educational attainment, occupation, wages, and employment status—would likely 
have the effect of giving lower consideration to blacks and Hispanics, and higher 
consideration to whites and Asians. In other words, since blacks and Hispanics are 
already at a disadvantage, a policy that counted economic productivity would seem to 
put them in a kind of double jeopardy, at least in the weak sense. To clarify, since 
blacks and Hispanics are already at a disadvantage across all of the different work 
force characteristics that might be relevant for gauging economic contribution, and 
                                               
but lower than they were for Asians; and in ‘production occupations,’ wages for blacks were 





since such a policy would generate an allocation recommendation based on economic 
contribution, what would result is that blacks and Hispanics would likely be presented 
with an injustice: they would likely be denied equal consideration for a lifesaving 
drug. 
Now, I believe that blacks and Hispanics are not individually responsible for 
having lower scores across all of these workforce characteristics and assume so in 
what follows. Thus, the question I wish to consider is whether or not their lower 
scores across all of these work force characteristics are the result of injustice. If they 
are, then a policy that counted economic contribution in these ways would put blacks 
and Hispanics in double jeopardy in the strong sense, since it would deny them equal 
consideration for a scarce, lifesaving resource on the basis of a prior injustice. 
Moreover, as I will argue, putting blacks in strong double jeopardy would seem to be 
worse than putting them in weak double jeopardy because the allocating entity would 
seem to be the same entity that brought about the injustices on which the allocation 
injustice is based.  
To see why one might think that an allocation policy that counted economic 
contribution would bring about an injustice to blacks that is based on a prior 
injustice—not on a prior misfortune—it’s important to consider the history of the 
concept of ‘race’ in the U.S. In what follows, I will focus only on the two main racial 





racial minority in the U.S.).102 Although a similar case can be made about other 
nonwhite groups in the U.S.—e.g., about Hispanics and Native Americans—an 
overview of that history is beyond the scope of this paper. 
 The concept of ‘race’ as it is understood today arguably emerged with the 
Atlantic slave trade and the financial need to produce cotton, tobacco, rice, and sugar 
(Fields 1990). ‘Race’ was at that time understood as a biological characteristic that 
was essential, inherited, and unchanging, thus serving to classify human beings into 
subgroups—that is, racial groups (Blum 2002, Shelby 2002). As a biological 
characteristic, race was also taken to determine the physical, mental, and moral 
capabilities of the individual members of each racial group, such that the groups 
could be ranked in a hierarchy, with those with light skin at the top, and those with 
dark skin at the bottom (Blum 2002, James 2017, Shelby 2002). Understood this way, 
‘race’ arguably served as a justification for the subordination and exploitation of 
nonwhites, which, in turn, made possible the production of cotton, tobacco, rice, and 
sugar (Blum 2002, James 2017, Shelby 2002). 
                                               
102 According to the U.S. Census Bureau, whites (not including Hispanics) make up 60.7% of 
the U.S. population and blacks make up 13.4%. Racial minorities in the U.S. include the 
following categories: Asian (5.8%), American Indian and Alaskan Native (1.3%), Native 
Hawaiian and Other Pacific Islander (0.2%). According to this report, Hispanics, who may be 






But this ideological understanding of race was arguably sustained over the 
centuries in part as a result of slavery, and later Jim Crow—laws that existed until just 
fifty years ago (Shelby 2002).103 For example, in the U.S., the military wasn’t 
integrated until 1948; segregation in public schools wasn’t deemed unconstitutional 
until Brown v. Board of Education in 1954; voter suppression wasn’t deemed illegal 
until the Voting Rights Act of 1965; and discrimination in housing wasn’t deemed 
illegal until the Fair Housing Act of 1968. Even today, when scientists and scholars 
tend to agree that race does not have a biological basis, there is reason to believe that 
the ideological understanding of race continues to influence the politics, race 
relations, and economic conditions of the U.S.104 The disparities reported by the U.S. 
Bureau of Labor, discussed above, are arguably just some of the ways in which this 
ideology continues to influence the social conditions of the U.S. Evidence also 
                                               
103 I here adopt Shelby’s use of ‘ideology,’ which, as he explains, is a Marxist understanding 
of ‘ideology.’ As I understand it, ‘ideology’ in the Marxist sense is a system of beliefs that 
shape how we perceive or make sense of the world, and which is produced, stabilized, 
maintained, and reproduced by the historical, economic and material conditions of society 
(which seem to include a ruling class that benefits from the ideology). If this is right, then to 
understand ‘race’ as an ideology is to understand it as a set of beliefs that emerges from and 
is maintained by the historical, economic and material conditions of society (e.g., the 
production of cotton, tobacco, etc.), and which serves to make sense of the world. See 
(Shelby 2002) and Fields (1990). 
104 See, for example, Kaplan and Winther (2014), Haslanger (2008), Glasgow (2006), Appiah 





suggests that black Americans have higher rates of poverty and incarceration, as well 
as lower rates of access to healthcare, than white Americans.105  
Thus, while African Americans historically have been and currently are 
generally worse off than whites in the contemporary U.S., these inequalities are not 
inevitable. In other words, they are not the result of some innate or biological factor, 
as the original concept of race would have us believe; they are historical and socially 
                                               
105 In terms of health, consider that according to the Center for Disease Control and 
Prevention HIV/AIDS has been a leading cause of death among young, black, adult women 
for more than a decade. See Shrage (2017). Shrage theorizes that there is a relationship 
between the very high HIV/AIDS rates among African Americans and their very high rates of 
incarceration. Specifically, she argues that that there is a kind of vicious cycle that occurs 
between the low amount of health resources and the high rates of legal punishment in African 
American communities, and the poor living conditions in U.S. prisons, which include very 
high rates of HIV infection, sexual and physical violence, and a mentally unhealthy 
environment. As Shrage puts it, “When a particular community or ethnic group is subject to 
both legal and extrajudicial punishment at a higher rate, because of a criminal justice system 
that racially profiles this group, imposes ‘zero tolerance’ sentencing … for nonviolent drug 
offenses not imposed on other groups, which then makes a considerable percentage of this 
group ineligible to vote and serve on juries… this amounts to political and social persecution” 
(at p. 455). For the purposes of this paper, we need not agree with Shrage that this amounts to 
“political and social persecution”; all I am trying to suggest here is that these disparities exist 
today in part as a result of the role that racist ideology has played in the social conditions of 





controllable. Moreover, given the history of the U.S. and the role that racist ideology 
has played in it, it is reasonable to believe that the disparities that we find between 
blacks and whites today are the result of unjust social, legal, and economic patterns 
that were ratified by governmental institutions.106  
If this is right, then counting economic contribution in scarce resource 
allocation would not only put blacks in double jeopardy in the weak sense—that is, 
by giving them lower consideration for a scarce, lifesaving resource; it would also 
likely put them in double jeopardy in the strong sense, as it would likely compound 
                                               
106 These continued disparities have been theorized to be at least partly the result of bias and 
stereotyping. For interesting discussions of how bias and stereotyping may play a role in 
employment status and the like, see Young (2001) and Anderson (2010). It’s worth noting 
that research suggests that social and economic conditions can have an effect even on 
people’s risk of illness, for instance, by causing long-term stress (Wilkinson and Marmot 
2003). According to this research, psychosocial factors affect physical health by “raising the 
heart rate, mobilizing stored energy, diverting blood to muscles and increasing alertness,” 
which, when maintained for extended periods of times, make people “more vulnerable to a 
wide range of conditions including infections, diabetes, high blood pressure, heart attack, 
stroke, depression and aggression” (Wilkinson and Marmot 2003). See also Marmot (2015) 
and The World Health Organization (2017). According to the latter, higher income has been 
linked to good health, and lower education and lack of employment have been linked to “poor 
health, more stress and lower self-confidence.” It would not be unreasonable to suppose that 
blacks and Hispanics or other individuals who belong to disadvantaged groups may generally 





the injustices that they already face.107 In other words, blacks already have lower 
scores than whites across all of the characteristics that one might reasonably appeal to 
in order to gauge economic contribution. And these lower scores are arguably the 
result of injustice insofar as they are the result of an unjust social and legal order. On 
an allocation scheme that counted such factors, then, blacks would be wronged a 
second time on the basis of a prior injustice they would have suffered: they would be 
denied equal consideration for a scarce, lifesaving resource on the basis of unjustly 
faring poorly across the various ways one might reasonably take to be indicative of 
economic contribution. 
I take it that many of us would agree that a concern with justice suggests that, 
all things considered, past wrongs should be ameliorated, or at the very least not 
compounded, so a scarce resource allocation scheme that put certain groups of people 
in double jeopardy in this strong sense would be gravely unjust. But the key question 
is this: Would it be worse if a policy that counted economic contribution put blacks in 
double jeopardy in the strong sense than it would be if it put blacks in double 
jeopardy only in the weak sense?  
                                               
107 Now, an opponent might say that while it may be unfortunate that blacks fare worse across 
all of the characteristics one might reasonable take to be indicative of economic contribution, 
it is not unjust. But I think that many of us would agree that, given the U.S.’s history of 
(social legal, and economic) mistreatment of blacks, that blacks continue to perform poorly 





I think it would be if the agent who brings about the second injustice is the 
same agent who brings about the first injustice, on which this second injustice is 
based. And, in the case of blacks in the contemporary U.S., the allocating entity—that 
is, a governmental institution—would seem to be the same entity that ratified the 
prior injustices that blacks already face (i.e., an unjust social order that gave rise to 
blacks’ lower scores across all the various work force characteristics).  
To clarify, imagine that the reason that blacks performed poorly today across 
all of the various measures one might take to be indicative of economic contribution 
was not an unjust social order, but rather sheer misfortune. An allocation scheme that 
counted economic contribution in such a case would, it would be reasonable to 
believe, give higher priority to whites than to blacks, thereby putting blacks in a kind 
of double jeopardy. But such a policy would not, in this imaginary case, put blacks in 
strong double jeopardy. The disadvantage that blacks face is not, in this imaginary 
case, the result of an injustice; rather, it is the result of misfortune. In the real case, 
however, the disadvantage that blacks face is the result of an injustice—an injustice 
that is brought about by the same entity that brings about the second injustice. Thus, 
in the imaginary case, the reason that blacks are at a prior disadvantage across all of 
the relevant economic contribution factors is not an injustice; it is just misfortune. 
But, in the real case, the reason that blacks are at a prior disadvantage is an unjust 
social order that the allocating agency itself brought about. A policy that counted 
economic contribution and put blacks in strong double jeopardy would thus seem to 
be worse; it would bring about not one, but two injustices to blacks: the second based 





Let me sum up this section. Examining the social conditions of the 
contemporary U.S. suggests that an allocation scheme that counted economic 
contribution in terms of educational attainment, wages, occupation, and employment 
status, would, in the contemporary U.S., likely give lower consideration to blacks and 
Hispanics than to whites and Asians, insofar as blacks and Hispanics fare poorly 
across all of these characteristics. Such an allocation scheme would thus seem to put 
blacks and Hispanics in double jeopardy in the weak sense. But, given that the U.S. 
has a long history of unjust mistreatment of blacks, there is reason to think that such 
an allocation scheme would also put blacks in double jeopardy in the strong sense—
that is, it would compound the injustices that blacks face. Since the allocating entity 
would, in this case, seem to be the same entity that brought about the original 
injustice on which the second injustice is based, a policy that put blacks in double 
jeopardy in a strong sense seems worse than a policy that put blacks in double 
jeopardy in a weak sense. 
4. Objections 
A number of objections might be raised to the idea that a policy that counted indirect 
benefits in the form of economic contribution would, in the contemporary U.S., put 
blacks in double jeopardy in the strong sense. An obvious objection is that such a 
policy would not be doubly unjust to blacks because blacks are not worse off than 
whites across economic contribution factors as a result of injustice. For instance, such 
critics might assert that blacks are morally responsible for not informing themselves 





part because of the impact of the concept of race discussed in the previous section, I 
believe that these criticisms are unsuccessful, and assume so in this article. 
Nevertheless, the opponent might ask: even if blacks’ lower scores across 
potential economic contribution measures were the result of unjust social, legal, and 
economic patterns, if our resources are limited and we cannot save everyone, is it 
really unfair or unjust to give lower priority to saving the lives of those who would be 
less likely to contribute to economic growth?108 After all, no matter what, someone 
will die, and saving those who would be less likely to contribute to economic growth 
would lead to worse consequences for society than saving those who would be more 
likely to contribute to economic growth. Put differently, the objection would seem to 
be that while blacks may have been subject to a prior injustice, it is not the place of an 
allocation scheme to rectify that injustice. It is the place of an allocation scheme to be 
forward-looking and bring about the best outcomes. Blacks may have suffered quite a 
bit as a result of having lower scores on all measures of economic contribution under 
discussion, but “[n]othing can be done about past suffering, whereas (often) 
something can be done about present and future suffering” (Singer, et al. 1995). 
Choosing to save those who would contribute to society would maximize the amount 
of future suffering we can prevent. Indirect benefits—e.g., in the form of economic 
contribution—should count. 
                                               
108 See Singer et al. (1995). Although Singer et al. do not ask this specific question, they 
suggest it, in the context on the QALY measure, when they ask if it is really unfair to 





But, while maximizing the amount of future suffering we can prevent is surely 
important, the point here is not that allocation schemes must be retrospective and 
compensate people for past suffering. The point is simply that a concern with justice 
suggests that disadvantage should be ameliorated, or at the very least not worsened—
especially if such disadvantage is unjust, and especially if such disadvantage was 
brought about by the same entity that seeks to allocate resources in a fair way.  
Another rejoinder to the idea that an allocation policy that counted economic 
contribution would, in the contemporary U.S., put blacks in double jeopardy in the 
strong sense is a form of the does-not-always-apply-reply, discussed in Section 2. The 
idea would be that while it may be true that counting economic contribution in the 
contemporary U.S. may sometimes lead to compounding injustice, this wouldn’t 
always be the case. Suppose we had to choose between two individuals to give our 
last lifesaving drug: one who had a very high income, the other who had a very low 
income. If the former were white and the latter were black, taking ‘wages’ into 
account as an indicator of economic contribution may well compound injustice. But if 
it turns out that the person with the higher income is black and the person with the 
lower income is white, then giving priority to the one with the higher income would 
not compound injustice. Thus, counting indirect benefits—here in the form of 
‘wages’ as an indicator of economic contribution—would not, even in the 
contemporary U.S., always lead to compounding injustice. 
In response to this objection, let me highlight again that this point amounts to 
the idea that there is no reason not to count economic contribution because doing so 





counting economic contribution and compounding injustice is not necessary does not 
mean that it’s not worth considering. Even if prioritizing by economic contribution 
would benefit blacks in some cases, the data show that, typically, it would not do so. 
In other words, even if an allocation scheme that counted economic contribution 
would not compound injustice in all cases, there is reason to believe that in the 
contemporary U.S. it would be likely to do so. 
An opponent may further note that just because there are practical worries 
with a method for counting economic contribution as indicative of indirect benefit 
does not mean that counting economic contribution is wrong in itself.109 That is, in an 
ideal society in which there were no correlations between race and various factors 
indicative of economic contribution, we would not, in virtue of counting economic 
contribution, face the problem of compounding injustice. Indirect benefits such as 
economic contribution should count. 
But, while it may be true that in an ideal society we would not face the 
problem of putting some people in double jeopardy in the strong sense, it may also be 
true that in an ideal society I could leave my laptop unattended at the airport while I 
go grab some coffee, and that my laptop would be there every time when I returned. 
Alas, we don’t live in such a society, and given the way people and societies work I 
have no reason to think that my laptop will always be there when I return; so, I err on 
the side of caution and either take my laptop with me or just skip the coffee. 
Similarly, we don’t live in an ideal society. In our society, as a result of prior social 
                                               





and legal patterns, benefits and burdens are not distributed equally, and greater 
economic contribution accrues with benefits, putting those who are generally less able 
to contribute economically as a result of injustice at an even further disadvantage. 
There is thus no reason to think that we should count economic contribution in the 
ways I’ve described it here just because doing so is not in principle wrong. 
Another objection to the idea that a policy that counted economic contribution 
would put blacks in strong double jeopardy may be that having a rule according to 
which we ought to take economic contribution into account only among people who 
have not already suffered a relevant injustice would prevent or diminish the 
likelihood of compounding injustice. Suppose we had to choose between two white 
male graduates of a prestigious university, neither of whom belongs to a group that 
has historically faced prior economic injustice—that is, in terms of educational 
attainment, wages, occupation, or employment status. Suppose, further, that the only 
difference between these candidates is their likelihood to contribute to the economy: 
while both have jobs that are predicted to create a constant rate of new jobs for the 
next twenty-five years, the predicted job-creation rate of one of these individuals 
happens to be slightly higher than the other’s. In this case, choosing the individual 
who is more likely to contribute more to the economy, the objection would go, would 
not compound injustice (because neither candidate has already suffered a relevant 
injustice). But it would lead to better consequences (given the higher predicted job-
creation rate of one of the candidates). The objection that counting economic 
contribution would be likely to compound injustice would thus not apply to this case; 





This point is not really an objection. It amounts to the idea that it would be 
permissible to count economic contribution so long as it did not compound 
injustice—a point that seems to implicitly accept the badness of counting economic 
contribution if it compounds injustice. Nonetheless, it’s worth noting a practical 
worry with the suggestion of having a rule according to which economic contribution 
would not play a role if it were likely to compound injustice. And that is: How, 
exactly, would prior injustice be measured? For instance, would it suffice that a 
candidate belongs to a group that has a history of unjust disadvantage? If so, how 
would we proceed in cases in which an individual belongs to a historically 
disadvantaged group but has never suffered a disadvantage? Giving that individual 
priority would seem to constitute a case of unfair or unjust advantage. Similarly, how 
would we proceed in cases where an individual who belongs to historically 
advantaged group has faced various unjust disadvantages in his life? Giving this 
individual priority would constitute a case of unfair disadvantage. Of course, these 
worries aren’t decisive against this proposal, but they do question the promise of its 
implementation. 
Finally, an opponent may note that while it may be true that counting 
economic contribution when allocating scarce lifesaving resources would amount to 
compounding injustice against some blacks, it does not follow that it would amount to 
compounding injustice against this group as a whole. Instead, allocating resources 
based on economic contribution might actually benefit this group as a whole. Imagine 
we could save either a patient who is not very likely to contribute to the economy and 





further, that the reason the white patient is more likely to contribute to the economy is 
that he is a very dedicated counselor at a predominantly black and Hispanic, inner-
city school, where he has helped a large percentage of high school seniors get into 
good universities, receive scholarships, and eventually obtain high-paying jobs. A 
policy that counted economic contribution in terms of, for example, ‘ability to help 
inner city children who belong to historically disadvantaged groups,’ would actually 
make blacks (and Hispanics) better off as a whole. In other words, although such a 
policy may initially seem to compound injustice (i.e., the black patient does not 
obtain the resource), it would not compound injustice in terms of blacks as a group; 
rather, it would seem to ameliorate the prior injustice that blacks are likely to have 
faced, as there would presumably be higher rates of blacks and Hispanics attending 
college and obtaining higher-paying jobs—factors that, according to most measures 
of wellbeing, go hand in hand with a better quality of life. In short, the idea would 
seem to be that in this case prioritizing the white counselor does not at the group level 
compound injustice; rather, it ameliorates it.  
But this point, too, is short of an objection. The policy it describes measures 
economic productivity in terms of ‘ability to help inner city children who belong to 
historically disadvantaged groups’—not in terms of any of the factors that I appealed 
to as indicative of economic contribution, across which blacks (and Hispanics) fare 
poorly. This policy is thus by definition aimed at avoiding compounding injustice; it 
thus implicitly acknowledges the moral significance of putting someone in double 
jeopardy in the strong sense. Nevertheless, this case also raises various worries. First, 





contribution would measure it in terms of ‘ability to help inner city children who 
belong to historically disadvantaged groups.’ And even if it did, practical worries 
would arise. For instance, how, exactly, would such an ability be measured? Would it 
suffice for an individual to be, e.g., a counselor, a teacher, or a nurse at an inner-city 
school? Would awards for community service at minority-group events do the trick? 
These questions aren’t decisive against this possibility, but they do highlight that 
implementing it does not seem a promising task.  
In short, even if counting economic contribution is not necessarily or in 
principle wrong, there are reasons for being wary of counting it: in the contemporary 
U.S., counting it would likely compound the injustices that blacks already face. 
Moreover, although there may be ways to count indirect benefits, including economic 
contribution, that would avoid compounding injustice, implementing such policies 
does not seem promising. 
5. Implications 
Recall the accident victim and the attack victim from Section 2. The idea was that on 
the QALY system, both would receive lower consideration for a lifesaving drug on 
the basis of their prior disadvantage: i.e., on the basis that they are paraplegic and 
thereby have a lower expected quality of life than the individuals who would make a 
full recovery. What I argued in that section is that the QALY system would seem to 
put the accident victim in weak double jeopardy, since it would deny her equal 
consideration for a lifesaving drug on the basis of a prior unfortunate disadvantage. 
But in the case of the attack victim, I argued, the QALY system would seem to put 





a lifesaving drug on the basis of a prior unjust disadvantage. One question that I was 
after in that section was whether it would really be worse for an allocation scheme to 
disfavor an attack victim than it would be for it to disfavor an accident victim. And I 
suggested that, setting aside issues about quantifying health states, it did seem worse 
for an allocation scheme to disfavor the attack victim than it did for it to disfavor the 
accident victim if the allocating entity was the same entity that brought about the 
original injustice on which the second injustice was based. In support of this idea, we 
imagined a case in which it was the allocating entity that attacked the attack victim, 
thereby leaving her with a poor quality of life. The idea was that this would be worse 
than a case in which the allocating entity brought about only once injustice to the 
victim. I now want to examine this idea in more detail, for I think that at least in the 
case of people with disabilities as a group, there is reason to think that the pre-
existing disadvantages that they face are the result of an unjust legal, social, political, 
and economic patterns, and not of misfortune. Specifically, the question I want to 
examine is: Does an allocating entity that uses the QALY measure really bring about 
only one injustice for an individual such as the accident victim, or does it compound 
the injustices that such an individual faces? 
In answering this question, it’s important to note that today, there is a near 
consensus among disability rights theorists that how we perceive an individual’s 
‘disability’ will depend to a great extent not only the disability’s impact on her health, 
but also on physical, social and attitudinal factors (Bickenbach 2016). On this “social 
model” of disability, the idea is that ‘disability’ is conceptually linked to an 





impairment there is no disability”; but it is not conceptually linked to the 
individual’s quality of life (Bickenbach 2016). An individual’s quality of life will 
depend not just on the impact of the disability on her health state, but also, at least 
in part, on physical, social, and attitudinal factors. 
Notice, though, that people with certain disabilities, much like blacks in the 
U.S., have historically faced unjust mistreatment. Not long ago, appropriate public 
accommodations for people with disabilities were not legally required in the U.S., 
which made it very difficult for people with certain disabilities to obtain a public 
education and get to work, among other things. It thus does not seem unreasonable to 
think that the more general lack of environmental resources that (certain) people with 
disabilities encounter today and which reduce their quality of life is, at least in part, 
the result of prior unjust social, political, legal and attitudinal patterns that have been 
ratified by governmental institutions. What I mean to suggest is that it may be that 
much like the ideological understanding of ‘race’ as a biological concept, which 
arguably continues to influence the politics, race relations, and economic conditions 
of the U.S., an ideological understanding of ‘disability’ as a characteristic that is 
entirely responsible for an individual’s quality of life may have shaped past and 
present environmental conditions for people with disabilities.110  
                                               
110 If this is right, then to understand ‘disability’ as an ideology would be to understand it as a 
set of beliefs that emerges from and is maintained by the historical, economic and material 





The idea is, then, that while people with certain disabilities have historically 
been at a disadvantage, these disadvantages are not entirely inevitable, since they are, 
at least in part, environmentally controllable. But if this is right, then in the accident 
case above, it’s not clear that the QALY measure brings about only one injustice for 
the accident victim. Rather, it seems reasonable to believe that the accident’s victim’s 
expected quality of life is lower than the individual who would make a full recovery’s 
as a result of unjust environmental conditions: i.e., a lack of resources that would 
have generated a higher quality of life score for the accident victim (on a system like 
the QALY measure). And if this is right, then it would not be clear that the attack 
victim’s prior (unjust) disadvantage is any worse than the accident victim’s prior 
(unfortunate) disadvantage, as in both cases that prior disadvantage is in part the 
result of unjust environmental conditions which, had they been just, could have 
increased those individuals’ expected quality of life. Thus, when the QALY system 
gives lower priority to people with certain disabilities because they have a lower 
expected quality of life—a quality of life that is lower because there is a lack of 
environmental resources that could have increased it—it may, after all, be putting 
them in double jeopardy in the strong sense, as it would deny them equal 
consideration for a lifesaving drug on the basis that they were already subjected to a 
prior injustice. In short, it may be that an allocating entity that uses the QALY system 
puts people with certain disabilities in strong double jeopardy regardless of whether 





6. Concluding remarks  
To sum up, while bioethicists tend to agree that counting indirect benefits such as 
social contribution when resources are scarce and not all can be saved is morally 
objectionable, the arguments for this view are surprisingly weak. As I argued, 
however, a policy that counted indirect benefits such as social contribution might put 
certain individuals in a kind of double jeopardy. But ‘double jeopardy’ can be 
understood in a weak sense, according to which an allocation scheme may bring 
about injustice, and in a strong sense, according to which an allocation scheme may 
compound injustice. In the contemporary U.S., for example, a policy that counted 
indirect benefits, e.g., in terms of economic contribution, would likely put black 
Americans in strong double jeopardy. This, I argued, would be worse than if such an 
allocation policy were to put black Americans in weak double jeopardy. This is 
because the allocating entity would seem to be the same entity that brought about the 
original injustice on which the second injustice is based. This does not mean that 
putting someone in double jeopardy in the weak sense would not be bad. All it means 
is that putting someone in double jeopardy in the strong sense seems worse if the 
agent that compounds injustice is the same agent that brought about the original 
injustice. A lot more needs to be said about how to understand prior injustice, but I 
hope to have shown at the very least that an allocation policy that puts people in 










Alexander, Shana. 1977. "They Decide Who Lives, Who Dies." In Ethical Issues in 
Medicine, by Robert Hunt and John Arras. Palo Alto, CA: Mayfield 
Publishing Co. 
Anderson, Elizabeth. 2010. The Imperative of Integration. Princeton, N.J: Princeton 
University Press. 
Appiah, Anthony. 1990. ""But Would That Still Be Me?" Notes on Gender, "Race." 
Ethnicity, as Sources of "Identity"." The Journal of Philosophy 87 (10): 493-
499. https://www.jstor.org/stable/2026866. 
Asch, Adrienne. 2003. "Disability equality and prenatal testing: contradictory or 
compatible." Florida State University Law Review 30 (2): 315-42. 
Asch, Adrienne. 2000. "Why I haven't changed my mind about prenatal diagnosis: 
reflections and refinements." In Prenatal Testing and Disability Rights, by 
Erik Parens and Adrienne Asch, 234-258. Washington, DC: Georgetown 
University Press. 
Asch, Adrienne, and David Wasserman. 2015. "Reproductive Testing for Disability." 
In The Routledge Companion to Bioethics, by J D Assas, E Fenton and R 
Kukla, 417-432. New York: Routledge. 
Austin, John Langshaw. 1962. How to Do Things with Words. Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press. 





Baily, Mary Ann. 2000. "Why I Had Amniocentesis." In Prenatal Testing and 
Disability Rights, by Erik Parens and Adrienne Asch, 64–71. Washington, 
DC: Georgetown University Press. 
Basson, Marc D. 1979. "Choosing among Candidates for Scarce Medical Resources." 
Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 4 (3): 313-333. 
Basu, Rima. 2019. "What we epistemically owe to each other." Philosophical Studies 
1-17. 
Basu, Rima, and Mark Schroeder. 2019. "Doxastic wronging." In Pragmatic 
Encroachment in Epistemology, by Brian Kim and Matthew McGrath, 181-
205. Routledge. 
Bickenbach, Jerome. 2016. "Disability and Health Care Rationing." Edited by 
Edward N Zalta. The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. 
https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2016/entries/disability-care-rationing/. 
Blum, Lawrence. 2002. “I’m not a racist but…”: The moral quandary of race. Ithaca: 
Cornell University Press. 
Bognar, Greg. 2008. "Well-being and health." Health Care Analysis 16: 97–113. 
Brock, Dan. 2003. "Separate Spheres and Indirect Benefits." Cost Effectiveness and 
Resource Allocation 1 (4). 
Broome, John. 1994. "Fairness versus doing the most good." The Hastings Center 
Report 24: 36–39. 
Buchanan, Allen. 1996. "Choosing who will be disabled: Genetic intervention and the 





Burns, Kelly. 2014. "Minimizing and Managing Microaggressions in the Philosophy 
Classroom." Teaching Philosophy 37 (3). 
Campbell, Bradley, and Jason Manning. 2014. "Microaggression and Moral 
Cultures." Comparative Sociology 13 (6): 692-726. 
Carruthers, Peter. 2011. The Opacity of Mind: An Integrative Theory of Self-
Knowledge. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Darwall, Stephen. 1977. "Two kinds of respect." Ethics 88: 36–49. 
DeGrazia, David. 2012. Creation Ethics: Reproduction, Genetics, and Quality of Life. 
Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Du Toit, Jessica, and Joseph Millum. 2016. "Are Indirect Benefits Relevant to Health 
Care Allocation Decisions?" Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 41 (5): 540–
557. doi:10.1093/jmp/jhw018. 
Edwards, S D. 2004. "Disability, identity and the ‘expressivist objection’." Journal of 
Medical Ethics 30 (4): 418-420. 
Eggleton, Ian, Sue Roberston, Ryan Justine, and Ralph Kober. 1999. "The impact of 
employment on the quality of life of people with an intellectual disability." 
Journal of Vocational Rehabilitation 13: 95–107. 
Fields, Barbara Jeanne. 1990. "Slavery, race, and ideology in the United States of 
America." New Left Review 95-118. 







Fricker, Miranda. 2007. Epistemic Injustice: Power and the Ethics of Knowing. 
Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Glasgow, Joshua. 2006. "A Third Way in the Race Debate." The Journal of Political 
Philosophy 14 (2): 163-185. 
Glover, Jonathan. 2008. Choosing Children: Genes, Disability, and Design. Oxford: 
Oxford University Press. 
Green, Emma. 2016. "When doctors refuse to treat LGBT patients." The Atlantic, 
April 19. https://www.theatlantic.com/health/archive/2016/04/medical-
religious-exemptions-doctors-therapists-mississippi-tennessee/478797/. 
Grice, Herbert Paul . 1989. "Logic and Conversation." In Studies in the Way of 
Words, by H P Grice, 22–40. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. 
Grice, Herbert Paul . 1957. "Meaning." The Philosophical Review 66: 377-388. 
Haidt, Jonathan. 2017. "The Unwisest Idea on Campus: Commentary on Lilienfeld." 
Perspectives on Psychological Science 12 (1): 176-177. 
Haidt, Jonathan, and Lee Jussim. 2016. "Hard Truths About Race on Campus." The 
Wall Street Journal .  
Hare, Richard Mervyn. 1952. The Language of Morals. Oxford: Clarendon Press. 
Harris, John. 1987. "QALYfying the value of life." Journal of Medical Ethics 13: 
117-123. 
—. 1985. The Value of Life: An Introduction to Medical Ethics. London: Routledge. 
Haslanger, Sally. 2008. "A Social Constructionist Analysis of Race." Revisitng Race 





Heil, Emily. 2018. "ABC cancels ‘Roseanne’ after its star, Roseanne Barr, went on a 





Hellman, Deborah. 2008. When is discrimination wrong? Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press. 
Hofmann, Bjørn . 2017. "‘You are inferior!’ Revisiting the expressivist argument." 
Bioethics 31: 505-514. 
Holm, Soren. 2008. "The expressivist objection to prenatal diagnosis: Can it be laid to 
rest?" Journal of Medical Ethics 234 (1): 24-25. 
James, Michael. 2017. "Race." Edited by Edward N Zalta. The Stanford Encyclopedia 
of Philosophy. https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2017/entries/race/. 
Kamm, Frances M. 1993. Morality, Mortality. Volume 1: Death and Whom to Save 
From It? . Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Kaplan, Jonathan Michael, and Rasmus Grønfeldt Winther. 2014. "Realism, 
Antirealism, and Conventionalism about Race." Philosophy of Science 
(Philosophy of Science , Vol. 81, No. 5 (December 2014), pp. 1039-1052) 81 
(5): 1039-1052. https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.1086/678314. 
Keller, Johannes. 2005. "In genes we trust: The biological component of 
psychological essentialism and its relationship to mechanisms of motivated 





Kerstein, Samuel J. 2017. "Kidney Vouchers and Inequity in Transplantation." 
Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 42 (5): 559-574. 
doi:10.1093/jmp/jhx020. 
Kneski, Laura. 2013. University of South Florida News: Choose A Better Word. April 
2. Accessed September 10, 2018. 
http://news.usf.edu/article/templates/?z=38&a=5326. 
Kukla, Rebecca, and Katherine Wayne. 2018. "Pregnancy, Birth, and Medicine." The 
Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Edited by Edward N Zalta. 
https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2018/entries/ ethics-pregnancy/. 
Lassiter, C. 2012. "Implicating without intending on the Gricean account of 
implicature." Empedocles: European Journal for the Philosophy of 
Communication 4 (2): 199-215. 
Leonhardt , David, and Ian Prasad Philbrick. 2018. "Donald Trump’s Racism: The 
Definitive List." New York Times, January 15. 
https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2018/01/15/opinion/leonhardt-trump-
racist.html. 
Leslie, Sarah Jane. 2014. "Carving up the social world with generics." Oxford Studies 
in Experimental Philosophy 1: 208-232. 
Lilienfeld, Scott O. 2017. "Microaggressions: Strong Claims, Inadequate Evidence." 
Perspectives on Psychological Science 12 (4): 138-169. 
Lippert-Rasmussen, Kasper, and Sigurd Lauridsen. 2010. "Justice and the allocation 
of healthcare resources: should indirect, non-health effects count?" Medicine, 





Lukianoff, Greg, and Jonathan Haidt. 2015. "The Coddling of the American Mind." 
The Atlantic.  
Marmot, Michael. 2015. The Health Gap: The Challenge of an Unequal World. 
London: Bloomsbury. 
Matthews, T J, D C Allain, A L Matthews, A Mitchell, S L Santoro, and L Cohen. 
2018. "An assessment of health, social, communication, and daily living skills 
of adults with Down syndrome." American Journal of Medical Genetics 
1389–1397. 
Mattoni, Alejandra. 2017. "The hardest part of getting my tubes tied was making 
doctors take me seriously." Broadly, July 31. 
https://broadly.vice.com/en_us/article/xwzexq/the-hardest-part-of-getting-my-
tubes-tied-was-making-doctors-take-me-seriously. 
McMahan, Jeff. 2005. "Preventing the existence of people with disabilities." In 
Quality of Life and Human Difference: Genetic Testing, Heath Care, and 
Disability, by David Wasserman, Jerome Bickenbach and Robert Wachbroit, 
142–171. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
McTernan, Emily. 2017. "Microaggressions, Equality and Social Practices." The 
Journal of Political Philosophy. doi:10.1111/jopp.12150. 
Mill, John Stuart. 1861. Utilitarianism. London: Fraser's Magazine. 
Moller, Dan. 2011. "Abortion and moral risk." Philosophy 86: 425-443. 






Nelson, James L. 1998. "The meaning of the act: Reflections on the expressive force 
of reproductive decision making and policies." Kennedy Institute of Ethics 
Journal 8 (2): 165-182. 
Parens, Erik, and Adrienne Asch. 2000. "The Disability Critique of Prenatal Genetic 
Testing: Reflection and Recommendations." In Prenatal Testing and 
Disability Rights, by Erik Parens and Adrienne Asch, 3-43. Washington, DC: 
Georgetown University Press. 
Parfit, Derek. 1997. "Equality and Priority." Ratio.  
Persad, Govind, Alan Wertheimer, and Ezekiel Emanuel. 2009. "Principles for 
allocation of scarce medical interventions." Lancet 373: 423-31. 
Pierce, Chester. 1970. "Black Psychiatry One Year After Miami." Journal of the 
National Medical Association 62: 471-473. 
Reinders, Hans. 2000. The future of the disabled in liberal society: An ethical 
analysis. University of Notre Dame Press. 
Rescher, Nicholas. 1969. "The Allocation of Exotic Medical Lifesaving Therapy." 
Ethics 79: 173-86. 
Rini, Regina. 2015. "Microaggression; macro harm." LA Times, October 12. 
https://www.latimes.com/opinion/op-ed/la-oe-1012-rini-microaggression-
solidarity-20151012-story.html. 







Rogers, Stephanie E, Angela D Thrasher, Yinghui Miao, W John Boscardin, and 
Alexander K Smith. 2015. "Discrimination in healthcare settings is associated 
with disability in older adults: Health and retirement study, 2008–2012." 
Journal of General Internal Medicine 30: 1413–20. 
Saxton, Marsha. 1997. "Disability rights and selective abortion." In Abortion Wars, 
by R (ed.) Solinger, 374-395. Berkeley: University of California Press. 
Scheiber, Noam, and Rachel Abrams. 2018. "Can Training Eliminate Biases? 
Starbucks Will Test the Thesis." New York Times, April 18. 
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/04/18/business/starbucks-racial-bias-
training.html. 
Schroeder, Mark. 2018. "When beliefs wrong." Philosophical Topics 46 (1): 115-127. 
Scott, Rosamund. 2005. "Prenatal testing, reproductive autonomy, and disability 
interests." Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics 14: 65–82. 
Searle, John. 1969. Speech Acts: An Essay in the Philosophy of Language. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Sesardic, Neven. 2010. "Race: A Social Destruction of a Biological Concept." 
Biology & Philosophy 25: 143-162. doi:10.1007/s10539-009-9193-7. 
Shakespeare, Tom. 2006. Disability Rights and Wrongs. London: Routledge. 
Shatin, Leo. 1966. "Medical Care and the Social Worth of a Man." American Journal 
of Orthopsychiatry 36: 96-101. 






Shrage, Laurie. 2017. "Race, Health Disparities, Incarceration, and Structural 
Inequality." In The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy and Race, by Naomi 
Zack. 
Skenazy, Lenore, and Jonathan Haidt. 2017. "The Fragile Generation." Reason: Free 
Minds and Free Markets, December. https://reason.com/2017/10/26/the-
fragile-generation. 
Sloper, P, and S Turner. 1996. "Progress in social-independent functioning of young 
people with Down's syndrome." Journal of Intellectual Disability Research 
40: 39-48. 
Sue, Derald Wing. 2017. "Microaggressions and ‘Evidence’: Empirical or 
Experiential Reality." Perspective on Psychological Science 12 (1): 170-172. 
Sue, Derald Wing, Christina M Capodilupo, Gina C Torino, Jennifer M Bucceri, 
Aisha M.B. Holder, Kevin L Nadal, and Marta Esquilin. 2007. "Racial 
Microaggressions in Everyday Life: Implications for Clinical Practice." 
American Psychologist 62 (4): 271-286. 
Sue, Derald Wing, Christina M Capodilupo, Gina C Torino, Jennifer M Bucceri, 
Aisha M.B. Holder, Kevin L Nadal, and Marta Esquilin. 2007. "Racial 
Microaggressions in Everyday Life: Implications for Clinical Practice." 
American Psychologist 62 (4): 271-286. 
Taylor, Peter. 2011. "Rehabilitating a Biological Notion of Race? A Response to 






Tello, Monique. 2017. "Racism and discrimination in health care: Providers and 
patients." Harvard Health Blog, January 16. 
https://www.health.harvard.edu/blog/racism-discrimination-health-care-
providers-patients-2017011611015. 
The World Health Organization. 2017. "Health Impact Assessment (HIA): The 
determinants of health." 
Tschaepe, Mark. 2016. "Addressing Microaggressions and Epistemic Injustice: 
Flourishing from the Work of Audre Lorde." Essays in the Philosophy of 
Humanism 24 (1): 87–101. 
University of Maryland, Division of Student Affairs. 2014. University of Maryland, 
Division of Student Affairs. Accessed October 15, 2018. 
https://dsa.umd.edu/events/itooammaryland-responses-to-racial-
microaggressions. 
U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics. 2017. "Labor force characteristics by race and 
ethnicity, 2016." Report 1070. https://www.bls.gov/opub/reports/race-and-
ethnicity/2016/home.htm. 
U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Centers for Disease Control and 
Prevention. 2013. "CDC Health Disparities and Inequalities Report — United 
States, 2013." https://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/pdf/other/su6203.pdf. 
Wilkinson, Richard, and Michael Marmot. 2003. Social Determinants of Health: The 
Solid Facts, 2nd Edition. . WHO Library Cataloguing in Publication Data. 
Williams, Thomas D. 2018. "Calling America ‘Land of Opportunity’ Is a 







Wolf, Jonathan, and Avner de-Shalit. 2007. Disadvantage. New York: Oxford 
Unviersity Press. 
Young, Iris Marion. 2001. "Equality of Whom? Social Groups and Judgments of 
Injustice." Journal of Political Philosophy 9: 1-18. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
157 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
158 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
